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AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY


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Subscribers to the Journal are invited to submit nominations for the best article published during 1990, together with a supporting statement, to Mr. J. G. Goellner, Director; The Johns Hopkins University Press; 701 West 40th Street; Baltimore, MD 21211. Nominations should be received within six weeks from the publication of this issue and will be referred for consideration to the judges, who will also make their own nominations and whose decision will be final.

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AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

APOLLO AS A MODEL FOR ACHILLES IN THE *ILIAD*

Commentators have long noted the ring-compositional effects that link the opening and closing of the *Iliad*.¹ For example, in Book 1, an old man, Chryses, the priest of Apollo, comes with gifts to the camp of the Achaeans in order to ransom his daughter. There he is rebuffed and dishonored by Agamemnon. This theme is repeated in Book 24 when another old man, Priam, the King of Troy, appears in the Achaean camp with gifts to ransom the corpse of his son. However, he is respected and obtains his wish. Similarly, Thetis' visit to Zeus in Book 1 arouses Hera to anger (1.536–43), but her later appearance on Olympus in Book 24 moves the goddess to a show of concern (24.101–2). To some degree, then, Book 24 achieves the effect of providing a fitting close to the *Iliad* by echoing the poem's beginning and sometimes also enacting satisfying and successful conclusions to stereotypical situations that went awry in Book 1. In this paper, I will argue that Achilles' victorious achievement in Book 24 is conveyed at least in part by the poet as the successful, if perhaps unconscious or even unintended, emulation of a precedent for the proper termination of wrath provided by the god Apollo in Book 1.²

Throughout the *Iliad*'s scenes of battle, Apollo and Achilles are implacable enemies. As a defender of Troy, the god slaps Patroclus,

¹For echoes of Book 1 in Book 24, cf. C. W. Macleod, *Homer. Iliad XXIV* (Cambridge 1982) 32–35. The best study of the ring-compositional structure of the *Iliad* remains: Cedric H. Whitman, *Homer and the Heroic Tradition* (New York 1958) 253–84. Also, cf. M. Davies, "The Judgement of Paris and *Iliad* XXIV," *JHS* 101 (1981) 56–62. In this essay, all citations from the *Iliad* employ the text of David B. Monro and Thomas W. Allen (Oxford 1920).³

²Achilles' interior consciousness and motives are extremely difficult to make out. In the manner characteristic of oral composition, the poet concentrates rather upon what is said and done: cf. Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy* (London 1982) 135.

wearing Achilles' armor, and becomes the cause of his death (16.788–92). Later, Apollo diverts Achilles from his slaughter of the Trojans, allowing many the opportunity to escape within the city's walls (22.1–20), a trick to which Achilles responds with a wish for revenge (22.20). Later still, as Hector prophesies at his death, Achilles will be slain by Paris and Apollo outside the gates of Troy (22.358–60). How are we to explain the origin and intensity of this hostility?

As a number of scholars have recently maintained, some of the major heroes and heroines of the Homeric epics live in constant danger from the very gods to the perfection of whose physical and mental attributes they most closely approximate, albeit in imperfect, human fashion.³ For any mortal, excellence (ἀρετή) possessed and exercised to a superlative degree may be construed as a form of *hubris* from the divine perspective. Hence, Apollo provides the appropriate warning for Achilles to remember his mortality (22.8–13): even outside the *Iliad* the two were often portrayed in strikingly similar fashion.⁴ Thus both Achilles and Hector, the former preeminent in wrath and the latter renowned for his (usual) good sense, will be slain by their divine counterparts, Apollo and Athena.⁵ There is substance, then, to the threat of Aphrodite that her love might turn easily to a hate that would direct the anger of both Achaeans and Trojans against Helen, her favorite (3.414–17). In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus just manages to escape the anger of Athena when he, the cleverest of mortals, contends in a game of wits with the cleverest of the gods.⁶ In a similar vein, I will argue here that the wrath of Achilles may be understood not only in origin but even in its final outcome as a magnification of the wrath of Apollo, his bitterest enemy. Parallels between their wraths are emphasized throughout Book 1. Moreover, the reconciliation of Achilles and Priam in Book 24 takes place in the familiar pattern of ring-composition as a doublet of the reconciliation of Apollo and the Achaeans in Book 1.

As the theme of the *Iliad*, the wrath (μῆτιν, 1.1) of Achilles is appropriately mentioned first in the poem, but its derivation from the

³Cf. Gregory Nagy, *The Best of the Achaeans. Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Baltimore 1979) 144, and Jenny Strauss Clay, *The Wrath of Athena. Gods and Men in the Odyssey* (Princeton 1983) 181.

⁴Cf. Walter Burkert, "Apellai und Apollon," *Rheinisches Museum* 118 (1975) 19, who calls Achilles "fast ein Doppelgänger" of Apollo. Also, cf. Nagy (note 3 above) 143.

⁵Cf. Nagy (note 3 above) 142–50.

⁶Cf. Clay (note 3 above) 186–212.

wrath of Apollo is referred to immediately thereafter (1.8–10).⁷ Indeed, Apollo's anger generates as effect an image of itself much closer to the original than Achilles himself realizes.⁸ Both in narration and speech the poet stresses in a multitude of ways the similarities of status, wrath, and destructive power attending the god and the man placed ambiguously between the divine and the human realms.⁹ Some readers, aware of the tendency of the oral, formulaic art to generate verbal echoes, will perhaps be unimpressed by the parallels found here among the events of Book 1, and even more skeptical about the significance of echoes sounding between Books 1 and 24.¹⁰ However, I think that these parallels reflect the immense power of the principles of self-organization inherent in the oral tradition. There is abundant evidence that Apollo and Achilles are linked in an elaborate pattern of ring-composition uniting the opening and the closing of the *Iliad*.

Apollo and Achilles both exercise the power of divine anger,¹¹ directed at the same target (Agamemnon) and for the same cause (the theft of a woman). The wrath of Apollo, aroused by the prayer of the old priest Chryses, is described first. Spurned by Agamemnon in his supplication for the return of a daughter, Chryses invokes the god in a string of lengthy epithets (1.37–39). But first the poet identifies him as the son of fair-haired Leto in a line of significance not only for the immediate context but also, as we will see below, anticipatory of the god's final intervention in Book 24:

⁷ Aristoxenus said that some texts of the *Iliad* began with the verses:

ἔσπετε νῦν μοι, Μοῦσαι, 'Ολύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
ὅπως δὴ μῆνίς τε χόλος θ' ἔλε Πηλείωνα
Λητοῦς τ' ἀγλαὸν υἱόν· ὁ γὰρ βασιλῆϊ χολωθεῖς

Cf. G. S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary. Volume I: Books 1–4* (Cambridge 1985) 52. However inept as a substitute for the more common prologue, these verses nicely isolate and connect the wraths of Apollo and Achilles.

⁸Cf. Robert J. Rabel, "Chryses and the Opening of the *Iliad*," *AJP* 109 (1988) 473–81.

⁹Cf. James M. Redfield, "The Proem of the *Iliad*: Homer's Art," *CP* 74 (1979) 98.

¹⁰For example, Macleod, Whitman, and Davies (note 1 above) find great significance in the echoes between Books 1 and 24. G. S. Kirk (note 7 above) passim tends to be skeptical of such connections. Mark W. Edwards, "Convention and Individuality in *Iliad* 1," *HSCP* 84 (1980) 27–28, leaves such aesthetic choices to the individual reader.

¹¹*Menis* is, properly speaking, the anger of a god: cf. C. Watkins, "A propos de ΜΗΝΙΣ," *Bull. Soc. Ling. de Paris* 72 (1977) 187–209; also, cf. Redfield (note 9 above) 97.

Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι, τὸν ἡὔκομος τέκε Λητώ· (1.36)

In the immediate context, the poet here suggests the imminent danger that awaits the entire Achaean army. The mortal enemy of the king is about to be erased and replaced by a more powerful foe: against Lord Agamemnon, the son of Atreus (Ἀτρεΐδης τε ἄναξ, 1.7), rises up the figure of Lord Apollo (Ἀπόλλωνι ἄνακτι, 1.36), the offspring of a goddess.¹² In a scene which he will reprise at the end of the epic in the pattern of ring-composition, Apollo, angry at heart (χωόμενος κῆρ, 1.44) for his priest, a father seeking a daughter's return, aims the shafts of his golden bow (ἄργυρέοιο βιοῖο, 1.49) at the Achaeans for nine days (ἐννῆμαρ, 1.53). Thus he forces on the tenth day (τῇ δεκάτῃ, 1.54) the assembly which will isolate Achilles from his comrades. On the twelfth day following (δωδεκάτῃ, 1.425) Zeus will intervene directly in the poem, assenting to Achilles' prayer for revenge. (The recurrence of the images and significant numbers in the *exemplum* of Niobe in Book 24 will be discussed below.)

The devastating effects of the plague which Apollo sends against the Achaeans to punish Agamemnon are termed λοιγός (1.67, 97, 456), a metaphorical extension into the field of disease and health of a word otherwise applied to the ravages of warfare.¹³ This mild catachresis of a common combat term has an effect that is simple and pointed; the poet wishes to foreshadow the destructive power of Achilles' coming wrath, the effects of which are repeatedly called λοιγός (1.341, 13.426, 15.736 *et passim*) in accordance with more standard usage.¹⁴ The cessation of one λοιγός, arising from the unequal struggle of a mortal king with the son of a goddess, results in a second such episode. Agamemnon, however, who himself refers to the divine origins of Achilles' power (1.178), does not grasp the irony of his dilemma: to propitiate the son of Leto he angers the son of Thetis.¹⁵

Agamemnon dispatches two embassies in Book 1, the first across the sea to Apollo and the second to the tent of Achilles. The poet's technique here seems especially artful. A simple, consecutive narration of these two embassies would have served merely to emphasize that Apollo's wrath was the cause of Achilles' wrath. Instead, the poet in-

¹²Cf. J. T. Kakridis, *Homer Revisited* (Lund 1971) 128–29.

¹³Cf. Daniel R. Blickman, "The Role of the Plague in the *Iliad*," *CA* 6 (1987) 2.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵As scholiast bt points out on lines 182–84, Agamemnon ranks himself as intermediate in power between Apollo and Achilles.

serts his description of the second embassy into the first. He separates the preparations for the voyage of Odysseus to Chryse (1.308–18) from the arrival and unsaying of Apollo's wrath (1.430–87), placing between them the story of the abduction of Briseis and the beginning of Achilles' wrath (1.318–430). These three episodes, linked at their points of contact through integral enjambement (cf. . . . οὐδ' Ἀγαμέμνων, 1.318; . . . αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεύς, 1.430), thus form a seamless web of incident, and the resulting synthesis provides ironic commentary on Agamemnon's blunder, equating what the king viewed as in every way incommensurable. For Agamemnon, acknowledging new respect for Apollo and his priest, first appoints Odysseus leader of the embassy of reconciliation for the return of Chryseis (1.308–12). Then, as if to emphasize the discrepancy in rank, he sends two heralds, men of humbler station, to remove Briseis from the tent of Achilles (1.326). Furthermore, in the familiar pattern of ring-composition discussed above, the immediate juxtaposition of the beginning of the wrath of Achilles and the conclusion of the wrath of Apollo provides a foretaste of the conclusion of the *Iliad* at its very beginning. Through his narration of Agamemnon's first embassy (to Apollo), the poet makes an initial, paradigmatic statement in Book 1 of the stages of ceremony necessary to resolve a cycle of wrath-devastation (μῆνις-λοιγός). A repetition of these same ceremonies in Priam's embassy to Achilles in Book 24 may then properly signal the final end of Achilles' wrath and of the poem itself.¹⁶

While his first embassy sails, Agamemnon orders a purification of the army and the offering of initial hecatombs to Apollo (1.315–17). These ceremonies are described only in the tersest fashion as if the poet, like the king, were impelled to haste by the press of war-time conditions. The embassy's voyage and successful conclusion are conveyed in highly formulaic language that is more characteristic of the *Odyssey* than of the *Iliad* (1.430–87). For example, all of the details of arrival in the harbor at Chryse (1.433–36) recur frequently in the descriptions of the later adventures of Odysseus after the Trojan War.¹⁷ There are several possible explanations for this anomaly. First and most

¹⁶In his analysis of the *Iliad's* ring-compositional structure, Whitman (note 1 above) 259–60, balances the journey of Odysseus to Chryse in Book 1 with the journey of Priam to Achilles in Book 24, but argues that otherwise the two scenes have little in common. I will show below that the two match as formal conclusions to the poem's minor and major statements of the theme of wrath.

¹⁷Cf. Kirk (note 7 above) 98–104, who charts in detail the frequency of Odyssean language.

obviously, seafaring occurs more often in the *Odyssey* than in the *Iliad*. Secondly, the figure of Odysseus himself may act as a magnet for the attraction of Odyssean terminology, either from the *Odyssey* itself or from the tradition then in the process of shaping the poem.¹⁸ Finally, I suggest that a high incidence of Odyssean terminology may be the poet's way of marking peace and a cessation of war-time hostilities. The plausibility of this suggestion increases when we note a similar density of Odyssean echoes throughout Book 24, which is likewise the concluding movement of a cycle of μῆνις-λοιγός.

For its very abundance of language from the *Odyssey* and for a perceived irrelevance to the plot of the *Iliad*, earlier critics such as Lachmann and Leaf dismissed the whole narrative of Odysseus' embassy to Chryse (1.430–87).¹⁹ (They thought that the *Iliad* would be much improved by joining line 493 directly to line 429.) Such a charge of irrelevance can be easily dismissed. For the satisfaction of both Apollo and the Achaeans, an end to the plague's devastation must be formally agreed upon and ratified in ritual and ceremony. The conclusion of the plague and of Apollo's wrath is accomplished by the poet through a sequence of four conventional type-scenes, which we will observe also in Book 24 at the conclusion of Achilles' wrath.

Upon the arrival of the embassy, Chryses, Odysseus, and his crew stage in the first of these type-scenes a carefully elaborate sacrifice to Apollo (1.447–67), the longest description in the *Iliad* of this important ritual, surpassed in length in the Homeric corpus only by the sacrifice of Nestor, in the company of the recently arrived Telemachus, in Book 3 of the *Odyssey*.²⁰ The meal following the sacrifice, the second type-scene, is only perfunctorily described (1.468–71), perhaps because the god, a major participant in the reconciliation, cannot by the rules of the *Iliad* be present.²¹ After dinner, the heroes of the *Iliad* normally engage in conversation, as in the lengthy colloquy in Book 9 (9.225–655). Here, however, in a fine adjustment of material to circumstance and degrees of

¹⁸Cf. Pietro Pucci, *Odysseus Polutropos. Intertextual Readings in the Odyssey and the Iliad* (Ithaca 1987) 41.

¹⁹Cf. Walter Leaf, *The Iliad* v. I (London 1900)² 1–2.

²⁰Cf. Kirk (note 7 above) 100–101.

²¹As Hermes later says to Priam:

νεμεσσητὸν δέ κεν εἴη
ἄθάνατον θεὸν ὧδε βροτοῦς ἀγαπαζέμεν ἄντην.

(24.463–64)

status, the poet in the third type-scene substitutes for the normal after-dinner conversation of mortals the performance by the Achaeans of a paean and a dance in honor of Apollo (1.472–74),²² whose response is pleasure (τέρεπτε', 1.474) and an implied assent to their request for an end of the plague. However, the god's delight in the Achaeans will only be temporary; he remains their enemy throughout the *Iliad*. In the final type-scene of what will emerge as a paradigmatic episode of reconciliation, the Achaeans spend the night in Chryse, sleeping by the stern-cables of their ship (1.475–76). The poet concludes his account of the wrath of Apollo in the description of the following dawn, employing a common Odyssean formula that will not recur in the *Iliad* until the conclusion of the wrath of Achilles and of the poem:

ἦμος δ' ἠριγένεια φάνη ἑοδοδάκτυλος Ἥώς. . . . (1.477 = 24.788)²³

The full complexity of Homeric parallelism in the ring-compositional structure of Books 1 and 24 only emerges when we note that Achilles' final reconciliation with Priam in Book 24 is also but a brief, personal interlude within the broader context of the Trojan War. In other words, μῆνις, the most violent and destructive of all emotions in the Homeric world, flares up and abates in its major manifestations within a framework of stabler, longer-lasting enmities that remain completely unresolved at the end of the poem.²⁴ Book 24 opens with a

²²Cf. Edwards (note 10 above) 21–22.

²³Cf. Kirk (note 7 above) 103–4, who sees no significant relation between these two unique occurrences in the *Iliad* of the common Odyssean formula. He believes that the embassy to Chryse and Book 24 share Odyssean phraseology only because of their similar content. Yet Homer's employment of Odyssean expressions—especially in Book 24 of the *Iliad*—often extends to the minutest detail (cf. *Iliad* 24.333 and *Odyssey* 5.28, for example) and seems to be a product of conscious artistic choice. For an extensive analysis of the massive catalogue of Odyssean expressions in *Iliad* 24, cf. Karl Reinhardt, *Die Ilias und ihr Dichter* (Göttingen 1961) 469–505.

²⁴There is little evidence in the text of the *Iliad* to support the thesis of Hesychius (s.v. μῆνιμα), Aristarchus (cf. *De Aristarchi Studiis Homericis*, ed. K. Lehrs [Leipzig 1882]³ 133), and Eustathius (cf. *Eustathii Commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem* [Leipzig 1827] 8, 14f.) that μῆνις is a long-lasting *pathos*. They were probably misled by their derivation of the word from the verb μένειν. The wraths of both Apollo and Achilles are resolved in the course of the poem. Though Menelaus at one point ties the impending destruction of Troy to the μῆνις of Zeus (13.624) and the poet speaks in simile of the μῆνις of god destroying a city (21.523), the passage that most emphatically looks forward to the destruction of Troy (24.25–30, discussed in detail by Davies [note 1 above]) employs the verb

description of Achilles, still in the throes of his anger, attempting to mutilate the body of Hector (24.3–18) in the face of Apollo's protection of the corpse (24.18–21). The two continue for the present in the state of mutual enmity that characterized their relationship through so much of the poem. Thereupon, Apollo opens an assembly of the gods with a speech that sets in motion the concluding acts of the poem (24.33–54), a keynote address that should remind us of his role as the sender of plague in Book 1.²⁵ There the god's *deeds* and the angry intensity of his μῆνις were both catalyst and prefigurement of the μῆνις of Achilles. Here, his *words* and attitude of calm detachment function once again at a critical juncture as a cause, persuading Zeus' final intervention in the poem and the dispatching of Thetis to Achilles (24.74–76); in addition they furnish a second paradigm to which his human counterpart may conform. Now, Apollo commends the example of a mortal (τις, 24.46) who relents in the face of loss, remembering that the Fates have placed in man a patient and enduring heart (τλητὸν . . . θυμόν, 24.49). He censures Achilles, on the other hand, for a lack of pity (ἔλεον, 24.44) and of shame (αἰδώς, 24.44). Later when he appears in Achilles' hut, Priam appeals to the very emotions that Apollo earlier found wanting in the hero (cf. αἰδέοιο θεούς, Ἀχιλεῦ, αὐτόν τ' ἔλεησον, 24.503). Achilles' response, beginning with ἄνσχεο in line 549, shows that he has learned Apollo's lesson well.²⁶

The reconciliation of Apollo and the Achaeans in Book 1 foreshadows that of Achilles and Priam in Book 24. Agamemnon's orders to Odysseus were twofold: to return Chryseis to her father and to propitiate Apollo with sacrifice (1.442–45). The first half of this double mission was accomplished swiftly and without suspense; the father joyfully accepted the return of his child (1.446–47), allowing the poet to dwell in greater detail upon the sequence of rituals, expressed in type-scenes, that won over the god and brought an end to his μῆνις. This emphasis is

ἀπῆχθετο, which Homer may have considered related to the verb ἔχειν ("to continue" [cf. 24.27]) and hence connoting persistence and long duration.

²⁵Cf. James M. Redfield, *Nature and Culture in the Iliad. The Tragedy of Hector* (Chicago 1975) 213: "The appearance of the god [Apollo] in this role—distant from the action rather than part of it—is a sign that the poem is drawing to its conclusion; as the action slackens, the gods disentangle themselves from it."

²⁶So Macleod (note 1 above) 92.

exactly reversed in Book 24. The unhappy transference of child (Hector's corpse) to father (Priam) quite naturally takes place in an awkward and emotionally charged atmosphere of mixed sorrow and anger that twice threatens to erupt into violence (cf. 24.560–70; 583–86). Thereupon, Achilles directs Priam to thoughts of food, recalling the example of Niobe who ate despite the loss of her children to an angry Apollo (Ἀπόλλων . . . χωόμενος, 24.605–6). In this mythologically innovative picture,²⁷ designed by Achilles with paradigmatic intent, the poet recalls for his audience images, motifs, and significant numbers from the theme of the wrath of Apollo in Book 1, thus framing the completed story of Achilles' wrath within two similar vignettes of the god's anger: the plague on the Achaean host in Book 1 and the story of Niobe in Book 24. For once the fair-haired Niobe (ἡῦκομος Νιόβη, 24.602) made the fatal error of likening herself to Leto, the goddess whom she most resembled. (Leto was earlier called "fair-haired" in the passage introducing Apollo's intervention in Book 1 [cf. 1.36]). She claimed that she had given birth to many children and the goddess only two. Apollo, Achilles tells us, aimed the shafts of his golden bow (ἀργυρέοιο βιοῖο, 24.605; cf. 1.49) and, with the aid of his sister Artemis, slew her twelve children (δῶδεκα, 24.603). These lay in death for nine days (ἐννῆμαρ, 24.610)—the length of the plague in Book 1—and the Olympians on the tenth (δεκάτῃ, 24.612) buried them, since Zeus had turned the people to stone (24.611). Certainly, this last detail was invented by the poet in order to explain a problem within the *exemplum* itself: the neglect of the corpses by the neighboring peoples.²⁸ Yet the poet may also have intended to bring the story of Niobe in line with a major motif of Book 1:

²⁷Niobe's dinner seems to have been a Homeric invention. In the striking formulation of J. T. Kakridis, *Homeric Researches* (Lund 1949) 101: "Niobe eats . . . for the simple reason that Priam must eat."

²⁸Cf. M. M. Willcock, "Mythological Paradeigmata in the *Iliad*," *CQ* 58 (1964) 142, and Mabel S. Lang, "Reverberation and Mythology in the *Iliad*," *Approaches to Homer*, ed. Carl A. Rubino and Cynthia W. Shelmerdine (Austin 1983) 143–46. According to Willcock, Homer sometimes invents significant mythological paradigms in accordance with his tradition's tendency to transfer themes from one story to another. Lang, on the other hand, argues that innovation is neither a one-time nor a one-poet operation. Rather, paradigms create parallels in the narrative and narrative demands parallels of the paradigms.

the arbitrariness of human suffering that sometimes results when presumptuous mortals like Niobe, Agamemnon, and, here, Priam dare to challenge the gods.²⁹ Notice also that insofar as Priam, bereft of children, resembles Niobe, Achilles, who has killed so many of them, resembles Apollo within the *exemplum*. Finally, in the four type-scenes that follow immediately, Priam and Achilles achieve through ritual a catharsis of the painful emotions aroused in the transference of Hector's corpse. Furthermore, Achilles completes the movement from *μήνις* to *τέρψις* exemplified by Apollo in Book 1. In the final paradox of the *Iliad*, the hero most closely resembles the divinity when he fully embraces his own humanity.

The poet repeats the same sequence of type-scenes discussed above in Book 1 when Priam and Achilles turn to food and sleep. Both sets are carefully adjusted to context and the status of the participants: divine and human characters in the former, humans only in the latter. Both also share an extraordinarily high density of formulae and language that we normally think of as Odyssean. The type-scene of sacrifice naturally predominates in Book 1 inasmuch as Odysseus must deal with a god. However, in Book 24, our attention after the opening council of the gods gradually becomes focused almost exclusively upon mortals, for Achilles now fully clarifies his earlier ambiguous status betwixt and between the two worlds. Fully rejoining the world of men, he conforms to the paradigm of endurance and measured grief recommended for mortals at the beginning of the book by Apollo, just as he earlier imitated the god himself in the formal pattern of *μήνις*. Accordingly, the type-scene of sacrifice sounds only a minor note at the poem's conclusion; Achilles begins by ritually slaughtering (*σφάζει*, 24.622)³⁰ a white sheep. Thereupon, he and his companions prepare the meal (24.622–26), the consumption of which is only briefly touched upon (24.627–28) in a transition to the two significant type-scenes which follow. As in Book 1, the normal after-dinner conversation between host and guest is precluded,³¹ there by the gulf separating mortal from immortal, here by the displacement of talk onto the earlier lengthy transactions involved

²⁹ Cf. Macleod (note 1 above) 140.

³⁰ The verb *σφάζειν* is used properly of sacrifice, though in Greek after Aeschylus it came to designate any slaughter, especially the cutting of the throat: cf. Froma I. Zeitlin, "The Motif of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*," *TAPA* 96 (1965) n. 13.

³¹ Cf. Edwards (note 10 above) 21–22.

in the return of Hector's corpse. Instead, Priam and Achilles stare in wonder at each other in lines whose stylistic and syntactic parallelism reinforces the position of hard-won equality attained by two mortals through iron-hearted endurance.³²

ἦτοι Δαρδανίδης Πρίαμος θαύμαζ' Ἀχιλλῆα,
 ὅσσοις ἔην οἶος τε θεοῖσι γὰρ ἅντα ἔφκει.
 αὐτὰρ ὁ Δαρδανίδην Πρίαμον θαύμαζεν Ἀχιλλεύς,
 εἰσορόων δ' ἦν τ' ἀγαθὴν καὶ μῦθον ἀκούων. (24.629–32)

Priam and Achilles take pleasure (τέρπησαν, 24.633) in the sight of each other, so that the emotional content of the type-scene recalls the pleasure with which Apollo greeted the after-dinner song of the Achaeans in Book 1 (cf. τέρπετ', 1.474). Once again *mḗniz* dissolves in *τέρπις*, and the macrocosmic theme of wrath repeats the microcosmic. Yet verbal parallelism in the designation of emotions serves all the more to draw attention to the contrasting natures of their objects: the enhancement of his transcendent self enjoyed by a god in the proper worship of inferiors is replaced here by a mortal hero's enjoyment of the reflection of his own iron-hearted endurance in suffering. Finally, the type-scene of spending the night, conveyed in language and formulae that we might identify as typically Odyssean,³³ imparts a fitting sense of closure to the story of a hero who not only discovers but even learns to take enjoyment in the limitations of his mortality, learned in the futile attempt to transcend them in imitation of a god. I think that Seth Benardete has expressed well the complexity of the *Iliad's* meditation on the themes of mortality and immortality:

³² Priam and Achilles alone in the *Iliad* are called "ironhearted": cf. 22.357, 24.205, 24.521.

³³ The type-scene of spending the night has been exhaustively analyzed by David M. Gunn, "Thematic Composition and Homeric Authorship," *HSCP* 75 (1971) 17–22, who shows that Priam's spending the night (24.635–76) follows the pattern of *Odyssey* 4.297–300, 7.336–39, and 7.340. With the exception of Books 1 and 24, this sequence of four type-scenes occurs otherwise in the *Iliad* only in Book 9, where the hope of a timely resolution of Achilles' wrath goes unrealized. Not surprisingly, then, *Iliad* 9 lacks the dense concentration of Odyssean phraseology that we have come to see as characteristic of peace and the end of wrath. Hence, Gunn notes that in its treatment of the theme of spending the night *Iliad* 9 diverges from other instances of that theme (p. 22).

[T]he *Iliad* moves from the apparently higher to the apparently lower, which then comes into sight as something beyond the original distinctions. To clarify that something completely would be to understand the *Iliad*.³⁴

ROBERT J. RABEL

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY

³⁴S. Benardete, "Achilles and the *Iliad*," *Hermes* 91 (1963) 16. I would like to thank Jane E. Phillips for reading and commenting upon an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank the anonymous referee of *AJP* for a number of helpful suggestions.

SOPHOCLES' *ANTIGONE* AND FUNERAL ORATORY

Exposed amid the corpses of his fellow warriors, Polyneices is more than Antigone's brother. He is one of the Seven slain before Thebes. Although scholars have always recognized that fact, they have ill-appreciated its consequences for Sophocles' dramaturgy. Antigone reprises a wondrous deed claimed for Athenians by their orators at public funerals since, at least, the 460s.¹ During the violent decades that preceded *Antigone* (c. 441 B.C.), Athenians were being educated in a revisionist version of the ancient tale of the Theban Dead. Accordingly, the Thebans do not voluntarily relinquish the bodies of the Argives; neither do they give them up to an entreating Theseus.² Their leaders, scorning their obligations to the dead and outraging the customs of the gods, prohibit burial. Athenians are forced on behalf of the dead and the gods to intervene militarily to secure removal and interment.

Sophocles composed his play for an actual audience whose makeup he had come to know through his experience as an Athenian and a dramatist. The backgrounds and experiences individuals brought to the theater that day in late Elaphebolion are irrecoverable. We can posit, however, an audience for whom Sophocles could have composed *Antigone*—one familiar with the elaborations wrought on the Theban Dead myth by funeral orators and tragedians. (Since Athenians probably invented the interdiction of burial, Antigone's resistance is probably also an invention; both are first evidenced by Aeschylus' *Septem*.³) The audience's knowledge of the *epitaphios logos* and earlier tragedies forms the subtext or *sous-entendu* joining Sophocles with his "authorial audience."⁴ That is, the *Antigone* "plays" against a background learned in the Kerameikos as well as in the theater. Our purpose is to

¹For this date and supporting discussion, see Nicole Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, translated by Alan Sheridan (Cambridge [Mass.] 1986) 56–72.

²Voluntarily: Pindar (*O.* 6.15) and Pausanias (1.39). Entretries: Aeschylus' *Eleusiniens ap. Plut. Thes.* 29.4. See Otto Schroeder, *De laudibus Athenarum a poetis tragicis et ab oratoribus epidicticis excultis* (Gottingae 1914) 40–43.

³R. C. Jebb, *Antigone* (Oxford 1888) ix–x.

⁴For the concept of the "authorial audience," the audience an author may have had in mind in writing a work, see Peter J. Rabinowitz, "Shifting Stands, Shifting

illuminate aspects of "*Antigone* in the theater"⁵ by comparing it to funeral discourse in order to study how Sophocles uses the power of that discourse for his own tragic mythmaking.

As with the *Ajax*,⁶ Sophocles is not enacting the story of an individual but an ideology that must secure the defeat of Creon for impiety. In this, the outer framework of the *dēmosion sēma* and the *epitaphios*' myth of the Theban Dead, both Athenian inventions, Sophocles' authorial audience would know how interdiction of burial had to come out. They would also recognize that whoever died seeking to accomplish burial intervened righteously. In this light, Antigone acts correctly because she does not defy Creon, leader of Athens, but Creon, the totalitarian ruler of impious Thebes.⁷ Orators told and told again that myth. Although Lysias provides the most extensive extant account, he is not indebted to Sophocles' treatment of the Theban Dead. Both orator and tragedian rehearse a cultural discourse by which the Athenians communicated with one another, whether at a public funeral or a festival of Dionysus Eleuthereus, their own identity as defender of gods and piety. For that reason, Lysias' narrative of the myth seems almost an outline for Sophocles' plot.

When Adrastus and Polyneices marched against Thebes and were defeated in battle, the Cadmeians would not allow the burial of the corpses.

Standards: Reading, Interpretation, and Literary Judgment," *Arethusa* 19 (1986) 115–34.

Authors . . . imagine presumed audiences for their texts. Since textual decisions are consequently made with the authorial audience in mind, the actual readers must come to share its characteristics as they read if they are to understand the text as the author wished. (117)

⁵The phrase "*Antigone* in the theater" attempts to escape the tenet of New Criticism that the text is an autonomous, self-contained entity. No amount of "close reading" of Sophocles' play by itself will reveal the implications of *monos*, for example, in Athenian culture. For New Criticism in classics, see Frederic William Danker, *A Century of Greco-Roman Philology* (Atlanta 1988) 204–12. Meaning is not to be found "in" the text but in the experience of the text by an audience, ancient and modern. See Jane P. Tompkins, "An Introduction to Reader-Response Criticism," in *Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism*, ed. Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore 1980) ix–xxvi.

⁶See Wm. Blake Tyrrell, "The Unity of Sophocles' *Ajax*," *Arethusa* 18 (1985) 155–185.

⁷Brian Vickers, *Towards Greek Tragedy: Drama, Myth, Society* (London 1973) 529–31, 545.

. . . Thus, they first sent heralds, requesting that the Cadmeians allow them to take up the corpses, believing it characteristic of brave men to avenge enemies who are living but of those who have no faith in themselves to show courage toward the bodies of the dead. When they could not obtain their request, they marched against the Cadmeians, although no previous quarrel existed with the Cadmeians, nor were they pleasing the living Argives. Rather, considering it proper that those killed in war receive the customary rites, they underwent dangers (ἐκινδύνευσαν) for others for the sake of both parties. . . . [A]lthough many were their enemies, they fought and gained victory with justice as their ally. Urged on by their success, they refrained from lusting for greater retribution from the Cadmeians. To them, in return for impiety, they displayed their bravery and, taking up the corpses of the Argives, prizes for which they had come, they buried them in their own Eleusis. In regard to those killed with the Seven against Thebes, they prove to be such men. (2.7–10)

In the speech, Athenians undergo danger; violence wipes away the resistance of impious Thebans; with no hope of personal gain, Athenians champion justice and perform customary rites. Antigone is the first, followed by Haemon and Tiresias, to play the role of Athenians. She assumes a κινδύνεσμα (42), a word recalling κίνδυνος and κινδυνεύω of the risks undertaken by Athenians of funeral oratory,⁸ to bury her brother. She fulfills “unwritten usages” (454–55: ἄγραπτα νόμματα) in the same way that Pericles asserts that Athenians obey “unwritten” *nomoi* (Thuc. 2.37.3). Like Demosthenes’ Athenians, she does not look elsewhere when “the usages (τὰ νόμματα) of the departed were being outraged at the time Creon prohibited interment of the Seven against Thebes” (60.8). She acts with justice (451) against Creon’s impiety (1068–74).

Creon, like the Thebans of the *epitaphios*, rejects peaceful intercession. Haemon, in the role of Athenian heralds sent by Theseus in Euripides (*Supp.* 357–58; 383–92) or by Athenians in Lysias, offers Creon the opportunity to yield without bloodshed or further transgressions against the dead. His failure to convince his father prompts the intervention of Tiresias, the emblem of the Athenians in arms, to whom Creon submits only after a violent exchange: “Alas, it’s hard, but I resign my heart’s desire to do this: a hopeless battle (δυσμαχητέον) must not be waged against necessity” (1106).

⁸Thuc. 2.39.1, 4; 40.3; 42.4; 43.4. Lys. 2.9, 12, 14, 20, 23, 25, 33, 34, 47, 50, 63, 68. Pl. *Menex.* 246c. Dem. 60.10, 11, 26, 29, 30. Hyp. 6.17.

Creon is the leader of Thebes of the *epitaphios* and the dramatic stage where, Froma I. Zeitlin observes, Thebes is an "anti-Athens," "the negative model of Athens's manifest image of itself with regard to its notions of the proper management of city, society, and self."⁹ A Creon who equates state (736–37) and divinity (282–89) with his notions of both, who cannot fathom actions done for any motive other than personal profit (310–14), and who confounds the living and the dead as well as piety toward upper and lower gods, imports the "anti-Athens" of the *epitaphios* into Sophocles' tragedy. In consideration of the *dēmos* of his audience, Sophocles dissociates the people of Thebes from its leader (692–700; 773–76).

To create a democratic, that is, public funeral, the *dēmos* appropriated rites of aristocratic funerals which its legislation had been continually restricting since Solon.¹⁰ The *dēmos* displayed the bones for two days, twice that allowed private funerals, under a tent in the agora (Thuc. 2.34). Here, families mourned their husbands, sons, and brothers with whatever customs they wished. This concession to familial loss and grief, loosened from normal curbs on public display, contrasts the first two days with the rituals of the third. On the dawning of this day, no longer are the bones distinguished by the names, identities, and economic and social differences that separated individuals in life. Now they are "the dead," an expression virtually synonymous with the city and reified by the organization of the remains in boxes according to the Cleisthenian tribes. Wagons carrying the chests formed a procession more elaborate than any family could mount. While laws denied the family's right to bring outsiders, slaves, strangers, and paid mourners into its funerals, anyone could join in the public ceremony.¹¹ Setting forth from the agora, the procession moved solemnly toward the Di-

⁹Froma I. Zeitlin, "Thebes: Theater of Self and Society in Athenian Drama," in *Greek Tragedy and Political Theory*, ed. J. Peter Euben (Berkeley 1986) 102.

¹⁰Plut. *Sol.* 21.5; [Dem.] 43.62 and Eberhard Ruschenbusch, ΣΟΛΩΝΟΣ ΝΟΜΟΙ, *Historia, Einzelschriften* 9 (1966) 95–97; Margaret Alexiou, *The Ritual Lament in Greek Tradition* (Cambridge 1974) 4–23.

¹¹Thucydides uses the same formula, *ho boulomenos*, that allowed access to the democracy for citizens with full rights. Here the formula opens the process to foreigners. Most probably were allies, a status increasingly equated with subordinates (Bernard M. W. Knox, "The *Ajax* of Sophocles," *HSCP* 65 [1961] 8–9). In effect, the Athenians' invitation, the offer to participate in their democracy, ordered the foreigners to mourn their oppressors. The tone was not lost on the orator: "Everywhere among all men, those who mourn their own disasters hymn the bravery of these men" (Lys. 2.2).

pylon and the city's "most beautiful suburb" (Thuc. 2.34.5). It was perhaps escorted by hoplites in full armor;¹² the high-pitched keening of the women fills the air, soon to be superseded by the orator's sonorous words. When the dead arrive at the public cemetery, the mourners seek renewal through an oration that replaces not only the familial rites of fertility and purification but also the praise and laments sung for individual heroes by poets.¹³

Funeral oratory develops a propagandistic image for Athens. In the fact of their growing imperialism, Athenians told themselves a story of their self-sacrifice on behalf of Greek freedom against oppressors, both foreign and Greek. Their ideology enacts a simple dualism of Athenians vs. *hoi alloi* that, heedless of fact, praises the city under praise of its dead.¹⁴ The myth of the Theban Dead belongs to a litany of Athenian services in mythic times to Greeks, the humble, and the helpless.¹⁵ Common to its myths are the themes of military intervention forced upon Athenians and their willingness to act alone without others. Repeatedly, the orator asserts that Athenians acted alone to accomplish noble ends. The key words are *μόνος*, *καλῶς*, and *ἐρημός*. "They alone endured risks for the sake of all Greece against many thousands of foreigners" (Lys. 2.20). "They alone twice repelled by land and sea the expeditions from all Asia" (Dem. 60.10). "We alone did not venture to surrender them" (Pl. *Menex.* 245c). "We were left alone again because of our unwillingness to commit a disgraceful and unholy act" (Pl. *Menex.* 245e). Plato's shift from "we alone did not venture" to "we were left alone" shows that he "perceived the hidden meaning of the *monos* boast, that it also signified abandonment, failure and loss of esteem."¹⁶ The *barbaroi* "disembarked onto Marathon, thinking that in this way we would be most deserted (*ἐρημοτάτους*) of allies" (Lys. 2.21). In the *epitaphios* abandonment becomes single-minded action: "[The Athenians] did not wait for allies" (Lys. 2.23), "The freedom of all Greece was preserved with the lives of these men" (Dem. 60.23); and

¹²Loraux (note 1 above) 20.

¹³Loraux (note 1 above) 53–54; K. R. Walters, "Rhetoric as Ritual: The Semiotics of the Attic Funeral Oration," *Florilegium* 2 (1980) 1–19. For rites at the grave, see Alexiou (note 10 above) 9.

¹⁴Walters (note 13 above) 8; Loraux (note 1 above) 133–45.

¹⁵Greeks: Amazons (Lys. 2.4–6; Dem. 60.8; Isoc. 4.70). Humble: Heraclidae (Lys. 2.11–16; Dem. 60.8; Isoc. 4.55 and 58; 12.172–74). Helpless: Theban Dead (Lys. 2.7–10; Dem. 60.8). See Schroeder (note 2 above) 38–43 and 61–62.

¹⁶Walters (note 13 above) 8.

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failure and disgrace, glorious death: "They thought that they had to live in a manner worthy of their forebears or die nobly" (Dem. 60.31), "Although we could have lived in dishonor, we chose to die nobly before disgracing you or shaming our fathers and forefathers" (Pl. *Menex.* 246d).

Reading places a play almost synchronically before the eye, while a play on stage flows diachronically as the actors deliver the lines. Sophocles develops an undercurrent of funeral discourse by reminding the audience with clues throughout the script. Those for whom the clues do not key that sense miss Sophocles' signals and decipher other meanings in them. Sophocles first alludes to the *epitaphios logos* with the words μόνη (19), μόνα (58), and καλόν (72), words which convey in Sophocles' other plays the loneliness and fierce determinism that mark the Sophoclean hero.¹⁷ In *Antigone*, they add meaning to Antigone's resolve by contextualizing the action and dialogue in the framework of funeral oratory.

Antigone begins alone with Ismene outside the city gates; by the end of the prologue, she is isolated from her sister. "Now that we two in turn are left all alone (μόνα), think how more wretchedly we will die if, in violence of law, we transgress the decree or power of absolute rulers" (58–60). Ismene's plea fails, and Antigone forswears her assistance in the burial. "I will bury him. It is noble (καλόν) for me to die doing that" (71–72). When Ismene cautions secrecy, Antigone responds, "Shout it aloud" (86), not because she wants to die but to die nobly. "I shall not suffer so much as to keep me from dying nobly (καλῶς)" (96–97). By the fourth episode, her isolation is complete. "Look at me, alone and last of the royal family" (941). She ends, "deserted" (773: ἐρημός), "deserted of kinsmen" (919: ἐρημός), without an ally (923), and imprisoned in a place "alone and deserted" (887: μόνην ἐρημόν). Among her last words is the conviction that her deeds may be καλά: "if these things are noble among the gods. . ." (925).

Topoi of the *epitaphios* inform the verbal clashes of the second episode. As often noted, Antigone's famous appeal to the gods' "unwritten and unshakable usages" (545–55) recalls Pericles' assertion that Athenians obey laws, especially those "which, being unwritten, bear admitted shame" (2.37.3). Adrastus, in Isocrates' version of the litany, begged Theseus not to ignore "ancient custom and traditional law," "which all men continue to follow, not as if laid down by human nature

¹⁷Bernard M. W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy* (Berkeley 1966) 32–33.

but as if commanded by the power of the divinity" (12.169). When Creon asks, "Are you not ashamed for thinking apart from those men?", Antigone replies: "There is nothing disgraceful in respecting those from the same womb" (510–11). She denies Creon's distinction between the brothers—"Nevertheless, Hades longs for these rites" (519: *nomoi*)—with a conviction similar to that Lysias attributes to the Athenians:

The Athenians judged that those men, if they had done some wrong, paid the utmost penalty by dying and that the gods below were not receiving their due. (2.7)

Athenians regularly lauded themselves for their intelligence. "They stopped the senselessness (*to aphron*) of brawn by the intelligence of their plans" (Gorg. frag. 6 DK). "Equality of birth compels us . . . to yield to nothing except a reputation for bravery and intelligence" (Pl. *Menex.* 239a). On stage, each character passes judgment on the intelligence of the burial:

If I seem to you to act foolishly, I perhaps incur a charge of foolishness in a fool's estimation. (Antigone: 469–70)

I say that these two girls, the one just now, the other by nature from the first, have appeared without sense. (Creon: 561–62)

Lord, the sense which grows does not abide with those faring poorly but departs. (Ismene: 563–64)

In your case, at any rate, when you chose to do evil with evil companions. . . . (Creon: 565)

The *μόνος* and *καλῶς τοποὶ* recur. "You seemed to think nobly to some, I to others" (557), Antigone tells Ismene. "Alone of Cadmeian women," Antigone sees the fear of Creon's power among the old men of the chorus (504–5). "An absolute rule (*tyrannis*), blest in many other respects, can do and say what it wishes" (506–7). Such sentiments, said of other forms of government, enhance the orator's praise of Athenians' democracy.¹⁸ Antigone's vehement refusal to allow Ismene a part in her *pathos* (541) and *moros* (554), although contributing to her character, derives from the subtext—the *monos topos*:

¹⁸Thuc. 2.37.1; Lys. 2.18; Dem. 60.26; Pl. *Menex.* 238c. Loraux (note 1 above) 172–220.

No, justice will not allow you this. (538)

Don't make your own what you did not touch. (546-47)

Antigone not only deprives her sister of posthumous credit for the rites; she harshly underlines her solitary defense of justice. "Many things," the orator declares, "conspired for our ancestors . . . to fight for justice" (Lys. 2.17). Beset with evils, Antigone considers it a profit (*kerdos*) to die (461-64). The *kerdos* theme reflects the *topos* of Athenians' willingness to encounter danger despite their wealth. Among those brave men, "the possession of wealth and enjoyment of life's pleasures are treated with disdain" (Dem. 60.2).¹⁹ On the other hand, Creon's materialistic outlook illustrates the attitude of *hoi alloi*, that is, the foil against which the orators create their image of Athenians.²⁰

The third episode ends on Creon's decision: "I will lead her where the path is deserted of people" (773). The chorus of Theban old men have concluded the third stasimon when they espy Antigone. She calls to them to attend to her plight. "O citizens of my paternal land, look at me" (806). Together, they join in a kommos in which they "debate," in Vernant's term,²¹ the chorus over the meaning of her resolve to disobey Creon and bury her brother. She embodies the "angry, stubborn temper," of the Sophoclean hero, while the chorus speak both in character as Theban elders and in "meta-character" as the voice of the subtext.²² Creon marks its end sarcastically: "You know, don't you, how if permitted one would never stop singing and wailing before dying?" (883-84). Antigone returns to spoken iambics to describe her future reunion with her family in Hades, give the *nomos* for her actions, and pray for vengeance upon her enemies (891-923). Creon enjoins the guards to haste, and when the elders react ("This word comes nearest to death" [933-34]), he replies: "I do not encourage you to console yourselves that

¹⁹See also Thuc. 2.42.4; Lys. 2.33; Dem. 60.18.

²⁰*Ant.* 220-21; 295-303; 310-12; 322; 325-26; 1055; 1061; 1063. On the *kerdos* theme, see Robert F. Goheen, *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone* (Princeton 1951) 14-19.

²¹Jean-Pierre Vernant, "Greek Tragedy: Problems of Interpretation," in *The Structuralist Controversy*, ed. Richard Macksey and Eugenio Donato (Baltimore 1972) 284. For the view of tragedy followed here, see also Charles Segal, *Tragedy and Civilization* (Cambridge [Mass.] 1981) 1-12.

²²Knox (note 17 above) 21. The prefix meta- indicates elements in the makeup of the chorus that stand "beside" or come from outside the strict delineations of their character as old men, namely, those of the subtext.

these arrangements will not be carried out as proposed" (935–36). Sophocles' choice of παραμυθοῦμαι sharply signals to his audience the παραμυθία, consolation to the living intermingled with threnetic elements that followed the ἐπαινός in the *epitaphios*.²³ The scene is framed by the παραμυθία.

Antigone laments her present situation—premature death, loss of marriage, union with Acheron (806–14). The chorus reply with "admiration of her way of death—but not, it will be noted, of the act which led to it."²⁴ "Renowned and possessing of praise (ἐπαινός), you depart for the recesses of the dead, struck by no wasting diseases or the wages of swords. Of your own free will and alive, you alone among mortals will make your way to Hades" (817–22). Sophocles' chorus in character as steadfast Thebans (165–69) cannot admire Antigone's deed, but their language lauds the manner of her death. As citizens of Thebes, the old men submit to Creon's authority (211–14) and chastise Antigone for disobedience (852–56; 872–75). But Sophocles' audience hears familiar praise underlying their reprimand. "Free of sickness of the body and without experience of the anxieties of the spirit that afflict the living, they obtain customary rites in great honor and much envy" (Dem. 60.33). "They did not entrust themselves to chance or wait death that comes of its own accord but chose for themselves the finest death" (Lys. 2.79). The elders confer on Antigone the praise and honor won by the men buried in the Kerameikos. "These men, having done many things, will justly be praised (ἐπαινεθήσονται)" (Dem. 60.15); "They are worthy of praise (ἐπαινός)" (Thuc. 2.36.2). Haemon confers the honor merited by those men: "She who did not abandon her own brother, fallen in slaughter and unburied, to be mutilated by savage dogs and birds, is she not worthy of a golden meed of honor (τιμῆς)?" (696–99). "Their memory is ageless, and their honors (τιμαί) envied by all" (Lys. 2.79); "It is glorious to look upon men possessed of ageless honors (τιμάς)" (Dem. 60.36); "It is just and fitting to give this honor (τιμήν) of memory" (Thuc. 2.36.1); "The city never ceases honoring (τιμῶσα) the dead" (Pl. *Menex.* 249b).

The old men deem Antigone "alone among mortals," but she likens herself to immortal Niobe. The elders object: "[Niobe] is a god

²³ John E. Ziolkowski, *Thucydides and the Tradition of Funeral Speeches at Athens* (Salem 1985) 49.

²⁴ D. A. Hester, "Sophocles the Unphilosophical—A Study in the *Antigone*," *Mnemosyne* 24 (1971) 34.

begotten of god while we are mortals born to die" (834–35). Then, like the orator, they console her again with future rewards: "And yet it is magnificent for a dying woman to hear that she holds a lot with the godlike in life and later in death" (836–39). According to R. C. Jebb, Antigone wants pity now, not recompense in the "hope for posthumous fame."²⁵ Bernard M. W. Knox responds in the opposite, that Antigone has her sight *sub specie aeternitatis*: "the hero, pitting himself alone against man's city and its demand for submission to time and change, can find consolation only in some kind of immortality, the quality of the gods."²⁶ Sophocles leaves the reason for the comparison to the listener's imagination; any reason suffices, provided the listener is prompted to think about Antigone in a context of immortality, as Jebb and Knox do very differently. In this way, Sophocles appropriates for her the consolation offered the surviving kin by the orator.²⁷ "[The dead] are mourned as mortals because of their nature, they are celebrated as immortals because of their bravery," says Lysias (2.80). Demosthenes claims that "Anyone would say that they probably sit beside the gods below, having the same place as earlier brave men in the Islands of the Blessed" (60.34). Hyperides contends: "If any perception does exist in Hades and any care from the *daimon*, as we assume, men who succored the honors of the gods when they were being subverted, likely will obtain care and attention from them" (6.43).

To Antigone, the young woman consigned alive to a rocky tomb, the chorus' comfort cuts to the quick. "I am mocked" (839). She calls for witnesses to what sort of person she is and by what customs she departs for death (843–49). The chorus reply:

προβάσ' ἐπ' ἑσχατον θράσους
 ὑψηλὸν ἐς Δίκας βάθρον
 προσέπεσες, ὃ τέκνον, πολύ.
 πατρώον δ' ἐκτίνεις τιν' ἄθλον.

(853–56 Jebb)

"The words mean," Hester concludes, "what they say: Antigone's rashness has brought her into collision with justice."²⁸ Thus, we trans-

²⁵Jebb (note 3 above) 153.

²⁶Knox (note 17 above) 66.

²⁷Ziolkowski (note 23 above) 127: "Immortality is mentioned in every speech except the *Menexenus*."

²⁸Hester (note 24 above) 35.

late: "You have gone to the limits of daring and, striking fully against the throne of justice, you have fallen, my child. You pay in full for your father's prize." In character, the Thebans are surely criticizing the rebellious young woman, a view with which some in the audience may have sympathized.²⁹

On the other hand, to hear the elders' words as spoken by the voice of the subtext confers upon them another meaning. Antigone, representative of Athenians of the *epitaphios*, could not bash or strike against justice. Daring in a woman is reprehensible; for the men of the *epitaphios* daring is esteemed. "They were bold when it counted" (Gorg. frag. 6); "Who could not have admired them for their boldness?" (Lys. 2.40). "They dared . . . not only to run risks for their own safety . . ." (Lys. 2.68). "Noble and marvelous the daring accomplished by these men" (Hyp. 6.40). The Scholiast on line 865, comprehending the surface meaning, perceives that the words mean more than what they appear to say. They laud Antigone for her daring: "Advancing to the highest throne of justice with daring, wishing to do something holy concerning your brother, you underwent the opposite, for you fell into an empty tomb."³⁰ Intent on piety for her brother, she suffers impiety herself. Antigone goes to the full limit of daring and in death strikes against the throne of justice to bury the dead. "They fought," Lysias says of the Athenians before Thebes, "and gained victory with justice as their ally" (2.10).

The same doubleness or ambiguity aroused by listening to the elders in character and as the voice of the subtext inhabits the chorus' response to Antigone's statement of the rites she performed for her family (857–71). "There is some piety in being pious, but power, for those who care about power, is not wont to be transgressed anywhere. Your own self-determining temper destroyed you" (872–75). The chorus' censure accuses her of adhering to her lineage, showing daring, being pious with regards to the gods, and *autonomos* (821). These are

²⁹William M. Calder III, "Sophokles' Political Tragedy, *Antigone*," *GRBS* 9 (1968) 404: "My point is that to side with Antigone implies an historical anachronism."

³⁰Scholiast on Soph. *Ant.* ΠΡΟΒΑΣ' ΕΠ' ΕΣΧΑΤΟΝ ΘΡΑΣΟΥΣ (cited by Hester [note 24 above] 35): προβάσα ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἔσχατον βάθρον μετὰ θράσους, βουλομένη τε ὁσίων τι δοῦναι περὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν, τὰ ἐναντία πέπονθας· ἔπεισες γὰρ εἰς τὸ κενεοτάφιον. The scholiast uses the ἐπὶ of Sophocles' text, which is usually translated to bring out a hostile collision, in a positive sense of attaining or reaching the altar.

the very qualities that Athenians found so noble and praiseworthy in their men before Thebes as eulogized in the *epitaphios*.

Moreover, Antigone has contravened Creon's decree because of devotion to her father's "prize," Jocasta: namely, the incest of mother and son. When the chorus sees Antigone's plight as the natural consequence of her lineage, her "father's prize," they imply that the pollution which bore her is bringing her to an ignoble end. However, it is by virtue of an Athenian mother that the men of the *epitaphios* came to die before Thebes; adherence to their lineage brings them to a noble end. Antigone, dying for the burial of the Theban Dead in service to her lineage, is seen as dying the same noble death as the Athenians. The chorus speaks in this context as Thebans justifying Creon's law in contrast to the just actions of the Athenians, who, in service to the gods, fought against interdiction of burial.

Antigone defines herself in terms of the family who determined her fate and for whom she now dies (857–71). Creon's power may have overcome Antigone, but she dies patriotically, burying the Theban Dead of her family. "That the city concerns itself with those who perish in war may be seen above all in the *nomos* by which it chooses a speaker at our public funerals" (Dem. 60.2). In her final speech, Antigone reminds the dead that she took care that each received proper burial (900–903). Then, like the orator, she gives the *nomos* for her actions, the anathematic 904ff.³¹

Antigone's *nomos* violates dramatic consistency when heard from the lips of a young woman who insists that "Nevertheless, Hades longs for these customs" for both brothers (519). As Jebb points out, "The general validity of the divine law, as asserted in 450–460, cannot be intelligibly reconciled with the limitation in vv. 905–907."³² In terms of Antigone's personal stance, Jebb is correct; thus, the "problem" remains. But Antigone represents Athens of funeral discourse—an Athens whose men must die for it and which, in turn, honors them with a funeral. In its need for warriors, the *polis* treats individuals as interchangeable, replaceable, and of less worth than its own welfare—a reality confirmed by the equal honors paid the eleventh and empty box (Thuc. 2.34.3) and reflected in Pericles' consolation to the parents of

³¹For bibliography and a survey of interpretations of these lines, see Hester (note 24 above) 55–58; also Sheila Murnaghan, "Antigone 904–20 and the Institution of Marriage," *AJP* 107 (1986) 192, n. 1.

³²Jebb (note 3 above) 164.

the dead: "Those who are of the age for producing children should take strength from the hope of other ones" (Thuc. 2.44.3). A. W. Gomme finds it "extraordinary" that Pericles in his *epitaphios* should comfort the living with hope of future children to replace those killed.³³ The idea seems to Gomme preposterous for parents of an age of men killed in fighting. But Pericles is not talking about marriage between people but marriage as the institution that replenishes the city's warriors.³⁴ Pericles' is the transpersonal view of the third day of the ceremony when he spoke before the assembled gathering.

Antigone does devalue marriage with her *nomos*, but her devaluation sounds the sacrifice Athens must make for its survival. She sacrifices marriage *in the dramatic context* to her family of father, mother, brothers, but *in the subtext*, she offers the *polis* the sacrifice that women had to offer, husbands and sons, to bury the Theban Dead of the *epitaphios*. Although the same rhetoric as Pericles', coming from the lips of Antigone, it causes a contradiction. Men and women offer different sacrifices to the *polis*—the former their lives, the latter their husbands and sons. Sophocles' use of a female to represent men breaks down (since Goethe³⁵) into a famous problem for moderns.

Antigone cannot represent Athenians with the purity of motive obtained by Euripides' Theseus. Theseus asserts his decision to bury the dead as the culture's ideal—man, warrior, leader with the consent of the led (*Supp.* 346–51). By tending to the dead, the duty and obligation of kinship, sex, and family, Antigone unavoidably "intrudes" upon the public sphere of the *polis* according to a dynamic familiar to theater-

³³ A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford 1956) 2.142.

³⁴ Sheila Murnaghan (note 31) 198 above has appreciated the relevance of Pericles' outlook for Antigone's *nomos*:

Antigone is defining "husband" not as the unchanging identity of a specific individual but as an abstract role that could be played by several different men. In doing so, she is pointing to the way in which marriage, unlike ties of kinship, is not created irrevocably by nature but instituted by society.

Murnaghan points out how marriage depends upon the execution of "a series of offices with stable functions held by a succession of different individuals" (199). By stressing this aspect of marriage, Murnaghan believes that Antigone places marriage "in the category of those things it is characteristic of her to devalue and reject. For throughout the play [Antigone] consistently undervalues human institutions" (200).

³⁵ *Conversations of Goethe with Eckerman and Soret*, tr. John Oxenford (London 1901) 227–28.

goers and described by Helene P. Foley.³⁶ On stage, what the orator simply extols the tragedian doubles with *ῥαῖα πανουργήσας* (74). "I shall lie with him, kin with kin, *having done everything holy / holy harm*" (73–74). Antigone's act is "holy" for performing traditional rites and "harm" for opposing male authority. Creon views Antigone's defiance in sexual terms: "In this circumstance, I am not the man, but she is the man, if this power will lie with her with impunity" (484–85). The second episode concludes on Creon's pronouncement of an end to sexual inversion: "From now on they must be women and not let loose. Even the bold flee whenever they see Hades already near their lives" (579–81). Antigone has acted against the male, a role played by the Amazons in the litany. Their attack on Athens fails, their sexual reversal of Greek male order is crushed: "A glorious reputation and high ambitions were their motives. But here they met brave men and came to possess spirits alike to their nature" (Lys. 2.5).³⁷ Creon's failure to recognize Polyneices as a corpse causes him to judge Antigone's actions as a sexual inversion and an affront to his male authority. The initial inversion in historical Athens, however, began when men seized women's prerogatives in burial for the state's benefit. Antigone's burying Polyneices, rather than depriving Creon of his maleness, reaffirms her status as a woman, the sex traditionally responsible for the burial of the dead. Sophocles reveals through Antigone's "intrusion" the sexual intrusion at the base of the public funeral.

³⁶ Helene P. Foley, "'The Female Intruder' Reconsidered: Women in Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* and *Ecclesiazusae*," *CP* 77 (1982) 5:

Men and women, when they participate in *common* religious festivals, *both* support cooperative values that promote the welfare of the state. Oikos and polis, and the participation of the sexes in both institutions, are thus organized on a comparable basis, although they differ in scale. At the same time, conflicts may arise or appear to arise between the interests of the individual and the welfare of the state. At these moments of conflict women in drama may make a unilateral move—or intrusion—in support of the interests of oikos and/or polis. Insofar as this move involves a disruption of the functioning of the above model . . . , the female intrusion poses threats as grave as the masculine misbehavior that provoked it: the masculinization or sexual license of women, the feminization of men, the disruption of both oikos and polis.

The expression, "female intruder," is originally that of M. Shaw, "The Female Intruder: Women in Fifth-Century Drama," *CP* 70 (1975) 255–66.

³⁷ For these reversals, see Wm. Blake Tyrrell, *Amazons: A Study in Athenian Mythmaking* (Baltimore 1984) 40–63.

During the archaic period, women exercised influence upon social and political life through their prominence in burial rites.³⁸ Beginning in the sixth century, legislation was passed that sought to curb their participation and tone down the extravagance of their lamentations and displays of grief. Private funerals, formerly conducted outside and through the streets, were confined to the household. Lament by women in public was prohibited. The food, drink, and garments that women carried in the *ekphora* were reduced to insignificant amounts, while attendance at the grave was open only to women of close kinship. Such legislation, intended to bolster the *demos*' position against aristocratic cults,³⁹ concomitantly caused new tensions by opening deep rifts in the *polis* and the *oikos*. Men who had grown up acculturated in women caring for the body, although slighting that care in the interests of the state, still, it seems, would be reluctant to deny it to women of their family.⁴⁰

Women were the proper agents of burial; Antigone and Ismene, their brother's nearest kinswomen, are responsible for providing him with fitting rites and lamentations. "See whether you will join in the toil, and do the deed with me" (Antigone: 41). Thus, when Creon, advised to rescue Antigone (1100–1101), tends to Polyneices first, he overvalues the corpse and, in his confusion of upper and lower realms, carries out a mock or perverted funeral. The corpse, whose *prothesis* was for birds and beasts to devour and all to see mangled, is now cleansed, an act that should have preceded its *prothesis*. Men, slaves of the master Creon and strangers to the dead,⁴¹ replace the kinswoman Antigone in rites conducted outside the house at the city's edge. The men then move as if in procession to the grave. There, in a traditional funeral women performed fertility rites to assure the dead a quiet rest and to purify the land for the living. Bewailing the dead, women beat their breasts, lacerated their cheeks, and called upon the dead. In a

³⁸ Alexiou (note 10 above) 14–21.

³⁹ Alexiou (note 10 above) 17 notes that funeral legislation appears in "advanced city states where a new society often culminating in a democracy was establishing itself." Since participation in burial rites legitimized a family member's right to inherit, funerals had economic ramifications for the *oikos* (20).

⁴⁰ Alexiou (note 10 above) 15 points out that vase paintings show that the laws were not being obeyed, perhaps because the men did not want to assume a more active role in burial rites.

⁴¹ Theseus' messenger emphasizes that "no slave stood over this task" (Eur. *Supp.* 763–66), but Theseus himself washed the corpses, spread the beds, and clothed the bodies. In Euripides' *Orestes* (95–106), Electra tells Helen that it would be a disgrace to send a servant to her mother's grave, but that she should go herself.

perversion of these rituals, a wailing Creon calls⁴² to his son, "Come out, my son, I beg you," and arouses a savage response in Haemon (1230–34). The fertility rites of the grave are turned into a marriage of death. No woman's cheek "is scarred bloody by tearing of the nail in newly cut furrows" (Aesch. *Cho.* 24–25). Haemon in extreme self-mutilation leans upon his sword, with his spurting blood staining Antigone's white cheek (1235–39), and an image recalling Aeschylus' blasphemy of the *hieros gamos* in *Agamemnon* (1390–92).

Modern critics have generally found in *Antigone* a conflict between Creon and Antigone in which one is right and the other wrong or both partially right and wrong.⁴³ Returning *Antigone* to its historical context, however, suggests a different reading. In the outer framework, Creon is wrong, always and absolutely wrong, for exposing the corpses. Although he tends to the body, he performs no burial according to custom. On the other hand, within the inner framework, Creon attempts no more than what Athenians themselves had been doing since Solon's time: namely, attempting to impose legislation that restricted women's participation in burials. Sophocles problematizes the orator's certainty by throwing the state's right to bury the dead, whether by the military force of the myth or the democratic institution of the *dēmosion sēma*, against the family's and its women's traditional prerogatives over the corpse. He casts a woman to build interior conflicts that mitigate but never transgress the absolutes of the outer frame.⁴⁴ He plays off attitudes felt by his audience toward burial that touch upon socially, politically, and economically sensitive areas of Athenian life. In this regard the conflict between Antigone and Creon perhaps mirrors that of Athenians themselves concerning who should have power over and obligation to the dead.⁴⁵

LARRY J. BENNETT AND WM. BLAKE TYRRELL

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

⁴²With *κἀνακακῶσας καλεῖ* (1227), Sophocles evokes the sound of *ἀνακαλεῖσθαι*, the verb "of the persistent calling of the dead by name during the supplication at the tomb" (Alexiou [note 10 above] 109). See, for example, Aesch. *Pers.* 621.

⁴³For a summary of the orthodox and Hegelian positions and bibliography, see Hester (note 24 above) 11–18 and Th. C. W. Oudemans and A. P. M. H. Lardinois, *Tragic Ambiguity: Anthropology, Philosophy and Sophocles' Antigone* (Leiden 1987) 107–17.

⁴⁴Within this framework, Creon asserts valid points that allow critics to find right in his stance.

⁴⁵The authors express their appreciation for the contribution made to the present study by the journal's anonymous reader.

DID PLATO COIN *RHĒTORIKĒ*?

The proposition advanced in this essay is that the word ῥητορικὴ may have been coined by Plato in the process of composing *Gorgias* around 385 B.C. I believe that the evidence for such a proposition is surprisingly clear, though the inferences one might draw from such a historical "fact" are far from obvious. Accordingly, the primary focus of this essay is to establish the plausibility of a relatively late dating of the coining of ῥητορικὴ, leaving to future efforts the task of addressing how traditional interpretations of certain fifth- and fourth-century texts are challenged by taking seriously the notion that the art of "rhetoric" was not clearly conceptualized *as such* until well into the fourth century.

I offer two arguments in support of the proposition that Plato coined ῥητορικὴ. The first is that the surviving instances of the word ῥητορικὴ demonstrate that its use in Plato's *Gorgias* is novel. The second is that Plato's penchant for coining terms ending in -ικὴ makes it highly probable that ῥητορικὴ, like most other terms denoting specific verbal arts, was originally coined by Plato.

Evidence for the first argument is straightforward: ῥητορικὴ does not appear in fifth- and early fourth-century texts where it would be expected to appear if the term was in common, or even in specialized, usage. Though ῥητήρ is found in the *Iliad* (IX: 443), the earliest surviving use of ῥήτωρ is in the Brea Decree, *circa* 445 B.C.¹ In the late fifth century, and through much of the fourth, ῥήτωρ was a technical term designating politicians who put forth motions in the courts or the assembly.² Accordingly, by the time of Plato's *Gorgias*, ῥήτωρ was recognized as delimiting a very specific group of people—politicians who

¹ So argues Stanley Wilcox, "The Scope of Early Rhetorical Instruction," *HSCP* 46 (1942) 127. For ῥήτωρ in the Brea Decree see I.G. i.³ 46:25. Cf. Marcus N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, new ed. (Chicago 1985) 88–90; Russell Meiggs and David Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1969) 128–33.

² Mogens Herman Hansen, "Initiative and Decision: the Separation of Powers in Fourth-Century Athens," *GRBS* 22 (1981) 368–70; R. K. Sinclair, *Democracy and Participation in Athens* (Cambridge 1988) 136–37. See also Mogens Herman Hansen, "The Athenian 'Politicians', 403–322 B.C.," *GRBS* 24 (1983) 33–55; and "Rhetores and Strategoi in Fourth-Century Athens," *GRBS* 24 (1983) 151–80.

spoke often in the courts or the assembly.³ It is usually taken for granted that a term specifying the art or skill of being a ῥήτωρ was in use prior to Plato, but the evidence simply does not support such a conclusion.

Ῥητορική does not appear in *any* of the fifth-century sources where it would be expected to be found if it was a term in use. A search for all forms of ρητορικ- in the texts of *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* indicates that the earliest documented use of the term is from the fourth century.⁴ Prior to the fourth century, λόγος and λέγειν were used to describe what later would be called rhetoric. Both terms are far broader in their meanings than is the term ῥητορική, hence the appearance of ῥητορική signals a new level of specificity and conceptual clarity concerning different verbal arts. Prior to the appearance of the term ῥητορική, both "sophist" and "philosopher" claimed the province of λόγος.

Fifth-century drama provides compelling evidence for a later date for the coining of ῥητορική. Euripides, who is generally assumed to have been familiar with sophistic doctrines regarding "rhetoric," used λέγειν to describe speeches or speakers, πείθω for persuasion, and λόγος for argument or speech.⁵ Aristophanes' well-known diatribe against sophistic training in *Clouds* never once used the word "rhetoric." Λέγειν is used repeatedly of "oratory," λόγος for "argument" or "speech," and "sophist"—not ῥήτωρ—as a trained speaker.⁶ The origi-

³Werner Pilz, *Der Rhetor im attischen Staat* (Weida 1934). On the dating of *Gorgias* see E. R. Dodds, *Plato: GORGIAS, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford 1959) 18–30; and W.K.C. Guthrie, *History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge 1975) vol. IV 284–85.

⁴A computer search through all corrected and uncorrected TLG data bank texts was conducted by TLG Director Theodore F. Brunner on May 5, 1989. The results support the hypothesis that ῥητορική was coined in the early fourth century. Attributions of the term to fifth-century sources are dealt with elsewhere in this essay, or are so clearly from contaminated later sources as to require no explicit comment (see the appendix of my forthcoming *Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric* [Columbia, S.C., 1991]).

⁵See, for example, *Medea* (for λόγος see 252, 546, 776, 801, 819, 965; for πείθω see 802, 941, 944, 964, 984; for λέγειν see 316, 475, 522, 580, 585), and *Hecuba* (for λόγος see 130, 250, 271, 294, 334, 840, 1190, 1239; for πείθω see 133, 294, 340, 816, 819, 1205; for λέγειν see 257, 293, 1189). On Euripides and the Sophists see Paul Decharme, *Euripides and the Spirit of His Dramas*, tr. J. Loeb (New York 1906) 34–42; T.B.L. Webster, *The Tragedies of Euripides* (London 1967) 22–23; R.G.A. Buxton, *Persuasion in Greek Tragedy, A Study of PEITHO* (Cambridge 1982); Ann Norris Michelini, *Euripides and the Tragic Tradition* (Madison 1987) 142–44.

⁶For λέγειν see lines 239, 260, 430, 486–87, 1106, 1211, 1314, 1334, 1398, 1422; λόγος

nal version of *Clouds* was presented in 423 B.C., at which time the Older Sophists were well known and their educational practices well established. Had the word ῥητορικὴ been used by the Sophists or had it even been associated with them, Aristophanes certainly would have targeted it as one of the objects of his attack. That ῥητορικὴ does not appear even once in this play is strong evidence that the term had not yet been invented.

There is no record of the first Sophist, Protagoras, having used the word ῥητορικὴ, even in the Platonic dialogue named after him. Protagoras' fragments make it clear that his focus was on λόγος. There is no evidence that Gorgias ever used the word "rhetoric" other than the Platonic dialogue named after him (which is discussed below). In the two tracts by Gorgias most likely to discuss ῥητορικὴ, *On Not-Being* and *Encomium to Helen*, it is the power of λόγος that is described and praised; ῥητορικὴ is never mentioned. Likewise, there are no surviving *ipsissima verba* from other fifth-century Sophists such as Antiphon, Prodicus, or Hippias that indicate the word ῥητορικὴ was in use in their time.⁷ Neither ῥητορικὴ nor ῥητορεία appears in the work of Herodotus, who was quite familiar with Sophistic teachings.⁸ A passage in the treatise *Dissoi Logoi*, circa 400 B.C., is noteworthy in this regard.⁹ Section 8 specifically addresses the characteristics of a person who wishes to give sound advice to the city: "the man acquainted with the

appears throughout, but see especially the debate between the two λόγοι, 882–1104. For the date of *Clouds* see K. J. Dover, *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Oxford 1968); and Alan H. Sommerstein, *Aristophanes: Clouds* (Warminster 1982). For the absence of ῥητορικὴ in Aristophanes see also Henry Dunbar, *A Complete Concordance to the Comedies and Fragments of Aristophanes* (Oxford 1883).

⁷Later writers often describe the teachings of the Older Sophists as being concerned with ῥητορικὴ, but no fragment regarded as authentically fifth-century contains the word. References to fifth-century Sophistic manuals of ῥητορικὴ are centuries removed and most likely refer to collections of speeches or "commonplaces." Notably, Aristotle's reference to earlier manuals entitles them τέχνας τῶν λόγων (*Rhetoric* 1354a12). For a more detailed argument that the various ῥητορικὰ τέχναι attributed to fifth-century Sophists are without authority see Edward Schiappa, "The Beginnings of Greek Rhetorical Theory," *Rhetorical Movement: Essays in Honor of Leland M. Griffin*, ed. David Zarefsky (Evanston 1990) in press.

⁸George A. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 44–47.

⁹On the dating of the *Dissoi Logoi* I follow T. M. Robinson, *Contrasting Arguments: An Edition of the Dissoi Logoi* (Salem 1979) 34–41. The traditional dating has been challenged by Thomas M. Conley, "Dating the So-called *Dissoi Logoi*: A Cautionary Note," *Ancient Philosophy* 5 (1985) 59–65.

skills (τέχνας) involved in argument (λόγων) will also know how to speak correctly (ὀρθῶς λέγειν) on every topic."¹⁰ To speak well, a person must know the laws and the "truth of things" of which he would speak. If there was a late fifth-century sophistic passage in which one would expect to find the word ῥητορικῇ, it surely is this one.

In short, as surprising as it may seem, neither the word ῥητορικῇ nor ῥητορεία appears where one would expect them to if, in fact, either word was in popular or specialized use in the fifth century. Accordingly, it is difficult to justify any conclusion other than that ῥητορικῇ originates in the early fourth century.

Ῥητορικῇ not only does not appear in the literature of the fifth century, its use in the fourth century is surprisingly rare. Once again, ῥητορικῇ does not appear where one expects it would if it were a term in common or specialized usage. Outside of the works of Plato and Aristotle, the two best known sources for fourth-century theorizing about rhetoric are Anaximenes' *Rhetoric to Alexander* and the texts of Isocrates. Ῥητορικῇ appears in neither.

Rhetoric to Alexander is considered the oldest extant full-length sophistic treatment of rhetorical theory other than the works of Isocrates. References in chapter eight date the text no earlier than 341 and possibly much later—hence the work appeared more than a generation after *Gorgias*.¹¹ Neither ῥητορικῇ nor ῥητορεία is ever used in the work other than in the title—which was almost certainly added later when the work was recast as addressed from Aristotle to Alexander. Λόγος is the term used to describe the capacity the work offers to improve. If ῥητορικῇ was a term denoting an established specialty as implied by Plato and Aristotle, it is remarkable that *Rhetoric to Alexander* never once used the word.

The first documented use of the word ῥητορεία, or "oratory," is in Isocrates' *Against the Sophists* (21). This programmatic work appears to date from the beginning of Isocrates' school, approximately 392 B.C. Unfortunately, the surviving lines of *Against the Sophists* end after only a few pages, so it is impossible to know how consistently Isocrates used the term, but the term appears only twice in other works of Isocrates (*To Philip* 26; *Panathenaicus* 2). Ῥητορικοὺς appears in *Nicocles* (8), published in 374, and in *Antidosis* (256), circa 354/353 B.C. In 346 B.C.

¹⁰Tr. Robinson (note 9 above) 139.

¹¹Kennedy (note 8 above) 114–24; H. Rackham, "Introduction," *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* (London 1937) 258–62.

ῥητορεύεσθαι appeared in the address *To Philip* (25). The scarcity of all these terms testifies to their novelty, particularly in light of Isocrates' preferred use of λόγος and λέγειν to describe what he was teaching. Throughout his extant writings Isocrates describes the education he provided as λόγων παιδεία. What translators have rendered as speech, discourse, and oratory are (except for the cases cited above) from the Greek λόγος and λέγειν.

In *Antidosis*—the famous defense of his life's work—Isocrates described his training as φιλοσοφία and calls it training for the mind as physical training is for the body (181). Philosophy teaches all forms of λόγος, according to Isocrates, and hence makes students stronger in their thinking (183–85). When Isocrates praises the art of discourse as that which makes humans superior to other animals, it is the art of λόγος that is praised (253–57). There certainly is no doubt that Isocrates taught oratory as it is now commonly understood. However, the dominance of λόγος in his writings, the rarity of ῥητορεία, and the absence of ῥητορικὴ suggest that Isocrates did not professionalize the word ῥητορικὴ. His art, like that of the fifth-century Sophists, was that of λόγος.

Though the term "rhetoric" is quite common in post-Aristotelian literature, its use during most of the fourth century is quite sparse. Though references to the ῥήτωρ became increasingly common in the fourth century, the specific notion of an art of being a rhetor—ῥητορικὴ—appears to be limited to Plato and Aristotle throughout much of the fourth century.

A possible exception, however, is the pamphlet by Alcidas tamed *On the Sophists* or *On the Writers of Written Discourses*.¹² The text twice uses ῥητορικῆς (1.5, 2.5) and hence poses a challenge to the hypothesis that *Gorgias* originated ῥητορικὴ if *On the Sophists* appeared prior to *Gorgias*. Though the pamphlet has been dated by L. V. Hook as written between 391 and 380 B.C., a closer textual analysis would date it well after 380, and hence well after *Gorgias*. Hook's argument is that Alcidas' pamphlet was in response to Isocrates' *Against the Sophists* (392 B.C.) and that Isocrates' reply appeared in *Panegyricus* (380

¹²The text of Alcidas' pamphlet is in Ludwig Radermacher, "Artium scriptores: Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik," *Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften: Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte*, 227. Band 3 (1951) B XXII 15. For an English translation and analysis see LaRue Van Hook, "Alcidas versus Isocrates," *CW* 12 (1919) 89–94.

B.C.). The basis for Hook's chronology is a passage in *Panegyricus* (11) which seems to respond to Alcidas' attacks (*On the Sophists*, 6, 12–13), but the link is tenuous at best. Alcidas' pamphlet attacks those who teach the writing of speeches rather than extemporaneous speaking. In 6 Alcidas argues that extemporaneous speaking is more difficult than writing speeches, hence by mastering his art a student will be trained to both speak *and* write, but that writing does not train one to speak. *Panegyricus* (11) does *not* respond to the difference between speaking and writing, but rather to the difference between plain and elegant styles. Isocrates *does* respond more directly to Alcidas' argument at 6 in *Antidosis* (49) *circa* 354/353 B.C. In 12–13, Alcidas says extemporaneous speaking is perceived as more spontaneous and hence more sincere by the audience. If Isocrates is responding to this charge in *Panegyricus* (11) as suggested by Reinhardt (cited by Hook, 92, n. 46), his defense is not particularly direct—but there *does* seem to be a direct reference to Alcidas' description of Isocrates' style as akin to poetry (2 and 12) in Isocrates' *Antidosis* (46–47). Hence I believe a chronology that does more justice to Isocrates' argumentative skills would have him answering Alcidas' charges in *Antidosis*, around 354/353, not in *Panegyricus*.

Furthermore, there is good evidence in Alcidas' text to suggest that it is in response to *Panegyricus* rather than the other way around (as argued by Hook). The evidence includes: 1) Alcidas' reference to Isocrates' vanity. Hook's own examples of Isocrates' vanity are from *Panegyricus* (4–14) or even later works. 2) References that apparently refer to a whole career of writing, not the beginning of a school (*On the Sophists*, 1 and 2). 3) Alcidas' complaint (4) that written works are the product of long premeditation and revision seems to be a direct reference to *Panegyricus* which took Isocrates ten years to complete (Quintilian, 10.4.4). 4) Alcidas' complaint (4) that written works have the luxury of assembling thoughts from many sources seems to be a direct response to Isocrates' *Panegyricus* (see 4, 7–10, 74; and Hook 91, n. 41). 5) Alcidas' complaint (4) that Isocrates revised his texts based on the advice of others *could* be the result of information in Alcidas' possession early in Isocrates' career, but the practice is not mentioned by Isocrates until *To Philip* (17), *circa* 346 B.C. (see also *Panathenaicus* 200, 233).

My suggested revised chronology thus has Alcidas' *On the Sophists* coming sometime after *Panegyricus* (380 B.C.) and before Isocrates' *Antidosis* (354–353 B.C.). Such a chronology makes better

sense of both authors' arguments. Such a dating would also preserve the possibility that Alcidas' criticism of written texts in 27–28 is, in fact, based on Plato's *Phaedrus* 275d. This possibility is acknowledged by Hook, but must be rejected if one accepts a pre-380 B.C. date for *On the Sophists*. Finally, it should be noted that Alcidas' passing reference to classifications of public speaking (9) seems more appropriate to mid-fourth-century rhetorical theory than that *circa* 385 B.C.¹³

So far the evidence suggesting that Plato first coined ῥητορικὴ has been indirect: namely, it seems clear that there are no extant uses of ῥητορικὴ that can be confidently dated prior to *Gorgias*.¹⁴ The manner in which Plato uses the term ῥητορικὴ throughout his dialogues also points to its novelty in *Gorgias*. Despite Plato's well-known reputation for controversy with the sophists and rhetoric, ῥητορικὴ appears surprisingly rarely in his works. *Ῥητορεία* appears only once (*Politicus* 304a1). Instances of the various forms of ῥητορικὴ are curiously distributed. In the middle and late dialogues, *Euthydemus*, *Theaetetus*, *Cratylus* and *Politicus*, ῥητορικὴ appears a combined total of only five times.¹⁵ The word is noticeably absent in *Protagoras*, *Hippias Major* and *Minor*, and *Sophist*. Even in *Phaedrus* the word appears only a bit over a dozen times. The earliest documented use of the word is in *Gorgias*—which is also the most extensive usage found in Plato. *Gorgias* uses the word nearly ninety times. Thus the earliest documented use of the word ῥητορικὴ is also the first time it is defined and examined philosophically.¹⁶

¹³Cf. Kennedy (note 8 above) 86. On the dates of Alcidas see also W.K.C. Guthrie, *The Sophists* (Cambridge 1971) 311–13, esp. 311, n. 5.

¹⁴"ῥητορικὴ findet sich nicht vor Plato," Pilz (note 3 above) 15, n. 1.

¹⁵See Leonard Brandwood, *A Word Index to Plato* (Leeds 1976) 809. The following forms were counted as instances of ῥητορικὴ: ῥητορικὴ, ῥητορικὴν, ῥητορικῆς, ῥητορικῇ, ῥητορικῶς. When the obvious translation is "rhetorician" (ῥητορικῶς) the term was not counted as an instance of "rhetoric." On the different periods of Plato's dialogues, see Francis M. Cornford, "The Athenian Philosophical Schools," *Cambridge Ancient History* 6 (1927) 310–32.

¹⁶The fifth-century text that is most theoretical in its treatment of persuasive λόγος is *Gorgias' Encomium to Helen*—cf. Charles P. Segal, "Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos," *HSCP* 66 (1962) 99–155. In a sense *Gorgias' Helen* is misleading as a guide to sophistic thinking—there is no other surviving fifth-century text of comparable theoretical depth. I do not think this is because the works were lost. Rather, I think the interest in theoretical treatments of persuasive discourse coincided with the growing literacy of the late fifth and early fourth century. As Kathy Eden notes, "we have no substantial evidence for the theoretical discussions of either rhetorical or interpretive strategies be-

The ready use Plato makes of *δητορικὴ* gives the reader the impression that the word is a "conceptual constant," a "given." Is it plausible that Plato, of all people, invented the word and in a sense the concept *δητορικὴ*? Further, *why* would Plato invent a term for a skill he obviously mistrusted?

Though it cannot be proved conclusively that Plato first coined the word *δητορικὴ*, there is inductive evidence supporting such a possibility. Plato's creative use of language is well established, as is his need to invent a proper philosophical vocabulary.¹⁷ In particular, it is significant that Plato was a prolific coiner of words ending with *-ικὴ* denoting "art of." The invention of such terms is an essential part of Plato's philosophical analysis of the relationship between *τέχνη* and *ἐπιστήμη*—art or skill and knowledge. In the dialogues *Euthydemus* and *Sophist*, for example, Plato coins literally dozens of terms ending in *-ικὴ*. Plato made a conceptual breakthrough with such innovations by linguistically linking knowledge and skill with an assortment of activities and professions.

Not only is Plato a prolific inventor of *-ικὴ* terms in general, he invented an important series of *-ικὴ* terms for *verbal arts* in particular. The Greek words for eristic (*ἐριστικὴ*), dialectic (*διαλεκτικὴ*), and anti-logic (*ἀντιλογικὴ*) all originate in Plato's writings, hence it would be remarkable if *δητορικὴ* was *not* coined by Plato.¹⁸

Etymologically, once *δη-* was made into *δήτωρ*, as it was in the fifth century, it is a simple step to extend the word to *δητορεία* and *δητορικὴ*. For decades scholars have accepted the premise that *δητορικὴ* is derived from *δήτωρ*. From such a premise it has been concluded that *δητορικὴ* was used in the fifth century to describe sophistic teachings. Yet no *ipsissima verba* of the Sophists is cited for authority. Rather, scholars such as Stanley Wilcox claim that passages in Plato's *Gorgias* "confirm the derivation." The possibility that Plato, himself, coined the derivation has not been considered seriously.¹⁹

fore the fourth century." See her "Hermeneutics and the Ancient Rhetorical Tradition," *Rhetorica* 5 (1988) 59–86.

¹⁷ See Eric Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge 1963).

¹⁸ *LSJ*, s.v. "ἀντιλογέω," "διαλεκτέον," and "ἐριστής." Additionally, a search through the *TLG* data bank for *ἀντιλογικ-*, *ἐριστικ-*, and *διαλεκτικ-* has confirmed that Plato's use of the *-ικὴ* forms was original.

¹⁹ Stanley Wilcox (note 1 above) 132. Cf. Jerzy Kowalski, *De artis rhetoricae originibus quaestiones selectae* (Leopoli 1933) 83; W. Pilz (note 3 above) 15.

Moreover, good reasons can be identified for Plato to coin the term ῥητορικὴ. *Gorgias* was written about the same time as *Menexenus*, a piece in which Plato also attacked ῥητορικὴ—despite providing what came to be regarded by Athenians as a good example of a funeral oration.²⁰ The combined target of *Gorgias* and *Menexenus* was nothing less than the most important public speaking practices in Athens: defense in the law—courts, speaking in the assembly, and the important political act of eulogizing the war—dead.²¹ If Plato could identify the “product” of his rival Isocrates’ training as something unnecessary or undesirable, so much the better for the reputation of Plato’s school. *Gorgias*, it should be remembered, was the teacher of Isocrates, hence a dialogue on public discourse titled *Gorgias* which included thinly veiled references to Isocrates would easily have been recognized in the fourth century as an attack on the training afforded by Isocrates.²² It is significant, I think, that the portion of the dialogue devoted to “What is Rhetoric?” begins with an exchange between the *students* of *Gorgias* and Socrates (Polus and Chaerephon); perhaps symbolically paralleling the conflict between Isocrates and Plato. The portions of the dialogue concerned explicitly with the nature of ῥητορικὴ involve *Gorgias*, afterwards his character fades from the dialogue. If, as I have conjectured, ῥητορεία was a novel term associated with the training offered by Isocrates, then *Gorgias*’ explicit declaration at 449a5 that he teaches the art of oratory would have been a clear signal to fourth-century readers that the target of the passage was Isocrates.

A more philosophical rationale is possible, as well. There is no question that one reason for the value of sophistic training in the skill of λόγος was its use in politics. Fifth- and fourth-century Athens was an exceptionally litigious society; careers and fortunes were won and lost in the law—courts.²³ Plato’s treatment of justice in *Gorgias* was designed, in part, to prove on philosophical grounds that sophistic training was unnecessary—the worst that could happen was that one would lose unjustly, in which case one was still better off than one’s unjust accuser (468e–481b). Similarly, Plato has Socrates conclude that orators in the

²⁰Guthrie, *HGP* IV 312–23; Dodds (note 3 above) 23–25.

²¹Cf. Richard Garner, *Law and Society in Classical Athens* (New York 1987) esp. chapter two; Nicole Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* (Cambridge 1986) see esp. 264–70, 311–27.

²²Guthrie, *HGP* IV 308–11.

²³Garner (note 21 above).

assembly end up having “less power” than anyone else, not more, again making an art of rhetoric unnecessary (466b–e). Hence, Plato may have coined *δητορικὴ* in order to limit the sophistic art of *λόγος* to speaking in the assembly and the law–courts which, in Plato’s view, was an art that could only lead to mischief.²⁴

Furthermore, for both pragmatic and philosophical reasons Plato wanted to establish a distinction between his own philosophical art of the *λόγος* and that of his rivals. In order to contrast clearly the training of philosophy to that of his sophistic competitors, Plato needed a conceptual target that would not be confused with the training offered by his own school. *Phaedo* contains a passage in which Socrates attributes misology (*μισολογία*), the dislike of *all* *λόγοι*, to an *improper* knowledge of *λόγων τέχνη*—the art of *λόγοι*. Socrates blames misology on those who practice antilogic, or *ἀντιλογικοὺς*, by whom Plato meant Protagoreans and sophists in general. Such training only leads to smugness and a casual attitude towards truth, Plato suggests. Only some *λόγοι* are true, and it is the task of the student of philosophy to learn to tell the difference between good and bad *λόγοι* (89d1–91c5).

Gorgias’ historical context is crucial to its proper interpretation. *Gorgias* documents Plato’s growing disillusionment with public life and its writing was, in Guthrie’s words, a result of an “emotional crisis” experienced by Plato after Socrates’ death.²⁵ *Gorgias* was not written as a philosophical treatise on rhetoric but as a broader attack on the life of the fourth–century politician. The issue is made explicit by Socrates: “our argument now concerns . . . the way one ought to live: whether it is the life to which you summon me, doing such manly things as speaking in public, practicing rhetoric, engaging in politics as you do now; or whether it is this life of mine in philosophy” (500c1–8).²⁶ The term *δητορες* in the fourth century designated a specific class of individuals who spoke often in court or the assembly.²⁷ Plato opposed education aimed at producing such orators because he did not trust such training

²⁴Guthrie (note 13 above) 177.

²⁵Guthrie, *HGP* IV 299.

²⁶Tr. R. E. Allen, *The Dialogues of Plato: Volume 1* (New Haven 1984) 289. Cf. *Gorgias* 472c6–d1, 487e7–488a4, 492d3–5, and Plato’s *Seventh Letter*. E. R. Dodds’s classic study of *Gorgias* documents the fact that even the earliest commentators noted that the purpose of the dialogue is to address the moral basis of politics. According to Dodds, by 492d3 “the ostensible question of rhetoric has vanished into the background” (note 3 above) 299.

²⁷Hansen (note 2 above); Sinclair (note 2 above).

to produce proper statesmen. Hence, whether he originated the term or not, ῥητορικὴ was a useful label for Plato to use to contrast the nature of Isocrates' (and others') training from his own.

Ῥητορικὴ is used sparingly in *Phaedrus* compared to *Gorgias*. It is noteworthy that in *Phaedrus*, where the possibility of philosophical rhetoric is outlined, Plato contrasts his conception of rhetoric with those teaching the "art of speech"—λόγων τέχνης (266d–274c). Guthrie has described aptly Plato's intention to differentiate between good and bad arts of λόγοι: "[T]he rhetorical art was also known as 'the art of the λόγοι,' and the wide meaning of this word (from talking or speech-making to argument, reason, thought) made possible very different conceptions of the art of which it was the subject. Plato's aim was to get it out of the hands of superficial persuaders and special pleaders, and show that, properly applied and based on knowledge of the truth, it was coextensive with philosophy."²⁸

There is a tendency to treat rhetoric as a "given" in Plato's *Gorgias*. That is, it is usually assumed that there was a discrete set of activities or a body of teachings which were consensually regarded as ῥητορικὴ and towards which Plato directed his critical abilities. A more likely situation was that Plato felt the sophists' art of λόγος was in danger of being ubiquitous and hence in need of definitional constraint. Just as in *Sophist* Plato sought to dissociate the traditional concept of Sophist as wise man into two concepts—the truly wise philosopher and the sham sophist—*Gorgias* sought, in part, to dissociate the art of λόγος into his philosophical approach and that of ῥητορικὴ.

Textual support for such a view can be found in *Gorgias*. Socrates asks Gorgias of what objects ῥητορικὴ represented knowledge. Gorgias answers περὶ λόγους, which many translators over-simplistically render as "words" (449d9–e1). The dialogue then addresses the question with what sorts of λόγους rhetoric is concerned? Gorgias makes the unlikely concession that not all kinds of λόγοι fall under ῥητορικὴ, only some. Though Socrates and Gorgias agree the art concerns λέγειν and πείθω, Socrates obtains Gorgias' admission that many if not all arts involve speaking and persuasion, including medicine, physical training, mathematics, astronomy, and business. Finally, Gorgias is limited to

²⁸ Guthrie (note 13 above) 177; cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 261b6–7, 278b–d. Even in Aristotle, rhetoric is consistently referred to as an art of λόγος. See William M. A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle, Rhetoric I: A Commentary* (New York 1980) 6, 38–39, 93 for examples and analysis.

defending ῥητορικὴ as training for persuasion in public gatherings. The remainder of Plato's treatment of rhetoric in *Gorgias* and in *Phaedrus* need not be examined here. The point is to note the process that Plato went through to enable the discussion to focus on the utility of ῥητορικὴ as an art of λόγος for the law-courts and the assembly. The art of discourse professed by Isocrates, the fourth-century successor of the sophistic tradition, was nothing less than training the mind to think; for Plato in *Gorgias*, rhetoric was reduced to (unnecessary) training for political persuasion.

The evidence for an early fourth-century origin of ῥητορικὴ can be summarized as follows. The word does not appear in fifth-century literature where one would expect to find it if, in fact, it was a term in use. The occurrence of ῥητορικὴ in Plato's *Gorgias* is the earliest recorded usage. While the term appears extensively in a Platonic work well-known for its polemic intent, its relatively rare use in other Platonic dialogues gives the impression that ῥητορικὴ is not a common word. The absence of ῥητορικὴ in any other theoretical literature from 400 to 350 B.C. further suggests that it was an early fourth-century derivation.

A skeptical interlocutor could object that evidence found in *Gorgias* itself points to an earlier origin. At 448d9 Socrates introduces rhetoric into the dialogue with the phrase τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν, typically translated as "what is called rhetoric." Later Plato presents Gorgias as unequivocally claiming to teach ῥητορικὴ (449a5). These passages have given commentators the impression that ῥητορικὴ was a term in common use.²⁹ However, an alternative interpretation is justifiable.

A survey of the thirty-eight instances of καλούμενος in Plato's works indicates the term has two predominant usages. One pattern involves prefacing common words with καλούμενος in order to show the use of the word is self-conscious. In these instances καλούμενος has the sense of "so-called"—as when Plato discusses the nature of "death" in *Phaedo* (86d3, 95d4) or in the *Republic* where Plato mentions "pleasure" (442a), "the arts" (511c6), and the "virtues of the soul" (518d9). In this pattern of usage καλούμενος is sometimes used to draw attention to errors in the way the "so-called" concept of "X" is commonly used. The second pattern involves giving old terms new mean-

²⁹My thanks to Malcolm Schofield (the "skeptical interlocutor" of an earlier version of this essay) for pointing to the significance of these passages.

ings or introducing new words, such as when Plato makes up fictitious names for gods in *Cratylus* (406c4–6), describes the anatomical origin of the belly and navel in *Symposium* (190e7), introduces the word “palinode” in *Phaedrus* (243b2), or introduces different kinds of “motions” in *Laws* (894c6). Given the fact that ῥητορικὴ is not a term found in the fifth century and only rarely in the fourth, it is probable that it is the second pattern which is at work in *Gorgias* (448d9). Τὴν καλουμένην ῥητορικὴν could be translated as “what is now called rhetoric” (cf. *Seventh Letter*; 343b1, esp. the Loeb trans.).

Furthermore, there are good reasons *not* to treat *Gorgias* as historically precise. Plato’s objective is not to describe accurately Gorgias’ views on the persuasive use of language—a fact illustrated by the substantial differences between the defense of λόγος found in the speeches of Gorgias and his floundering performance in Plato’s dialogue.³⁰ Additionally, Socrates makes the uncharacteristic claim that he alone practices the true political art—πολιτικὴ τέχνη—and hence is Athens’ only true statesman (521d6–8). R. E. Allen describes the dialogue as so “riddled with anachronism that no dramatic date can be assigned to it.” In light of “intentional and repeated conflicts of dates,” Allen believes that “tense distinctions lose their relevance” in the dialogue.³¹ What matters is the *agon* between the life of the philosopher and the life of the orator. If Plato is willing to put unhistorical sayings in the mouth of Socrates for the sake of argument, there is no reason why he could not do the same with Gorgias.

Even if Plato did not originally coin ῥητορικὴ, the evidence adduced so far plainly points to the conclusion that the term is novel when *Gorgias* was written. As the seminal analytical treatment of ῥητορικὴ, *Gorgias* stands in marked contrast to the descriptions of the art of λόγος as found in Gorgias and Isocrates. In a manner somewhat different than traditionally suspected, Plato continues to cast a long shadow over the history of rhetoric.

It is my contention that some, perhaps much, previous scholarship has misunderstood fifth-century philosophy because the term “rhetoric” has been used uncritically to interpret the texts and fragments of and about the period. Intellectual enterprises change, in part, through the evolution of a specialized vocabulary, hence historical accounts of the development of what is now called rhetorical theory that

³⁰Cf. Segal (note 16 above) and Guthrie, *HGP* IV 308–11.

³¹Allen (note 26 above) 189; Dodds (note 3 above) 17–18.

fail to consider the move from λόγος to ῥητορικὴ are likely to be misleading. Just *how* misleading is a question this essay will not attempt to answer. At the very least it can be said that any treatment of the Older Sophists, or even of the fourth-century rivals of Plato, that takes the notion of "rhetoric" as a "given" or as a "conceptual constant" is likely to be in need of revision. Λόγος and λέγειν cannot be reduced to ῥητορικὴ. The terms cannot simply be substituted without some change in our understanding of what was happening in fifth- and fourth-century Greece.

CONCLUSION

The central hypothesis defended in this essay is that the term ῥητορικὴ originated in the early fourth century and was possibly coined by Plato. The hypothesis is refuted if an authentic fifth-century passage containing ῥητορικὴ is identified. Until such time, the rare and odd distribution of ῥητορικὴ in the fourth century is an anomaly which requires explanation.

If the hypothesis stands, certain old issues will require fresh treatment. Elsewhere I have argued that the legend of Corax and Tisias "inventing" rhetoric must be considered largely a later fabrication (though possibly inspired by real events).³² Scholarship concerning the Sophists must contend with the disquieting fact that they did not, contrary to the received view, teach rhetoric as we typically think of it. Plato's *Gorgias* may need to be approached anew. Aristotle's conception of rhetoric may be due for a reappraisal. No doubt other implications of a late emergence of the term ῥητορικὴ will be identified as well. With regard to such matters this essay is intended to be propaedeutic rather than definitive.³³

EDWARD SCHIAPPA

PURDUE UNIVERSITY

³²Schiappa (note 7 above).

³³My thanks to David Sedley and an anonymous *AJP* reviewer for vigorous criticism of earlier drafts of this essay. A special thanks to George A. Kennedy for his helpful suggestions and editing. The remaining errors are entirely my responsibility.

CURIOSITAS AND THE PLATONISM OF APULEIUS' *GOLDEN ASS*

Curiositas has long been recognized as an important theme in Apuleius' *Golden Ass*, for obvious philological and critical reasons. The word itself is found in a literary text only once in extant Latin prior to Apuleius,¹ whereas it occurs twelve times in the *Golden Ass* alone, not to mention twelve occurrences of the adjective *curiosus*.² Yet these words occur not only frequently, but also in ways which make clear that they represent a notion of great interpretive importance. It is *curiositas*, for instance, that precipitates both Lucius' and Psyche's stories. Lucius' *curiositas* is irremediably piqued at hearing of Pamphile's magical powers and leads to the disastrous attempt at metamorphosis on which all subsequent action depends:

At ego curiosus alioquin, ut primum artis magicae semper optatum nomen audiui, tantum a cautela Pamphiles afui, ut etiam ultro gestirem tali magisterio me volens ampla cum mercede tradere. . . . (2.6.1-4)

But I, being otherwise *curiosus*, as soon as I heard the long hoped for name of the art of magic, so far was I from being cautious of Pamphile, that I wilfully longed to hand myself over to such a teacher along with an ample supply of money.

Similarly, in Book 5 Cupid warns Psyche in vain against succumbing to *curiositas*, which in turn will initiate the action of her story:

¹Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, 2.12.2. A. Labhardt, "Curiositas: notes sur l'histoire d'un mot et d'une notion," *Museum Helveticum* 17 (1960) 209 comments: "*Curiositas*, dans la lettre à Atticus, serait une création du moment, un de ces néologismes sans lendemain que l'on risque dans une conversation familière, pour l'oublier aussitôt."

²*Curiositas*: 1.12.21; 3.14.1; 5.6.16, 19.9; 6.20.15, 21.13; 9.12.7, 13.14, 15.8; 11.15.6, 22.30, 23.22.

Curiosus: 1.2.19, 17.7; 2.4.27, 6.1, 29.2; 4.16.13; 5.23.1, 28.16; 7.13.12; 9.30.5, 42.4; 10.29.18. (*Curiosulus*: 11.31.6.)

Throughout this paper I assume a certain singularity of reference for *curiosus* and *curiositas*. That is, if someone is said to be *curiosus*, I take this to mean that he or she has the quality of *curiositas*. I do not make the corresponding assumption about the adverb *curiose*, which often, as in Latin quite generally, merely means "carefully." Since it would be both laborious and unnecessary for present purposes to justify my opinion about *curiose*, I shall let it stand as an assumption.

. . . sed identidem monuit ac saepe terruit, ne quando sororum pernicioso consilio suasa de forma mariti quaerat neve se sacrilega curiositate de tanto fortunarum suggestu pessum deiciat. . . . (5.6.14–17)

But he repeatedly warned and even frightened her lest, persuaded by the pernicious counsels of her sisters, she should try to see her husband's form, and because of her *sacrilega curiositas* deprive herself of the height of fortune.

Over the last thirty years a great deal of attention has been paid to the general history of *curiositas*,³ as well as to its specific importance as a theme in the *Golden Ass*.⁴ Likewise, some scholarly work on Apuleius has aimed at delineating the boundaries of his Platonism as it is manifested in the *Golden Ass*,⁵ and a few scholars have noted a Platonic significance for Lucius' transformation into an ass.⁶ Yet no one, I believe, has appreciated the important role played by the theme of *curiositas* in connection with Apuleius' Platonism.⁷ In what follows I shall attempt to establish what I believe this role to be and how understanding it helps to reveal the fundamental meaning of Lucius' transformations.

³H. J. Mette, "Curiositas," in *Festschrift Bruno Snell*, ed. H. Erbse (Munich 1956) 227–35; A. Labhardt (note 1 above) 206–24; R. Joly, "Curiositas," *Antiquité Classique* 30 (1961) 33–44; P. G. Walsh, "The rights and wrongs of curiosity (Plutarch to Augustine)," *Greece and Rome* 35 (1988) 73–85.

⁴S. Lancel, "Curiositas et préoccupations spirituelles chez Apulée," *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions* 160 (1961) 25–46; L. MacKay, "The sin of the golden ass," *Arion* 4 (1965) 474–80; C. Schlam, "The curiosity of the golden ass," *Classical Journal* 64 (1968) 120–25; G. Sandy, "Knowledge and curiosity in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," *Latomus* 31 (1972) 179–83; J. L. Penwill, "Slavish pleasures and profitless curiosity: fall and redemption in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," *Ramus* 4 (1975) 49–82.

⁵R. Thibau, "Les *Métamorphoses* d'Apulée et la théorie Platonicienne de l'éros," *Studia Philosophica Gandensia* 3 (1965) 89–144; C. Schlam, "Platonica in the *Metamorphoses* of Apuleius," *TAPA* 101 (1970) 477–87; P. G. Walsh, "Apuleius and Plutarch," in *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought*, ed. H. J. Blumenthal and R. A. Markus (London 1981) 20–32.

⁶Schlam (note 5 above) 480 connects Lucius' asininity with the idea of the transmigration of the soul as it is found in Plato's middle period dialogues. Thibau (note 5 above) 122 sees in Apuleius' ass an allusion to *Phaedrus* 260bc, where Socrates employs the example of an orator who tries to persuade the ignorant that an ass is a horse.

⁷Walsh (note 5 above) 24 and J. Tatum, *Apuleius and the Golden Ass* (Ithaca 1979) 43–47, come close, but fail to make the connection between *curiositas* and Apuleius' Platonism because they do not recognize the symbolic significance of Typhon in Plato's moral psychology, which is discussed in section II of this paper.

But first a point about methodology. There is by now an established scholarly tradition of examining Apuleius' Platonism, both in his rhetorical and philosophical works and in the *Golden Ass*. In considering the Platonism of the *Golden Ass* one of two approaches is normally taken. According to what may be called the "Platonic elements" approach, one attempts to cull from the text of the *Golden Ass* specific passages which recall directly ideas that are expressed in the writings of Plato himself.⁸ Such passages do exist in the novel, of which the most obvious and most thoroughly treated is the story of Cupid and Psyche.⁹ The drawback of this approach, however, is that it leaves one with a list of Platonic elements in the *Golden Ass*, but without a good sense of why Apuleius bothered to include them, other than to have Platonic elements interspersed throughout the text.¹⁰

The other common approach to the novel's Platonism involves going to a set of sources more immediate to Apuleius, both in time and in intellectual orientation, namely Plutarch and other Middle Platonists, among them Apuleius himself. Scholars who follow this approach sometimes suggest that Apuleius is hardly directly influenced by the writings of Plato.¹¹ He seems to be influenced primarily by Plutarch,

⁸This is the basic approach taken by both Schlam (note 5 above) and Thibau (note 5 above), though the uses to which they put their observed parallels differ greatly.

⁹I am convinced by Penwill's excellent interpretation of the Cupid and Psyche story from a Platonist perspective (note 4 above) 50–59, which is discussed in note 16 below. J. Winkler, *Auctor & Actor: a narratological reading of Apuleius's Golden Ass* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1985) 147, n. 13 has recently praised Penwill's overall interpretation as the best of what he disapprovingly calls the "moralizing" readings of the *Golden Ass*. I agree with Winkler that it is a mistake to read the novel as though it were a treatise. Still, the very terms in which Apuleius chooses to tell his story suggest numerous moralistic implications; it is not a mistake to try to understand what these implications are. At the end of this paper I shall discuss briefly to what extent I believe a "serious" interpretation of the *Golden Ass* is justified by its Platonic associations.

¹⁰Schlam (note 5 above) notes a number of allusions to Plato himself while remaining sensitive to the syncretism and mystical overtones of second century Platonism. Yet even he does not offer a compelling explanation why Apuleius would bother to "Platonize" his novel, other than that he happened to be a Platonist who was writing a novel. There is of course no *a priori* reason to suppose that Apuleius had an overarching Platonic theme in mind. I shall argue, however, that the role of *curiositas* in the *Golden Ass* suggests a Platonist interpretation that (i) should be fairly obvious to anyone who has read his Plato carefully, and (ii) seems to fit perfectly with what we know of Middle Platonism.

¹¹For example, Walsh (note 5 above) 21: "it may well be more useful to view Apuleius' novel through the Platonist spectacles of a Plutarch than to expose the correspondences with the dialogues of Plato himself. Clearly the approaches ought to be

and his Platonist interests are defined by the concerns of Middle Platonism, prominent among which is a belief in the influence of *daemones* in the sublunary world. While Apuleius' interest in magic and demonology obviously pervades the *Golden Ass* and his other works, I believe that considering this interest alone is not sufficient to reveal the true Platonist underpinnings of the novel.

I intend to straddle the two aforementioned approaches. I will not argue that any particular passage in the *Golden Ass* is derived from or reminiscent of any particular passage in Plato. I will, however, examine some Platonic images and metaphors for the soul which help to explain why the theme of *curiositas* would be of interest to someone with Platonist concerns. I will further appeal to Plutarch, in particular to his treatise *De Iside et Osiride* (*DIO*), to establish that it was part of Apuleius' intellectual climate to interpret Isiac religion Platonically, again in such a way that *curiositas* becomes a theme of interest and importance to a Platonist. I hope to demonstrate that the Platonism of Apuleius' novel informs one of its most central themes, and is not limited merely to the incorporation of Platonic elements into a narrative that is otherwise decidedly un-Platonic.¹²

My procedure in the rest of this paper will fall into four sections. In section I, I discuss *curiositas* in the *Golden Ass*, primarily with respect to Lucius. I then turn in section II to examine briefly some ideas and images in Plato's *Republic* and *Phaedrus*, which help to explain the Platonic origin of the theme of meddlesomeness and its association with Typhon. In section III, I consider Plutarch's Platonist interpretation of Isiac religion. Finally, I return in section IV to the *Golden Ass* and

complementary, but Plutarch is the figure looming closer in the forefront of Apuleius' mind."

¹²In this respect, this paper ought to be considered a partial response to Winkler (note 9 above) 124–25, who gives as his "ultimate assessment of the *Golden Ass* . . . that it is a philosophical comedy about religious knowledge" (124). He sees in Apuleius' "hermeneutic playfulness" a kind of limited skepticism and suggests lines of research which may ultimately show connections between the *Golden Ass* and Academic skepticism. My overall argument shall suggest that the philosophical background that is most important for understanding the *Golden Ass* is the more dogmatic brand of Platonism of the 1st and 2nd centuries A.D., which relies greatly on interpreting and developing ideas found in such Platonic dialogues as the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Timaeus* and *Laws*, often in response to Stoic, Epicurean or Peripatetic views. It will become clear, I think, that the *curiositas* theme presents such glaringly obvious connections with dogmatic Platonism that this is *prima facie* the most promising place to look.

conclude briefly with some remarks on the proper place of a Platonist reading in the interpretation of the novel.

I

Lucius' *curiositas* is portrayed as an ingrained and habitual aspect of his character, both before and after his transformation into an ass.¹³ After Fotis has offered herself to be punished for her role in the goat-skin incident—and along the way revealed the extent of her mistress' magical powers—Lucius describes himself as, “incited by [his] *familiaris curiositas* and longing to discover the hidden cause of the matter” (3.14.1). Nor is this the only time he characterizes his *curiositas* as *familiaris*. In Book 9, after his first day of work in the baker's mill, he is both horrified and excited at the sight of the slaves' hellish lot there:

At ego, quamquam eximie fatigatus et refectione virium vehementer indiguus et prorsus fame perditus, tamen familiari curiositate attonitus et satis anxius, postposito cibo, qui copiosus aderat, inoptabilis officinae disciplinam cum delectatione quadam arbitrabar. (9.12.5–9)

But, although I was extremely weary and greatly needed to restore my strength and had been utterly devastated with hunger, nevertheless I was sufficiently anxious and excited by my *familiaris curiositas* that I observed with a certain delight the condition of the mill, without even touching my food, which was in plentiful supply.

Thus, in two very different circumstances—as man and ass, as forgiving lover and overworked beast of burden—Lucius is capable of precisely the same reaction. The use of the same adjective in both contexts indicates the consistent and integrated role Lucius' *curiositas* plays in his orientation toward the world. The fact that *familiaris* is the adjective so used has further significance, for it emphasizes the intimacy of the connection between Lucius' character and the quality of *curiositas*. Lucius is habitually *curiosus*: he carries this quality with him wherever he goes and under whatever guise—whether in the skin of a man or of an ass.¹⁴

¹³ Lancel (note 4 above) 26–27.

¹⁴ Winkler (note 9 above) 151 comments interestingly without making specific mention of Lucius' *curiositas*: “The folk metaphysics of transformation tales requires that the

Indeed, the continuity between Lucius as ass and man which his *curiositas* provides serves even as a source of comfort to him when his luck takes a turn for the worse in the baker's mill. Reflecting on the sad condition of his companion horses and mules, he realizes that the harsh demands of the mill will soon take a similar toll on him, and he becomes morosely despondent:

Nec ullam uspiam cruciabilis vitae solacium aderat, nisi quod ingenita mihi curiositate recreabar, dum praesentiam meam parvi facientes libere, quae volunt, omnes et agunt et loquuntur. (9.13.13–16)

Nor was any consolation for my torturous life at hand, except that I was reborn because of my *ingenita curiositas* so long as everyone freely did and said what they wanted, caring not at all for my presence.

It is not just that Lucius derives satisfaction from his newly untrammelled access to the supposedly hidden actions and words of others. The *curiositas* which was such a prominent feature of his character as a man also provides a point of contact with that previous life, during which, as he has just said (9.13.11), he enjoyed his share of good fortune. This point of contact is underscored by the adjective *ingenita*, "in-born," which both emphasizes again how essential *curiositas* is to Lucius' character and calls us back to the original Lucius. There is even a poignant note to this mention of his *curiositas*, for it provides his only solace in the present circumstances and is thereby responsible for a kind of rebirth: "*recreabar*" he says, when what he most desperately wants under the circumstances is a real *recreation* as a man.¹⁵

Psyche's *curiositas* is also modified by significant adjectives. In her case, though, it is not the ingrained and habitual nature of the *curiositas* that is emphasized, but rather its impetuosity and sacrile-

person before and the animal after have a common core of identity. The same thinking *ego* is transferred to a new body, there to discover new physical sensations . . . but with memory, language, *values and personality* intact" (emphasis added).

¹⁵The irony of Lucius' comments about his *ingenita curiositas* in 9.13 has been strangely lost on commentators. Walsh (note 3 above) 77–78 and Schlam (note 4 above) 123 both note that Lucius' *curiositas* is here a source of consolation to him without mentioning the strong resonance that a word like *recreabar* is bound to have in this context. Winkler (note 9 above) 167 writes of "*solacium* and *recreabar* as defining the point of the comment," but even he does not say *what* point *recreabar* is defining.

giousness.¹⁶ Cupid, when he finally allows her to see her sisters in the passage quoted earlier, makes a single proviso: that she not be persuaded to look at him lest "because of *sacrilega curiositas*" she "deprive herself of the height of fortune" (5.6.15–17). This is the first mention of Psyche's *curiositas* and at this point in the story it is still only potential. The adjective *sacrilega* serves then to set the tone for her subsequent actions. The misfortunes she ultimately endures for disregarding this warning are implicitly a kind of punishment for an act of impiety. Psyche similarly fails to obey the tower's instructions in Book 6, when her mind is seized by *temeraria curiositas* and she opens the box containing Proserpina's *divina formonsitas* in hopes of procuring a little for herself.

In order to appreciate these patterns in the usage of *curiositas* we need first of all an accurate idea of what it is supposed to mean. It is just here, however, that we encounter a stumbling block, for the word has almost no prior history in Latin, nor does "curiosity" carry the same connotations in English. To illustrate this latter point we may take two examples, from the first and last books of the *Golden Ass*, respectively.

Curiosus first occurs early in Book 1, when Lucius implores Aristomenes to tell his story:

Immo vero, inquam, impertite sermonis non quidem curiosum, sed qui velim scire vel cuncta vel certe plurima. (1.2.19–20)

Please, I said, share your conversation with one who is not *curiosus*, but who wishes to know everything or at least most things.

¹⁶ Virtually everyone who has written on *curiositas* in Apuleius has noted that the striking parallelism between the stories of Psyche and Lucius centers on the fact that both endure their particular hardships because of *curiositas*: Mette (note 3 above) 231; Labhardt (note 1 above) 215; Lancel (note 4 above) 34; MacKay (note 4 above) 477–78; Schlam (note 4 above) 122; J. Tatum, "The tales in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*," *TAPA* 100 (1969) 509; P. G. Walsh, *The Roman Novel* (Cambridge 1970) 190–93; Sandy (note 4 above) 180; Walsh (note 3 above) 76.

Penwill (note 4 above) 50–59 has argued convincingly against the orthodoxy that the parallels between the stories of Psyche and Lucius "serve the function of turning the [Cupid and Psyche] episode into a restatement of the novel's main theme" (50–51). His argument turns on recognizing that the story of Cupid and Psyche is, if anything, an anti-Platonist allegory. The *Voluptas* to which Psyche gives birth is mortal (5.11.20–23). It therefore represents not the pleasure which the soul derives from contemplation of the form of Beauty, but rather the base pleasure which serves to enslave the soul to the body (cf. *Phaedrus* 250e). Penwill writes: "He who would seek salvation must, like Lucius in Book 11, break the tie between Psyche and Cupid: only then can he come to an understanding of the truth" (59).

The strong irony of Lucius' claim that he is not *curiosus* makes it difficult to tell how seriously we are supposed to take him. But read straightforwardly, his words here imply a contrast between *curiositas* and the plain desire to know many things. The form of his entreaty to these strangers he has met on the road is: "do x for me, because I am not y, but only z." For this entreaty to make sense, the qualities of y-ness and z-ness must not only be different, but y-ness must be recognizable as the more worthy of reproach. Otherwise, Lucius' words provide no incentive to Aristomenes to "share his conversation." Thus, near the very beginning of the novel, we find a distinction between *curiositas* and the desire for knowledge which implies that *curiositas* is blameworthy in a way that mere curiosity is not.¹⁷

A contrast between *curiositas* and curiosity is also implied by Lucius' words in Book 11, when he explains to the *scrupulosus lector* why he cannot divulge the secrets of his initiation into the mysteries of Isis:

Dicerem, si dicere liceret, cognosceres, si liceret audire. sed parem noxam contraherent et aures et linguae illae temerariae curiositatis.

(11.23.20–22)

I would tell if it were right to tell, and you would learn if it were right to hear. But [your] ears and [my] tongue would contract an equal punishment for that *temeraria curiositas*.

¹⁷These lines are not always read this way. Penwill (note 4 above) 67 translates: "Please share your story with one who is not *just* inquisitive, but desires to know either everything or at least most things" (emphasis added). If this translation is correct, then Lucius is saying in effect that he is *extremely curiosus*, and the contrast which I see in these lines is not really there. There are two objections to Penwill's translation.

(i) The connotations of *curiosus* and *curiositas* in the *Golden Ass* are always pejorative. Though some commentators have seen in Lucius' comparison of himself to Odysseus (9.13) a hint at a good kind of *curiositas* (Schlam [note 4 above] 123; Walsh [note 3 above] 78), it is a slender hint and is supported nowhere else in the work. It would therefore be ridiculous for Lucius to describe himself as *extremely curiosus* as an incentive to converse with him. This would amount to recommending himself as a busybody.

(ii) Latin grammar prefers the interpretation offered here. The "*quidem . . . sed . . .*" locution is used to express a contrast between a pair of opposed terms, often with a concessive sense to the *quidem* side of the opposition. (See R. Kuehner–C. Stegman, *Ausführliche Grammatik der Lateinischen Sprache*, II.1, 5th ed. [Hannover 1976] 623–24.) Penwill's translation, by his own reckoning, fails to preserve such a contrast, for he believes that Lucius' indiscriminate desire to know everything just is his *curiositas* (67–68).

The fact that Lucius and the *scrupulosus lector* would contract an equal punishment for *curiositas* suggests that they are both equally guilty of it. But this is difficult to understand if *curiositas* is mere curiosity, for in telling about the Isiac rites Lucius would not be satisfying his own desire to know, but rather ours, as readers of the novel. One could explain this discrepancy away, as does Griffiths, by saying that "the teller also is involved in the guilt of curiosity since he is attempting to satisfy it in another."¹⁸ This explanation begs the question at hand, however, for it assumes that *curiositas* and "curiosity" are near synonyms, an assumption which there is reason to question. But more importantly it also ignores what is surely Lucius' point here, namely, that *he* will not now succumb to the impulses of *curiositas* by impiously revealing the secrets of Isis, since *he* is no longer a *curiosus*.¹⁹ The question now is, how does the quality of *curiositas* differ from curiosity understood as the plain desire for knowledge?

The answer to this question is to be derived, I believe, from Apuleius' Platonist tradition. So far as I can tell, there is undisputed scholarly agreement that *curiositas* is a coinage that attempts to capture in Latin the meaning of the Greek terms *periergia* and *polupragmosunē*,²⁰ which are themselves frequently treated as synonyms (e.g., Plutarch, *De Curiositate*, 516a, 519c). If there is even a rough equivalence between the Greek and Latin terms, then two things are clear. First, "curiosity" will not be adequate as a universal translation for *curiositas*, which ought to mean something closer to "meddlesomeness." This point is supported by Latin etymology as well: the *curios-* root suggests being full of cares, i.e., *too many* or *inappropriate* cares.²¹ This

¹⁸J. G. Griffiths, *The Isis-Book (Metamorphoses, Book II)* (Leiden 1975) 294.

¹⁹There is then an implied contrast between Lucius and Psyche which supports Penwill's thesis (see note 16 above). Psyche's *curiositas* was specifically said to be *temeraria* when she looked into the box that was supposed to contain Proserpina's beauty (6.20.15), an act that is reasonably described as prying into and therefore meddling with divine secrets (cf. Schlam [note 4 above] 123). Lucius' language here in Book II takes on the tone of an announcement that he will not succumb to the kind of temptation that proved too much for Psyche. This contrast between Lucius and Psyche is in line with a distinction observed by Lancel (note 4 above) between two kinds of *curiositas* in the *Golden Ass*, "*curiositas des mirabilia*" and "*curiositas ubristique*," the latter of which he describes as "un sentiment d'impatience qui conduit à des initiatives sacrilèges accomplies suivant des techniques contraignantes, magiques pour tout dire" (31).

²⁰Mette (note 3 above) 229; Labhardt (note 1 above) 206; Lancel (note 4 above) 26; Schlam (note 4 above) 121; Walsh (note 3 above) 75–76.

²¹Unlike *curiositas*, *curiosus* has an extensive history in Latin prior to Apuleius, and is not always used pejoratively, as one can tell from a glance at the entries in the

does not mean that *curiositas* cannot mean “curiosity,” only that the Latin word has a different semantic range: curiosity is, in some of its manifestations, just one species of meddlesome behavior.²² Secondly, since Apuleius is an avowed Platonist, and *polupragmosunē* is a prominent metaphor in Plato’s moral psychology, a consideration of *polupragmosunē* in Plato should provide a promising first step to uncovering both the meaning of the Latin word as Apuleius uses it, and the Platonism of his novel.

II

In Book 4 of the *Republic*, Socrates describes justice in terms of the avoidance of *polupragmosunē*:

Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμανεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν. (433a8–b1)

We have heard from many others and have often said ourselves that justice is doing one’s own and not meddling.

This is, in philosophical parlance, an other-regarding conception of justice, since whether one is just depends solely on one’s behavior *vis-à-vis* one’s neighbors. This formulation is represented by Socrates as relatively common and therefore uncontroversial. He is not content with merely describing just behavior, however, and therefore goes on to apply this definition of justice to the psychic life of the individual.

Later in Book 4, after the soul has been divided into rational, spirited and appetitive parts, Socrates is able to characterize justice as consisting in a certain relationship among these three parts of the soul:

Oxford Latin Dictionary. The pejorative sense of *curiosus* seems to have come to the fore with the Stoic notion that intellectual curiosity should be directed toward realizing moral goodness (see Labhardt [note 1 above] 210–14; Joly [note 3 above] 35–38; Walsh [note 3 above] 78–80). Christian writers after Apuleius, most notably Augustine, took up the notion of *sacrilega curiositas* with a vengeance (see especially Walsh [note 3 above] 81–84).

²²This realization makes it easy to explain what Lucius has in mind at 11.23.20–22. *Curiositas* denotes meddlesome and inappropriate behavior, which comprehends both prying into things one is not supposed to learn and divulging information to those who ought not to learn it.

Τὸ δέ γε ἀληθές, τοιοῦτόν τι ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ τὴν ἔξω πράξιν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντός, ὡς ἀληθῶς περὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἑάσαντα τὰλλότρια πράττειν ἕκαστον ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γένη. . . . (443c9–d3)

Justice truly was some such thing, so it seems, though not with regard to doing one's own externally, but rather internally, concerning what is truly one's self and one's own; that is, one does not allow the parts of the soul each to do another's work, or to meddle with one another.

Justice, and therefore *polupragmosunē*, has been given an entirely new reference. A man's justice is defined not by his behavior toward others, but by an ordering of the parts of his soul, according to which each one performs its and only its function. *Polupragmosunē* is now not merely the name for a certain kind of political behavior, but also, and primarily, for a condition of the soul, wherein at least one of the parts pre-empts the work of another part. This conception of justice, unlike the non-controversial principle from which it is derived, is no longer entirely other-regarding, for in order to see whether someone is just we must look to his soul and not only to the way he treats his fellow citizens. Nor, on the other hand, can we tell whether someone is *unjust* merely by observing his behavior, for injustice is properly a kind of *psychic* meddling, whereby the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul seize from the intellect its decision-making function.


In *Republic* 9 Socrates puts this analysis to work to decide once and for all between the lives of justice and injustice. Here he constructs an image (*eikōn*) of the soul, which corresponds to the tripartite division of Book 4 in the following way:

<u>Part of Soul</u>	<u>Part of Image</u>
Rational	Man
Spirited	Lion
Appetitive	Multiform and many-headed beast

The three parts of the image are attached so as to grow together (588d7), and then another *eikōn* is placed around them, the image of a man,

ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντός ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἔλυτρον ὁρῶντι, ἐν ζῶον φαίνεσθαι, ἄνθρωπον. (588d11–e1)

. . . so that to one who is unable to look within, but sees only the outer shell, it seems to be a single animal, a human being.



Socrates uses this image in his final attack on the proponents of injustice.²³ Within the soul of the unjust man, the true *polupragmōn*, the lion and multiform beast are dominant. Socrates describes their domination in a manner that is both picturesque and rhetorically effective: they starve and weaken the man, and are able to drag him wherever they choose to go (588e3–589a4). The unjust man therefore presents the outward appearance of a human being, while inside, where it really counts, he is more a wild and uncivilized beast. Plato seems to intend a strong sense in which the unjust man really is less a man than a beast; he is literally subject to a mass of unruly and bestial appetites, which effectively subdue the only properly human part of his soul.

Similar imagery occurs again in *Phaedrus*, though this time with a twist that provides an intriguing connection to Plutarch's interpretation of the Isis myth. Early in the dialogue, after reaching their *locus amoenus* outside the city, Phaedrus mentions to Socrates that he thinks this is supposed to be the place from which Boreas snatched Oreithuia. Socrates points out that the spot is actually "two or three stadia away," upon which Phaedrus asks whether he thinks the myth is true. Socrates responds that such considerations are not worth his time, and explains:

σκοπῶ σὺ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἑμαυτόν, εἴτε τι θηρίον ὃν τυγχάνω
 Τυφῶνος πολυπλοκώτερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτεθυμμένον, εἴτε ἡμερώτερόν
 τε καὶ ἀπλούστερον ζῷον, θείας τινὸς καὶ ἀτύφου μοίρας φύσει μετέχον.
 (230a3–6)

I do not investigate these things, but look only to myself, to see whether I happen to be a beast more complex and filled with desires than Typhon, or whether I am a gentler and simpler animal, possessing in my nature a share of something divine and un-Typhonic.

Poluplokōteron here has much the same associations as the adjectives *poikilon* (588c7) and *pantodapon* (588d5), which were used to describe the beast of *Republic* 9, while *epitethumenon* clearly recalls the *Republic*'s name for the appetitive part of the soul. The difference between the two images is that here Socrates compares his soul to Typhon rather than to the *Republic*'s polymorphous monstrosity. Yet even this is not a great difference. In Hesiod's *Theogony* (821ff.) Typhon is portrayed as

²³ See T. Irwin, *Plato's Moral Theory* (Oxford 1977) 243–48, for a discussion of this image and its adequacy as an answer to the challenge of Glaucon and Adeimantus in *Republic* 2.

quite variegated both in appearance and in the sounds he makes.²⁴ He is clearly a principle of violence and disorder. Plato is able to fill out this vague impression with the specific content of his moral psychology: Typhon represents that *polupragmosunē* within the soul which defines injustice. Nor was the significance of Typhon in the writings of Plato lost on Plutarch. He makes full use of it in *DIO*, which bears directly on Apuleius' Platonism as it is manifested in the *Golden Ass*.

III

DIO provides a wealth of information about the forms of Egyptian myths and rituals which pertain to Isis and Osiris and their ongoing conflict with the evil Seth. But it is clear that Plutarch's primary concern is not to record information about Egyptian religion. The treatise is addressed to his friend Clea, an initiate of Isis, and is intended to demonstrate to her that the rites and mythology of Isiac religion have a significance that can be properly revealed only by the application of a critical and philosophical intelligence.

Indeed, while Plutarch clearly believes that religious knowledge in general is acquired by means of a philosophical approach, it is also clear that he thinks such an approach has particular value in the case of Isiac religion. He makes this plain near the beginning of the treatise, in Chapter 2, when he characterizes Isis as "exceptionally wise and a philosopher" (351e) and the true Isiac as one who, regarding the rites of Isis, "investigates with reason and philosophizes concerning the truth in them" (3, 352c). This attitude toward the religion of Isis is a direct correlate of his belief that it reflects truths that are universally applicable and not just peculiar to Egypt (66, 377cd; 67, 377ef). Such an attitude among Greeks toward foreign religions can be traced back at least to Herodotus, but Plutarch differs substantially from Herodotus in that he has a sharply defined ideology as to the nature of the truths that religious practices and beliefs seek to express. This ideology is his own version of Platonism, a fact he announces explicitly when he writes, in Chapter 48, that,

τὰ ἐπιόντα δηλώσει τοῦ λόγου τὴν Αἰγυπτίων
θεολογίαν μάλιστα ταύτῃ τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ συννοικειοῦντος. (371a)

²⁴Following M. L. West, *Hesiod: Theogony* (Oxford 1966) 252, I take Typhoeus and Typhon to be the same figure. There seems to be no controversy in doing this.

the rest of the treatise (*logos*) will elucidate the theology of the Egyptians by relating it especially to this [i.e., Platonic] philosophy.

Plutarch's Platonizing interpretation of the Isis myth starts from a dualistic view of the world, which he bases on his view of the *Timaeus* and Book 10 of the *Laws*. The presence of evil in the created world is to be explained by the existence of both good and evil world souls. The evil soul is necessary because if god were the cause of everything, then there ought to be no evil, whereas if he were the cause of nothing, there would be no good (45, 369a; cf. *De Def. Or.* 414f). The world, however, is manifestly both good and evil. Plato's *Laws* lends authority to this view, for at 896d the Athenian Stranger seems to posit at least two souls, one good and one evil, to explain the presence of good and evil in the world.²⁵ Plutarch introduces to this polarity a third intermediate nature, which has a natural affinity and longing for the good soul, but which may also be acted upon by the bad one (48, 371f). This third principle he identifies as Isis, and characterizes in terms which indicate he believes her to be the receptacle (*hupodochē*) of the *Timaeus* (49a, 51a):

Ἡ γὰρ Ἴσις ἐστὶ μὲν τῆς φύσεως θῆλυ καὶ δεκτικὸν ἀπάσης γενέσεως, καθὸ τιθήνη καὶ πανδεχῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν μυριώνυμος κέκληται διὰ τὸ πάσας ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τρεπομένη μορφὰς δέχεσθαι καὶ ἰδέας. (53, 372e)

For Isis is the female principle in nature and is receptive of all generation, and accordingly is called "nurse" and "all-receptive" by Plato, but "myriad-named" by the many, because in being transformed by reason, she receives all the forms and ideas.

As the principle which is receptive of Forms, which are the proper objects of the intellect, Isis is associated with the good world-soul,

²⁵I say "seems to posit" because it is notoriously difficult to discern Plato's exact intention here, especially since the *Timaeus* has not explicitly prepared us for an evil world soul. J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London 1977) 203 writes: "Plato, as so often, leaves this disquieting development in philosophy hanging in the air, but what he let slip in this passage is enough for a man like Plutarch to build on."

H. Cherniss, "The sources of evil according to Plato," in *Plato II*, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, NY 1971) 244-58 has argued forcefully that Plato does not posit an evil world soul in *Laws* 10. For a recent discussion of some of these issues, see R. D. Mohr, "The sources of evil problem and the principle of motion doctrine in the *Phaedrus* and *Laws* 10," in *The Platonic Cosmology* (Leiden 1985) 158-70.

Osiris, and assists him in the perpetual conflict with Typhon, who is identified as the evil world-soul.

Now, this interpretation is clearly an inaccurate representation of Plato. The receptacle of the *Timaeus* is supposed to serve as a neutral substrate for the generation of sensible entities. As such it is intermediate between Forms and sensibles, not between good and evil souls, and therefore could not be a kind of soul, as Isis is supposed to be.²⁶ But whatever the defects of Plutarch's views as an interpretation of Plato, they comprise, as we shall see, the backdrop for some interesting connections to the *Golden Ass*.

First consider the opposition between Osiris and Typhon. Plutarch identifies Osiris as *nous* in the soul, and characterizes the good order of the seasons and heavenly bodies, in near-neo-Platonic language, as an "emanation (*aporrhoe*) and manifest image" (49, 371ab) of Osiris. Typhon, however, is a principle of destruction in nature, and

... τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ παθητικὸν καὶ τιτανικὸν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ ἐμπληκ-
τον, ... (49, 371b)

... is the part of the soul which is passionate, titanic, irrational and impulsive.

As in Plato, Typhon represents those elements which are responsible for disorder in the soul, psychic *polupragmosunē*. Nor would it be unlikely that Plutarch has in mind the *Phaedrus* passage discussed earlier, for he actually quotes it verbatim elsewhere (*Adv. Col.* 1119b). This Platonic characterization of Typhon in *DIO*, when combined with the role Plutarch has assigned him in Isiac religion, introduces some new and important associations.

Recall Plutarch's initial exhortation to Clea to pursue a rationalistic, one might even say "gnostic," approach to Isis. Typhon is there opposed to her as well, because he is "puffed up (*tetuphomenos*) with ignorance and deceit (*anoia* and *apatē*)" (2, 351f). Plutarch then describes the genuine Isiac attendants as "those who carry in their souls,

²⁶Michael Frede has pointed out to me that it was natural for later Platonists, relying on *Phaedrus* and *Laws*, to suppose that the receptacle was ensouled, due to its shifting motions. Plutarch's interpretation of the source of evil in *De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo* (1014e–1015f) bears this out, though he stops short of claiming that matter in itself is evil. He attributes evil rather to the matter's disorderly motions, to which god put a stop when he created the world (1015e).

as in a box, the sacred *logos* about the gods which is pure of all superstition and meddlesomeness (*periergia*)" (3, 352b, following Griffiths' translation). It would perhaps be a mistake to overemphasize this occurrence of *periergia*, but neither should it be dismissed. Plutarch wrote a treatise on *polupragmosunē*, for which he unselfconsciously uses *periergia* as a synonym (516a, 519c). When he says in *DIO* that the *logos* of Isis is free of *periergia*, he no doubt means that one can only acquire knowledge of her when free of the interfering and unhealthy impulses which riddle the soul of the *polupragmōn*.²⁷ The idea that intellectual progress takes place only in the absence of strong and cumbersome attachments to material desires is nowhere more prominent than in the writings of Plato's middle period. There is, therefore, a thoroughly Platonic cast to Plutarch's representation of the opposition between Isis and Typhon, which clearly acknowledges the power of psychic meddlesomeness to obstruct one's progress toward truth and the goddess.

Of equal importance for present purposes is Typhon's special, though not exclusive, association with the ass.²⁸ Plutarch relates that at Coptos there are festivals which involve abusing men of ruddy complexion and tossing an ass off a cliff, "because Typhon was ruddy and asinine in form" (30, 362f). In Busiris and Lycopolis the *salpinx* is not played because of the similarity of its sound to the braying of an ass, and the ass is generally believed to be impure and "daemonic" (*daemonikos*) because of its similarity to Typhon (362f).

This symbolism of the ass in Isiac religion helps first of all to

²⁷It is a recurrent theme in Plutarch's *De Curiositate* that *polupragmosunē* is a state of the soul which hinders one's progress toward knowledge and virtue. In his programmatic remarks in Chapter 1 Plutarch describes it as one of the "diseased and harmful affections which provide winter and darkness to the soul" (515c). Later he points out that inappropriate interest in the affairs of others has the pernicious effect of drawing one away from the many fine pursuits of life (519f; cf. 522e).

²⁸It is of course Seth, not Typhon, who was originally associated with the ass in Egyptian religion. But the identification of Typhon and Seth in Greek thought reaches back to Herodotus (2.144, 3.5), Aeschylus (*Supplices* 560) and Pherecydes of Syros (See W. Kranz, "Vorsokratisches I," *Hermes* 69 [1934] 114; J. G. Griffiths, "The flight of the gods before Typhon," *Hermes* 88 [1960] 374–76, and Plutarch's *De Iside et Osiride* [University of Wales 1970] 259, 389–90.). It must have been quite natural long before the time of Plutarch to use the name Typhon even when relating Egyptian myths. It is interesting too that the original Greek version of the Typhon myth seems to have been derived from earlier Asian origins. West (note 24 above) 379–80 lists features of the Typhonomachy in the *Theogony* that associate it with Near Eastern myths of succession.

explain Isis' words to Lucius in Book 11 of the *Golden Ass*, when she appears in his dream and instructs him first to eat the roses her priest will be carrying in the following day's procession and then to "shed the skin of that vile (*detestabilis*) beast that has long been most hated to me" (11.6.6–7, following Griffiths' translation).²⁹ It is worth noting, too, that Plutarch also says the Egyptians generally believe the ass to be "daemoniac," for *daemonikos* is a particularly Greek epithet.³⁰ Superficially, the daemoniac quality of the ass is its association with Typhon. According to Plutarch, Isis, Osiris and Typhon were all three originally daemones, though Isis and Osiris have been elevated to the ranks of the gods because of their goodness (27, 361de; 30, 362e). Typhon, however, remains a daemon, hence the daemoniac nature of animals associated with him.

Yet this explains only *why* the ass is called "daemoniac," and not at all what Plutarch or anyone else takes this adjective to mean. It would therefore be helpful to have an idea of what a daemon is conceived to be in Middle Platonist thought. Here we may take as an example Apuleius' own characterization of the differences among human beings, *daemones*, and gods in *De Deo Socratis*:³¹

Sunt enim inter nos ac deos ut loco regionis ita ingenio mentis intersiti, habentes communem cum superis immortalitatem, cum inferis passionem. nam proinde ut nos pati possunt omnia animorum placamenta vel

²⁹Griffiths (note 18 above) 162 lists evidence for the Sethian ass–association, among which is the depiction of Seth as an ass-headed man in the Greek magical papyri (K. Preisendanz, ed., *Papyri Graecae Magicae*, II, 2nd ed. [Stuttgart 1974] Plate 2, illus. 11), which is reprinted in Tatum (note 7 above) 44.

³⁰J. Hani, *La Religion Égyptienne dans la Pensée de Plutarque* (Paris 1976) 228–29 points out that there is no Egyptian word that corresponds to the meaning of *daemon* and *daemonikos* in Greek, though he endorses a loose parallelism between the animistic tendencies of Egyptian religion and the role of *daemones* in Greek thought.

³¹According to J. Beaujeu, *Apulée: opusculs philosophiques* (Paris 1973), Apuleius' description of the characteristics of *daemones* is drawn from a "chatéchisme platonicienne" (228). It certainly owes much to an image employed by Xenocrates and related by Plutarch (*De Defectu Oraculorum*, 416cd [= R. Heinze, *Xenocrates* (Leipzig 1892) frag. 23 166–68]), according to which the divine is like an equilateral, the daemoniac an isosceles and the human a scalene triangle.

Apuleius attributes the great variety of religious rites and practices to the fact that different *daemones* delight in different things depending on the disposition of their souls (*De Deo Socratis* 14). This is close to Xenocrates' ascription of unlucky days and festivals that involve unpleasanties (lamentations, beatings, foul language, etc.) to evil *daemones* (ap. Plutarch, *DIO*, 361b [= frag. 25 Heinze]; cf. Dillon [note 25 above] 318–19).

incitamenta. . . . quae propterea passiva non absurde, ut arbitror, nominavi, quod sunt iisdem, quibus nos, turbationibus mentis obnoxii.

(*De Deo Socratis* 13)

They are situated between us and the gods both in the location of their domain and in the nature of their souls, having in common with their superiors immortality, and with their inferiors the passions. For they are able, just as we are, to suffer everything that either soothes or incites the soul. . . . and so I have called them, not absurdly I think, "passive" because they are vulnerable to the same perturbations of the soul as we.

According to this description of the nature of *daemones*, the point of the epithet "daemonic" should be to emphasize susceptibility to the passions of the soul. Evil *daemones*, such as Typhon, are especially subject to and representative of those passions most tied to the body, and that most hinder the progress of the intellect. This idea seems to be behind the Pythagoreans' calling Typhon *daemonikos* (363a), and Plutarch's assertion in another treatise that "the irrational and disordered and violent element in us is not from the gods (*theion*) but is rather *daemonic*" (*De Esu Carnium*, 996c).

Now, it may seem strange that an unembodied soul such as a daemon should be representative of, or even subject to, affections normally associated with a composite nature. Two things help to explain this feature of Middle Platonist demonology. First, Plato himself portrayed all three parts of the soul existing in the afterlife, most explicitly in the *Phaedrus* myth of the charioteer (cf. *Phaedo* 81c8–d4).³² It would therefore have been unproblematic for a Platonist to think of an unembodied soul as having "physical" desires. Secondly, later Platonists actually conceived of *daemones* as material beings. Apparently reading *Symposium* 202e into *Timaeus* 39e–40a, the Pseudo-Platonic *Epinomis* posits a scale of living beings in the order earth, water, air, aether and fire (984b2–d2). The aetherial beings are *daemones*, and the aerial beings are very similar to them in nature, though they are called only the *aerion genos* (984d8–e1). These beings, unlike the gods, are subject to feelings of pleasure and pain (985a4–7), and it is natural to suppose that this passionate aspect of their nature is due at least in part to their materiality. Apuleius himself adopts the *Epinomis*' arguments in *De Deo Socratis* (8–11) in order to establish the existence of *daemones* as

³²See W. K. C. Guthrie, "Plato's views on the nature of the soul," in *Recherches sur la Tradition Platonicienne* (Vandeuves–Genève 1957) 3–19.

beings whose proper domain is the region between the moon and the stars and whose matter is aether.³³

This very selective consideration of Plato and Middle Platonist thought makes it possible now to appreciate better the intellectual background of Lucius' metamorphoses in the *Golden Ass*. It is generally acknowledged that Apuleius was influenced as a Platonist by Plutarch, and the two references in the *Golden Ass* to Lucius' ancestor of the same name (1.2.2, 2.3.3) almost compel one to think of the historical Plutarch.³⁴ Given his Platonizing interpretation of the conflict between Isis and Typhon, and the appearance of Typhon in the writings of both Plato and Plutarch as a symbol of those excessive appetites which are responsible for psychic *polupragmosunē* and *periergia*, the connection between a Platonist reading of the *Golden Ass* and the theme of *curiositas* is close at hand.

IV

Lucius' metamorphosis into an ass symbolizes his transformation into a Typhon figure. This transformation is both caused by and emblematic of his *curiositas*, that quality of soul which is the cause of meddlesome behavior and which itself consists in the meddlesome hindrance of the rational faculty by one's appetites and desires. Accordingly, what one scholar has said about the ass as a symbol for Lucius' sexuality applies at least as well to his *curiositas*: "The metamorphosis changes his appearance, but it serves to objectify rather than alter his nature."³⁵ Read Platonically, the *eikōn* of *Republic* 9 has, with an Isiac twist, been turned inside out: Lucius becomes outwardly what he had previously been only inwardly, a meddlesome ass. It is the intervention of Isis—worldly principle of rationality and order (cf. 11.5.1ff.)—that allows the man inside Lucius to come to the fore and rule over the whole person, just as in Platonic moral psychology only the just soul is ruled by the man within and not by a horde of bestial appetites.

Now consider this interpretation of Lucius' metamorphoses in the

³³ See L. Taran, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis* (Philadelphia 1975) 162 on the *Epinomis*' influence on Apuleius' demonology.

³⁴ Walsh (note 5 above) 22.

³⁵ Schlam (note 5 above) 481. See too the remarks of Winkler quoted in note 14 above.

light of Mithras' words to him in Book 11, after he has been turned back into a man:

Nec tibi natales ac ne dignitas quidem, vel ipsa, qua flores, usquam doctrina profuit, sed lubrico virentis aetatae ad serviles delapsus voluptates curiositatis inprosperae sinistram praemium reportasti. (11.15.3–7)

Neither your lineage nor your dignity nor the education in which you abound did you any good, but down the slope of verdant youth did you slip into slavish pleasures and gather the sinister reward of your unlucky *curiositas*.

It is obviously important for the Platonist reading I am suggesting that Mithras here attributes Lucius' bad luck to his *curiositas*. But also intriguing is the connection implied by his words between "slavish pleasures" and *curiositas*. This connection is both significant and not entirely obvious. Of 27 occurrences in the novel (excluding the name of Psyche's baby) the word *voluptas* refers 26 times to pleasures of the senses.³⁶ It often denotes sexual pleasure, as in the phrase *voluptas veneria* (1.8.2, 4.27.22; cf. 2.10.1, 17, 10.20.10), and frequently refers to the pleasure of some spectacular or beautiful sight, as in Socrates' *voluptas gladiatorii spectaculi* (1.7.13)³⁷ or Psyche's gazing on Cupid *summa cum voluptate* (5.2.9; cf. 4.13.6, 14.2). It may refer to the pleasure which motivates greed, as in Myrmex's deliberation: *illuc cruciatus, hic voluptas* (9.19.9). And we know from Book 2 that Lucius was susceptible to the lure of erotic pleasure, especially if it promised to

³⁶The one non-physical *voluptas* in the novel is in Book 11, where Lucius describes the pleasure he derives from contemplating the statue of Isis: "Paucis dehinc ibidem commoratus diebus inexplicabili voluptate simulacri divini perfruebar, inremunerabili quippe beneficio pigneratus" (11.24.21–23). See Penwill (note 4 above) 52.

³⁷It is worth noting that Aristomenes' narration of Socrates' story in Book 1 bristles with references to *curiositas*, pleasure and transformation. First, Socrates attributes his misfortune to a detour he made to enjoy a glatorial spectacle: "Me miserum, inquit, qui dum voluptatem gladiatorii spectaculi satis famigerabilis consector, in has aerumnas incidi" (1.7.10–12). Aristomenes then denounces Socrates for preferring the "voluptatem veneriam et scortum scortum" (1.8.3) to his family. Socrates is alarmed by Aristomenes' strong language and relates to him a virtual litany of bestial transformations effected by Meroe (1.9.1–10). Later, when Meroe and Panthia catch up with them, Meroe announces that she will punish Aristomenes for his *curiositas* (which she associates with talkativeness): "Faxo eum sero, immo statim, immo vero iam nunc, ut et praecedentis dicacitatis et instantis curiositas paeniteat" (1.12.1921; cf. 1.17.7).

satisfy his hair-fetish—to say nothing of his desire to dabble in magic. What, however, does pleasure-seeking in general have to do with *curiositas*?

The answer implicit in Apuleius' Platonist tradition is that *curiositas* is really the daemonic, Typhonic or asinine condition of being under the control of one's appetites and the pleasures which motivate them. It is when the appetites predominate in the soul that one meddles, just as the appetites themselves meddle when they usurp from the intellect its role as decision-maker for the whole person. Accordingly, Lucius felt impelled to try his hand at magic, despite the knowledge that it would be dangerous and even impious to do so. So too Psyche could not resist sneaking a look at Cupid or Proserpina's beauty, though in each case she had been warned of the consequences of her actions. Under the sway of *curiositas* both Lucius and Psyche let rational considerations be overcome by the power of their sensual desires and pleasures, of their desires to do or know things they aren't supposed to do or know and which are somehow bad for them. They resemble Plato's *eikōn* of the unjust soul, whose human part is dominated and weakened by its two bestial parts. And what more "bestial" desire could there be than Lucius' long-standing wish to *become* a beast by means of magic?

One commentator has recently referred to *curiositas* in the *Golden Ass* as "the key to the novel."³⁸ Whether or not one should accord overwhelming authority to any single theme in this complex work, it seems without doubt that *curiositas* is *one* of the keys to the novel. If the case I have been making stands up, then this one key cannot be properly understood without considering Apuleius' Platonist tradition. But it would certainly be a mistake to focus narrowly on Apuleius' Platonism and impute an entirely moralistic intention to the novel as a whole. The curious and meddlesome young man who accidentally turns himself into an ass is, after all, the butt of a hilarious joke. Nor is Lucius the *curiosus* a demonstrably bad person; he has his own particular desires and is attracted by the pleasures which satisfy them. Sometimes they get the better of him and cause him to take unnecessary and dangerous risks. At least once, we know, he has a bit of bad luck, gets turned into an ass and can't turn himself back again. It seems to me that in this respect Lucius is actually typical of his fellow human beings, and that this is part of Apuleius' point. The Middle Platonist synthesis

³⁸ Walsh (note 3 above) 76.

of Platonic philosophy and Isiac religion offered Apuleius a handy matrix of meaning-laden symbols and themes. He made skillful use of this matrix to tell the story of a regular guy whose desire to become a beast one day got the better of him, with results that were both comic and disastrous.³⁹

JOSEPH G. DEFILIPPO

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

³⁹I am most grateful to Christina Dufner, Michael Frede and Howard Jackson for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to an audience at Duke University for a number of challenging criticisms. This paper is descended from one that was written for J. Arthur Hanson's Princeton seminar on Apuleius in the Spring of 1984; it is dedicated to his memory.

WOMEN'S PUBLIC IMAGE IN ITALIAN HONORARY INSCRIPTIONS

What are the virtues for which Roman women were most often praised? People familiar with Latin literature and funerary inscriptions would most likely answer with a list of virtues that pertain almost exclusively to women's private, domestic life, such as *castitas*, *pietas*, *pudicitia*, and *lanificium*, to name only a few. For example, Lefkowitz's and Fant's chapter on the praise of Roman women¹ comprises twenty-one representative texts, eleven of which are epitaphs or eulogies, the remaining ten being taken from the works of Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, Seneca, Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, and Dio Cassius. Despite the different backgrounds of these aristocratic male writers and the families of the deceased women, all praise their female subjects for one or more of the following: chastity, marital fidelity, wifely and motherly devotion, dedication to housework.² In fact, the catalogue of domestic virtues had become so standard a feature in texts praising women that in his eulogy at his mother's funeral one man took the opportunity to remark (*CIL* 6.10230 = *ILS* 8394):³

Quibus de causeis quom omnium bonarum feminarum simplex similisque esse laudatio soleat, quod naturalia bona propria custodia servata varietates verborum non desiderent, satisque sit eadem omnes bona fama digna fecisse, et quia adquirere novas laudes mulieri sit arduum, quom minoribus varietatibus vita iactetur, necessario communia esse colenda, ne quod amissum ex iustis praeceptis cetera turpet.

For these reasons praise for all good women is simple and similar, since their native goodness and the trust they have maintained do not require a

¹M. R. Lefkowitz and M. B. Fant, *Women's Life in Greece and Rome* (Baltimore 1982) 133–47.

²Lattimore notes the same qualities in his study of women in Latin sepulchral inscriptions, *Themes in Greek and Latin Epitaphs*, *Illinois Studies in Language and Literature* 28 (1942) 294–300. For the popularity of the epithets *pious*, and *carus*, and their compounds in women's epitaphs from Roman Spain and Roman Britain specifically, see L. A. Curchin, "Familial Epithets in the Epigraphy of Roman Spain," *Cahiers des Etudes anciennes* 14 (1982) 179–82; *idem*, "Familial Epithets in the Epigraphy of Roman Britain," *Britannia* 14 (1983) 255–56.

³Translated by M. Lefkowitz (note 1 above) 136, no. 139.

diversity of words. Sufficient is the fact that they have all done the same good deeds with the fine reputation they deserve, and since it is hard to find new forms of praise for a woman, since their lives fluctuate with less diversity, by necessity we pay tribute to values they hold in common, so that nothing may be lost from fair precepts and harm what remains.

In this man's opinion, the features that his mother had in common with all virtuous women included *modestia*, *probitas*, *pudicitia*, *obsequium*, *lanificium*, *diligentia*, and *fides*.

Literary texts and epitaphs clearly indicate that among Roman writers and within families the domestically virtuous matron was the prevailing ideal of womanhood. What was Roman women's image, though, outside family and literary circles? In other words, what was Roman women's public image? One valuable source for determining public attitudes toward women is the body of inscriptions erected publicly by cities and civic organizations throughout the Roman empire in honor of aristocratic and influential women. These inscriptions often served as a base for a statue of the honoree and were displayed in town *fora* where the whole community could see them. When the dedicators of such monuments chose to enumerate the good deeds and virtues of their female honorees in the text of the inscription, did they adopt the standard vocabulary of praise from depictions of women in literature and sepulchral inscriptions, or did they recognize the women with other terms more appropriate for their public stature and achievement?

This study addresses women's virtues in Italian honorary inscriptions of the first three centuries A.D. An analysis of these inscriptions reveals that Italian municipals created an image for aristocratic women in honorary inscriptions much different from that image found in literary accounts and women's epitaphs. Instead of the devoted wife and mother, immortalized in numerous tombstone inscriptions, the image of the wealthy and publicly generous benefactress predominates in honorary inscriptions. This public image can be explained largely in terms of the Italians' growing concern for the upkeep of their municipalities as the number of able and willing benefactors decreased beginning in the second century.⁴

⁴For the decline in number of munificent decurions in the Roman empire see R. MacMullen, *Corruption and the Decline of Rome* (New Haven 1988) 44–49; P. Garnsey, "The Decline of the Urban Aristocracy in the Empire," *ANRW* 2.1 (1974) 230–52. Garnsey 232–38 specifically demonstrates an early second-century date for this decline.

As public monuments, honorary inscriptions performed two separate but related functions. First of all, by singling out deserving individuals for public admiration they ensured the gratitude of such people who then might be moved to make further benefactions in the community.⁵ In doing so, they also proclaimed which virtues, achievements, and gracious acts would earn others similar public recognition and prominence. In light of this second function, the part of the inscription explaining why the person is being so honored assumes great significance, for it allows the public some influence in encouraging specific, desired types of behavior in local dignitaries.⁶

What types of behavior then did honorary inscriptions encourage in women throughout the Roman empire? MacMullen and VanBremen have recently examined women's public image in Greek honorary inscriptions.⁷ According to both scholars, the language in honorary inscriptions to patronesses from the Greek East does *not* differ much

⁵See also J. Nicols, "Zur Verleihung öffentlicher Ehrungen in der römischen Welt," *Chiron* 9 (1979) 243: "Die Gemeinden verewigten individuelle und kollektive Leistungen, belohnten oder ermutigten ihre Wohltäter und versicherten sich des guten Willens der Mächtigen."

⁶For discussion of honorary inscriptions being used to influence others' behavior, see I. Kajanto, "Un'Analisi Filologico-Letteraria delle Iscrizioni Onorarie," *Epigraphica* 33 (1971) 5-6. Note, however, that his example inscriptions date to the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. Earlier evidence that the Romans perceived public honors as having the power to encourage specific behavior in others is in a *lex collegi* from Lanuvium dating to A.D. 136 (*ILS* 7212). Lines 21 and 22 of this document state that all magistrates of the *collegium* who have fulfilled their administrative duties faithfully will receive one and a half times the normal amount of food and wine at banquets, "ut et reliqui recte faciendo idem sperent." On the subject of these inscriptions' audience see W. V. Harris, "Literacy and Epigraphy," *ZPE* 52 (1983) 87-111. From an analysis of the Pompeian graffiti Harris 110 concludes that all members of Pompeii's curial class and some women in their families could read. Although he suggests that literacy levels in Pompeii were probably higher than those in other Italian cities, referring to literate Pompeian artisans, tradesmen, and slaves, Harris' findings indicate that in other cities throughout Italy a majority of the curial class and at least a few of their female relatives, the very group to whom honorary inscriptions were addressed both as commemoration and motivation, were able to read.

⁷R. MacMullen, "Women in Public in the Roman Empire," *Historia* 29 (1980) 216; R. VanBremen, "Women and Wealth," in *Images of Women in Antiquity*, ed. A. Cameron and A. Kuhrt (London 1983) 223-42. See also Lefkowitz, "Influential Women," in *Images of Women in Antiquity* 56-57. None of these scholars bases their observations on a thorough investigation of any clearly defined set of relevant inscriptions. VanBremen 225 and Lefkowitz 57 refer only to the collection in H. W. Pleket, *Epigraphica II: Texts on the Social History of the Greek World* (Leiden 1969) 10-41, which includes both honorary and funerary examples.

from that found in women's epitaphs from the same region. VanBremen specifically points out the contrast between the prominent public role played by such women and the more traditional domestic virtues for which they are praised in public inscriptions. In her opinion, the presence of two images, patroness and matron, in these inscriptions resulted from a blending of the public and private spheres of municipal life among the Greek upper classes of the Roman empire.⁸

Honorary inscriptions to women in Italian municipalities follow a significantly different pattern. Unlike their Greek counterparts, Italian municipals did not conflate the image of patroness and matron. Not only did the Italians honor aristocratic women for their public munificence, but they also praised them accordingly. The following inscription to a benefactress from Formiae in the late second century A.D. illustrates this point (*AE* 1971.79):

Cassiae Corneliae G(aii) f(iliae) Priscae, c(larissimae) f(eminæ), Aufidi Frontonis co(n)s(ulis), pontificis, proco(n)s(ulis) Asiae, patroni col(oniae) uxori, sacerdoti Augustae et patriae, Formiani publice, pro splendore munificentiae eius.

The citizens of Formiae publicly [give honor to] Cassia Cornelia Prisca, the daughter of Gaius, a woman of senatorial rank, the wife of Aufidius Fronto the consul, pontifex, proconsul of Asia, and patron of our colony, a priestess of the Augusta and of the fatherland, in return for the magnificence of her generosity.

Compare the following inscription honoring a wealthy priestess and magistrate from Lycia around A.D. 100 (Pleket 13):

Ἀ]ρνεατῶν καὶ τῶν συνπολιτευ-
[ο]μένων οἱ δῆμοι Λάλλαν Τειμάρχου
τ]οῦ Διοτείμου, τὴν ἑαυτῶν πολει-
[τι]ν, γυναῖκα Διοτείμου τοῦ Ὀάσσου,
ἱερ]ασαμένην τῶν Σεβαστῶν καὶ
[γε]γυμνασιαρχηκυῖαν δωρεάν,
τε]τειμημένην πεντάκις,
[σώ]φρονα καὶ ἀστήν καὶ φίλα[v-

5

⁸ VanBremen (note 7 above) 236. See also J. Panagopoulos, "Vocabulaire et mentalité dans les *Moralia* de Plutarque," *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne* 3 (1977) 197-235, who compares the language in Greek public decrees with that in Plutarch's *Praecepta Coniugalia*.

δε]ον καὶ πᾶσαν διυπερβεβλ[η?-
 μ]ένην πανάρετον δόξαν,
 κ]εκοσμηκυῖαν καὶ τὰς τῶν
 [πε]ογόνων ἀρετὰς τοῖς ἰδί-
 οι]ς τῶν τρόπων ὑποδείγμα-
 [σι], ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐνοίας ἔνεκεν.

10

The people of Arneae and vicinity, to Lalla daughter of Timarchus son of Diotimus, their fellow citizen, wife of Diotimus son of Vassus; priestess of the Emperor's cult and gymnasiarch out of her own resources, honored five times, chaste, cultivated, devoted to her husband and a model of all virtues, surpassing in every respect. She has glorified her ancestors' virtues with the example of her own character. [Erected] in recognition of her virtues and good will.⁹

Lalla's wealth and generosity, which almost certainly motivated the people of Arneae to erect the inscription in the first place, are merely alluded to in the words *dorean* (1.6) and *eunoias* (1.14) only to be eclipsed by the catalogue of her personal and domestic virtues (11.8–14). Prisca, the benefactress from Formiae, on the other hand, receives no recognition for any domestic virtues; the inscription states simply that she is the wife of a consul, which reflects more on her social status and wealth than on her conjugal devotion. Her financial generosity, though, is emphasized in the fulsome phrase at the end of the inscription: *pro splendore munificentiae eius*.

Prisca's inscription, which is representative of the majority of honorary inscriptions to aristocratic Italian women, presents no disparity between her economic and political influence, as manifested in the physical monument itself, and her virtue of *munificentia*. Instead of blending public and private, as do the Greeks in public inscriptions to their benefactresses, the Italians either ignore or minimize the importance of a benefactress' domestic duties. In fact, the language applied to aristocratic Italian women in honorary inscriptions greatly resembles that in honorary inscriptions commemorating aristocratic Italian men. Although a woman praised publicly for traditional domestic qualities would probably be just as motivated to be generous toward her flatterers as a woman praised for munificence explicitly, the Italians saw in honorary inscriptions more than just a means of publicizing the honoree's virtues. Honorary inscriptions also gave them a voice for their

⁹Translated by M. Lefkowitz (note 1 above) 157, no. 159.

own needs and desires. Thus, when undertaking the not inexpensive task of erecting a public monument to a benefactress the Italians made sure that their appreciation of the woman's financial generosity specifically be carved onto the stone as much as an advertisement of their own financial goals as a commemoration of the woman.

Only a few honorary inscriptions to women remain: I have collected all those from regions 1 through 8 of Italy¹⁰ that date between A.D. 1 and 300 in the major Latin epigraphical collections¹¹ and have found only thirty-two.¹² They represent only those examples from this area and time period which contain either an explanation for the honor or a description of some outstanding quality of the honoree. A comprehensive treatment of all honorary inscriptions to women in the Roman empire is far beyond the scope of this article. I have limited my study to those relevant inscriptions from peninsular Italy of the first three centuries A.D. for two reasons: 1) since the scholarship concerning women in honorary inscriptions has thus far used evidence from the Eastern provinces only,¹³ a study of Italian inscriptions contributes useful comparative material from an area of the Western empire; 2) the honorary inscription does not seem to have developed as a regular feature of Italian municipal society until the mid first century, achieving its peak at the end of the second century.¹⁴

For the purposes of my discussion, I have divided the inscriptions into two groups, corresponding to Tables I and II below. Group I comprises those examples which honor and praise women exclusively for their public benefactions or for those of their female relatives; here the honored women receive no traditionally female epithets or virtues, and

¹⁰These regions cover Italy, excluding Rome, south of the Po river.

¹¹*CIL* (vols. 9–11, 14), *AE* (1888–1985), *Notizie degli scavi* (1884–1983), *Ephemeris Epigraphica* (vol. 8). I believe that these collections provide a reasonably complete coverage of my chosen geographical area and time period; it is unlikely that any few additional items not addressed here would substantially alter my conclusions.

¹²See Tables I and II below. I have given each inscription its own number within the collection which I will use when referring to individual examples.

¹³See R. MacMullen and R. VanBremen (note 7 above).

¹⁴The earliest datable inscription in the collection dates to A.D. 79 (3) and the latest to A.D. 256 (19). A majority of the other datable examples falls between A.D. 140 and 200 (2, 5, 13, 30). Although such evidence might indicate that female benefactors were most active in the late second century, the frequency of an activity cannot be determined from the frequency of its being recorded in inscriptions according to MacMullen, "The Epigraphic Habit in the Roman Empire," *AJP* 103 (1982) 243–46; *idem*, *Corruption and Decline* (note 4 above) 3–7.

any mention of their male relatives is secondary to the recognition given to their own accomplishments. Nineteen inscriptions, that is 59% of the total of thirty-two examples, belong to Group I. Group II consists of those examples which honor women for the benefactions of their male relatives, and/or which praise women with traditionally female epithets and virtues. I have subdivided the inscriptions in Group II into two smaller groups: those which also acknowledge women's own public generosity, and those which do not. Out of the thirteen inscriptions in Group II, six (18%) of the total of thirty-two praise women exclusively for their domestic virtue or for their male relatives' generosity. The other seven inscriptions give as much, if not more, credit to women's public benefactions as they do to their domesticity or to their male relatives' munificence.

Four words describe the women's financial benefactions in both Groups I and II: *munificentia*, *liberalitas*, *beneficia*, *merita*. *Merita*, by far the most popular, appears in fifteen examples, or 46% of the entire sample. All four terms occur in twenty-two, or 69%, of the total of thirty-two inscriptions.¹⁵ A comparison of the frequency of these terms in Italian women's inscriptions with their frequency in honorary inscriptions to Italian men will illustrate the similar vocabulary used by the Italians to praise their male and female benefactors. *Merita* occurs in 36% of Italian men's honorary inscriptions that specify why the honor is being given or describe the honoree in flattering terms. Out of this same group of inscriptions, 53% contain the terms *merita*, *munificentia*, *liberalitas*, or *beneficia*.¹⁶ Note, too, that in Group II five out of the ten inscriptions honoring women in connection with their male relatives describe the men's achievement with the term *merita* (20, 26, 27, 28, 29). The Italians evidently did not hesitate to acknowledge women with the same terms that they did men.

The words in Group II that depict the women in their more traditional domestic roles include *rarissima* (24), *pudicial/pudicissima* (25, 30), and *castitas* (32). They account, though, for only four, or 12%, of

¹⁵For *merita*, see nos. 7–17, 26, 27, 28, and 31. For *munificentia*, *liberalitas*, and *beneficia*, see nos. 1–4, 30, and 32.

¹⁶These percentages are based on an analysis of 326 honorary inscriptions erected to men in Italy between A.D. 1 and 300. For further discussion of terms for generosity and benefactions and their frequency in these inscriptions, see my Ph.D. dissertation, *The Language of Praise in Honorary Inscriptions to Italian Municipals, A.D. 1–300* (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 1988) 29–53; 149–51.

the entire sample. Other epithets applied to a few of the women are *dignissima* (17), *honorificentissima* (30), and *honestal/honestissima* (23, 24, 31). The first two, it will be shown, denote financial generosity and the last refers to a woman's position within the equestrian class or the municipal nobility.

I. INSCRIPTIONS PRAISING THE PUBLIC BENEFACCTIONS OF WOMEN ONLY

Inscriptions 1 through 4 represent women who are praised generally for their generosity; the terms used are *munifica* (1), *munificentia* (2, 3), and *liberalitas* (4). Tutia (4) is also recognized for her *beneficia*, which in this context refer to her *financial* gifts within the community. Although the term *beneficia* by itself is vague, signifying any number of helpful activities, in honorary inscriptions it is synonymous with *liberalitas*, the word with which it appears in Tutia's inscription, and *largitio*.¹⁷ Several honorary inscriptions to male benefactors within Italy also use the term *beneficia* together with *munificentia*¹⁸ or specific descriptions of the honoree's expenditures.¹⁹

Honorary inscriptions to women, as well as men, will sometimes describe the honoree's specific financial benefactions, as do inscriptions 5 and 6. Agusia Priscilla (5) paid for the repair of a *porticus* and financed public entertainment, all in honor of her new religious appointment. Marcia Aurelia Ceionia (6) financed the restoration of a town's local baths and distributed money to the populace at the dedication of her honorary monument.

Inscriptions 7 through 17 praise women for their *merita* or the *merita* of a *female* relative. The term *merita* translates here as "financial favors," although, like *beneficium*, *meritum* out of context can signify any type of favor from responsible behavior in public office, to giving valuable legal advice, to donating money. The contexts within which the term *merita* appears in Italian honorary inscriptions, how-

¹⁷For the terms *beneficia* and *largitio* in the same honorary inscriptions, see *CIL* 10.5968. On the similarity between *beneficium*, *liberalitas*, and *largitio* in literature, see J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République* (Paris 1963) 168. Cicero, *Verr.* 2.3.94, for example, criticizes provincial governors for bribing Roman equestrians with favors and gifts, *beneficiis et liberalitate*.

¹⁸See *CIL* 10.5968; 11.4579; 11.5749; 11.5750.

¹⁹See *CIL* 9.1175; 10.5200.

ever, reveal that it had primarily financial connotations for the Roman readers of such inscriptions. Most Italians, both male and female, who are honored *ob merita*, receive additional praise either for their virtues of generosity, such as *munificentia*, *liberalitas*, and *largitio*,²⁰ or for their expenditures on items such as public games, public building and restoration projects, maintenance of towns' grain supplies, the establishment of private foundations, distributions of *sportulae* at the dedication of the honorary monument, and, finally, assumption of the cost of the honorary monument.²¹ Illustrating these last three types of financial generosity, Flavia Ammia (7), when honored by the *collegium centonariorum* for her *merita*, paid for the cost of the monument and distributed twenty sesterces to each member of the *collegium* at the dedication ceremony. She then deposited 5000 sesterces in the organization's treasury in order for them to use the interest subsequently to celebrate her birthday every year with a feast. Another reason for assuming that the *merita* of women in honorary inscriptions refer to their financial gifts, of course, is that other forms of *merita*, namely political and legal favors, would largely have been off-limits to them.

In addition to being honored for her *merita*, Varia Italia (17) receives the epithet *dignissima*. This epithet is found most often in Italian honorary inscriptions in connection with high-ranking male patrons who have been financially generous to their communities.²² Similar to her male counterparts, Varia, a priestess from Capena, very likely bestowed financial favors upon the public. Certainly, her position as *sacerdos* and *cultrix* in the local cults of Ceres and Venus indicates her social prestige and its attendant wealth.

Two other inscriptions from Capena (18, 19) also honor priestesses of the local cult of Ceres. Both examples mention that *caerimoniae*,

²⁰ *Merita* and *munificentia*: *CIL* 11.5749; 14.3014; *AE* 1894.148. *Merita*, *liberalitas*, and *largitio*: *CIL* 11.6357.

²¹ A few of the many examples of inscriptions mentioning *merita* in combination with public benefactions are: *merita* and public games, *CIL* 9.981, 9.2237; *merita* and public building and restoration projects, *CIL* 11.3258; 11.3938; *merita* and maintenance of a town's grain supply, *CIL* 11.5178; *merita* and private foundations, *CIL* 9.4691; 10.114; *merita* and the distribution of *sportulae*, *CIL* 9.981; 9.3838; *merita* and assumption of cost of the honorary monument, *CIL* 11.3258; 11.3938.

²² See, for example, *CIL* 10.5200, a patron who restores a town's public baths, and *CIL* 11.7556, an honorary *quinquennalis* who donates to the public a silver and bronze statue. For some examples of *patroni dignissimi* who distribute cash at the dedications of their honorary monuments, see *CIL* 10.451 and 10.3759.

sacred rites, were performed in conjunction with the woman's assumption of her religious office (*honos*). These *caerimoniae* were most likely financed out of the women's own resources in honor of their new religious post.²³ Compare Agusia Priscilla (5), who followed the example of former priestesses (*exemplo inlustrum feminar(um)*) by making benefactions in honor of her recent appointment (*ob sacerdotium*). Note, too, that Iulia Paulina, the priestess in inscription 19, later provided a feast and distributed *sportulae* to the local senate and municipals in her capacity as a *sacerdos Veneris*, an act which underscores her wealth and largesse. The evidence in inscriptions 5, 17, 18, and 19 concerning Italian priestesses illustrates a very important connection between a woman's *financial* resources, as opposed to her purely social or political connections,²⁴ and her capacity to hold religious posts.

II. INSCRIPTIONS HONORING WOMEN FOR THE LARGESSE OF MALE RELATIVES AND/OR FOR TRADITIONAL FEMALE QUALITIES

A. Without Recognition of Any Public Benefactions from the Honoree

Inscriptions 20 through 22 honor women merely for their fathers' accomplishments. The fathers of Magia Severina (20) and Iulia Lucilia (21) have been financially generous within their respective communities. Although the praise "in honorem . . . patris eius" in Flavia Kara Gentia's inscription (22) describes only the public distinction of her

²³For other examples of women who act generously in their capacity as public priestesses, see: *CIL* 2.1471, an honorary inscription to a *sacerdos* from Astigi who finances *circenses* in honor of her new religious office (*ob honorem sacerdotalem*); *CIL* 2.1278, an honorary inscription to a *sacerdos* from Salpensa who dedicates a statue made from 100 pounds of silver to *Fortuna Aug(usti?)* upon her new religious appointment (*ob honorem sacerdoti*); Pleket 18, an honorary decree to a priestess of the imperial cult in Aphrodisias who supplied oil for local athletes, among other benefactions; Pleket 25, an honorary decree to a priestess of Demeter in Syros who celebrates religious rites out of her own resources both as a local magistrate and priestess. For discussion of benefactions made by new religious appointees, both male and female, in Roman Spain, see L. A. Curchin, "Personal Wealth in Roman Spain," *Historia* 32 (1983) 236.

²⁴Cf. MacMullen (note 7 above) 209: "To be chosen priestess brought one before the public eye very sharply . . . election was connected with great wealth, wide business associations, a husband an office-holder, and forebears the same."

father, he probably earned such distinction, at least in part, through his wealth and munificence.

Mammia Aufidia Titecia Maria (23) and Gavia Fabia Rufina (24), in addition to being honored for the sake of their male relatives, receive their own epithets. Mammia's inscription (23) refers to her as an *honesta puella* first before mentioning her father's *benignitas*. Gavia's inscription (24) recognizes her as an *honestissima matrona* and a *rarissima femina*, as well as the *uxor*, *filia*, and *soror* of three politically active and wealthy men. The epithet *rarissima* appears frequently in women's epitaphs, and is often associated with other traditionally feminine virtues, such as *castitas*.²⁵

The epithet *honesta* (23) and its superlative *honestissima* (24), on the other hand, most likely do not pertain to these women's domestic virtue. In North African inscriptions *honesta/honestissima* denotes a woman's social rank as the wife of an equestrian or a municipal notable.²⁶ The same meaning probably pertains here, for both Mammia's (23) and Gavia's (24) inscription state that they are married to equestrians and that Gavia's brother, too, is of equestrian rank. Amelia Crescentia (31), another *femina honestissima*, is also married to an equestrian. The epithet is not even used of women exclusively. Several inscriptions, again from North Africa, describe equestrian men as being *honestae memoriae viri*.²⁷ *Honesta* and *honestissima*, therefore, refer here to these women's public prominence as the wives of important men rather than to their private virtue as matrons.

Inscription 25 honors Iunia Gratilla for her *pudicitia*, a virtue commonly associated with women. The inscription goes on, however, to describe how her husband and sons refurbished the town's *schola* in her name.

A noteworthy pattern emerges from the first six inscriptions in this second group (20–25), namely that the relationship between these women and their male relatives is significant only in terms of the men's

²⁵ See, for example, *CIL* 9.1893, an epitaph to a woman *raae castitatis*. Tacitus, *Agricola* 4.2, too, describes Agricola's mother, Iulia Procilla, as a woman *raae castitatis*. For discussion of *raae/rarissima* in women's epitaphs, see Lattimore (note 2 above) 296.

²⁶ See Z. Benzina-ben-Abdallah and L. Ladjimi-Sebai, "Egregiae memoriae filia? A propos d'une inscription inédite d'Haidra (Tunisie)," *Antiquités africaines* 11 (1977) 164. Among their examples are *CIL* 8.16159 and 8.23205.

²⁷ See H.-G. Pflaum, "Titulature et Rang Social sous le haut-empire," in *Recherches sur les structures sociales dans l'antiquité classique* (Paris 1970) 183. Among Pflaum's examples are *CIL* 8.9050 and 8.15455.

financial favors. None of these inscriptions, in other words, commemorates a woman solely for her role as sister, daughter, wife, or mother.

B. With Recognition of Generosity of Honoree or a Female Relative

Although the last seven examples from Group II praise women for traditionally female virtues or recognize the benefactions of their male relatives, each inscription states explicitly that the woman's own generosity or that of a female relative has also earned the public honor. Annia Rufina (26), for example, receives praise for the *merita* of her grandfather and her mother. Rutilia Paulina (27) shares the spotlight with her father for their *merita*, as does Abeiena Balbina (28) with her husband. Inscription 29 honors Severina Afra both for the *merita* of her husband and for her own *beneficia*.

Although inscription 30 applies to Aurelia Calligenia the typically feminine epithet *pudicissima*, it also describes her as *honorificentissima* and praises her for her and her husband's *munificentia*. The end of the inscription records that Aurelia alone, or perhaps together with her husband, distributed 4 sesterces to each member of the *collegium fabrum*, the organization which erected the monument. The epithet *honorificentissima* in this example, as well as in other inscriptions, is practically synonymous with other terms for financial generosity.²⁸ Another honorary inscription from Italy (CIL 9.1685), for example, to a male patron, who built a temple to Canopus at his own expense, describes the honoree as a *largissimus* and *honorificentissimus vir*. The *collegium* erecting the inscription also states that it is "memor liberalitatis (sic) et honorificentiae eius."

Similar to Aurelia Calligenia (30), Aurelia Crescentia (31) is called *pudicissima*, yet she is honored *ob merita*. The language in inscriptions 30 and 31 differentiate between these women's personal qualities, which appear only in the form of epithets, and their financial generosity which earns them the actual honor. Although these women may have been *pudicissimae* at home, they have won the public's admiration *ob munificentiam* (30) or *ob merita* (31). Only the final example, inscription 32 from the senate of Hispellum, states that Licinia Victorina has been honored "ob singularem eius castitatem et erga se munificentiam."

²⁸Cf. *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, s.v., v. 6, part 3, col. 2937, 11.3-4.

Note, however, the text's specification that her *castitas* was hers alone (*eius*), yet her *munificentia* was displayed publicly (*erga se*). In all three of these last inscriptions (30–32) the woman's public and private behavior are kept separate; each honoree's private domestic virtue is acknowledged, but always within the parameters of her own person, whereas those qualities which bring her public recognition concern precisely her financial interactions with the public. We do not see here any blending of public and private.

III. CONCLUSION

The overwhelming emphasis on wealth and munificence in the language of these inscriptions reveals the material motives behind the use of honorary inscriptions by municipal organizations in Italy. These motives become especially clear when one compares the vocabulary in these inscriptions with that found in Latin epitaphs to women. The adjective *pia* and the noun *pietas*, standard terms in women's sepulchral inscriptions,²⁹ appear nowhere in these honorary inscriptions. Only one woman is praised for *castitas* (32), another traditionally female quality. *Pudicitia* makes just one appearance (25), and its superlative adjective *pudicissima* occurs only twice (30, 31). *Merita*, the most frequently used term of praise in these inscriptions, is quite uncommon in women's epitaphs.³⁰

The epitaph speaks well of the dead only; therefore, what it chooses to extol in the character of the deceased has little effect other than the perpetuation of a good memory. Epitaphs, as Lattimore states, represent “. . . not precise reminiscence, but the elaboration and adaptation of an ideal.”³¹ An honorary inscription, although it too speaks well of its subject and even idealizes it at times, most often addresses living individuals who, it is understood, will henceforth come under public scrutiny: are they continuing to live up to their reputations or not? It is noteworthy, then, that the qualities of women which these Italian inscriptions present as praiseworthy consist primarily of gen-

²⁹ See Lattimore (note 2 above) 296.

³⁰ Most often epitaphs will use the participle *merens* in phrases such as *bene merenti* (e.g., *CIL* 10.572; 10.573), which means something entirely different from the noun *merita*, a term denoting financial benefactions specifically.

³¹ Lattimore (note 2 above) 299.

erous acts on behalf of one's community, not virtuous conduct within the home. Indeed, female honorees are praised with a similar vocabulary (*merita, munificentia, liberalitas, beneficia, honestissima, honorificentissima, dignissima*) for the same types of public benefactions as male honorees. If honorary inscriptions in Italy were used to publicize the moral virtues of honorees for their own sake, then they would have praised women more often for traditional female virtues. The aim of honorary inscriptions, however, was to encourage women to contribute to the public welfare with their financial resources. Italian municipalities certainly did not consider a woman's domestic virtues unimportant; they simply left it to a woman's private circle of family and friends to praise her conduct in private life.

The Italians' encouragement of financial generosity in wealthy women through the use of honorary inscriptions indicates their awareness that fewer and fewer men in the curial class were able to bestow financial gifts upon their respective communities. During the second and third centuries A.D., the very period to which all but one (3) of the datable inscriptions in the sample belong, Italian municipals came to depend increasingly on the prosperity and largesse of a few individuals, whose voluntary expenditures often provided communities with all their physical comforts, such as public works construction and repair and public games—comforts which also insured social stability. Municipalities of the Roman empire seldom used public money for public works and entertainment. In her discussion of Spanish municipalities Nicola Mackie points out that what public money was raised through public land rents, local taxes, *summae honorariae*, or other means went toward public administrative expenses, such as salaries for secretarial and menial positions, and toward the maintenance of public slaves.³² Most often public works projects and public entertainments took the form of *munera patrimoniorum*, duties required of private individuals, but to be paid for at their own expense.³³ Such *munera* could be quite burdensome to both a person's time and resources, and might even compel certain individuals to take rather drastic measures to avoid

³²Nicola Mackie, *Local Administration in Roman Spain, A.D. 14–212*, British Archaeological Reports, International Series 172 (Oxford 1983) 118.

³³*Dig.* 50.4.18. See also Abbott and Johnson, *Municipal Administration in the Roman Empire* (Princeton 1926) 94–99.

them.³⁴ Sections 5 and 6 of Book 50 of the *Digesta* are, in fact, devoted to discussions of releases, exemptions, and immunities from civic *munera*. These passages indicate that municipal *munera*, as well as *honores*, had become so oppressive that local councilors had to be compelled to fulfill such duties.³⁵

Considering the well-known difficulties that Italian cities experienced in achieving adequate revenues for civic *munera*, we can appreciate the gratitude felt toward those individuals who undertook expensive public projects voluntarily, that is free from the constraints of a *munus*. Nor should it surprise us that women received as much of the gratitude as men. Indeed, as the number of public benefactors dwindled, wealthy women assumed a significant amount of influence. This influence is perhaps best attested in the language of their honorary inscriptions. The traditional ideology surrounding women in ancient Roman society, crystallized in the formulaic language of funerary inscriptions, creeps into the vocabulary of only a handful of the inscriptions in this study. Instead, the language in these Italian benefactresses' inscriptions places them alongside male benefactors. The financial stature of such women insured that they, like their male counterparts, received not only the honor of a public monument but also the praise befitting their *dignitas*.³⁶

ELIZABETH P. FORBIS

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

³⁴ Even joining the military did not weaken a community's claim on an individual: Ulpian, *Dig.* 50.4.3. See also F. Millar, *The Emperor in the Roman World* (Ithaca 1977) 180.

³⁵ See, for example, *Dig.* 50.1.18, Septimius Severus' distinction between unwilling (*inviti*) and willing (*volentes*) office-holders: *Dig.* 50.1.21 pref.; 50.2.6.4; 50.2.7.3; 50.1.2 pref., all addressing the nomination of sons of decurions to magistracies and/or liturgies against their father's wishes. Although these passages date to the Severan period, Garnsey (note 4 above) 232–38 demonstrates that the onus of civic *munera* made its impact on decurions as early as the first half of the second century. See also Garnsey, "*Honorarium Decurionatus*," *Historia* 20 (1971) 309–25.

³⁶ I wish to thank the Louisiana State University Council on Research for providing me with the funds to work at the University of North Carolina–Chapel Hill during the Summer of 1989. I am also grateful to George Houston and Dennis Kehoe for their comments on earlier drafts and their encouragement. I would also like to thank the article's referee whose suggestions have clarified several points in my discussion.

Table I.
Inscriptions Praising Benefactions of Women Only³⁷

No.	Name and Rank	Dedicator and Date	Vocabulary of Praise	Citation
1.	Sextia	Colonia Iulia (Cumae)	quod ea munifica coloniam fuit	<i>CIL</i> 10.3703
2.	Cassia Cornelia Prisca, S, P	Formiae, c. 199	pro splendore munificentiae eius	<i>AE</i> 1971.79
3.	Claudia Iusta, V[.....]iva, P Faustina, P Amullia Primigenia, Satria Pietas, Claudia Ptolemais, Terentia Athenais	<i>dendrophores</i> of Regium Iulium, 79	ob munificentiam earum	<i>CIL</i> 10.7
4.	Tutia	Cora	ob beneficia et lib(eralitatem) eius	<i>CIL</i> 10.6529
5.	Agusia Priscilla, P	Gabii, 140	quod post inpenas exemplo inlustrium feminar(um) factas ob sacerdotium, etiam opus portic(us) Spei vetustate vexatum pecunia sua refectionem se promiserit populo, cum pro salute principis Antonini Aug(usti) Pii . . . liberorumque eius eximio ludorum spectaculo edito religioni veste donata	<i>CIL</i> 14.2804

³⁷I use the following abbreviations to indicate the woman's social rank, if known: S = senatorial, E = equestrian, P = priestess. For those inscriptions dedicated by decree of the local senate, by the populace, or the senate in combination with any sector of the populace, I have simply given the town name as the dedicator. All dates are A.D.

Table I—*Continued*
Inscriptions Praising Benefactions of Women Only

No.	Name and Rank	Dedicator and Date	Vocabulary of Praise	Citation
6.	Marcia Aurelia Ceionia, E ³⁸	Anagnia	ob dedicationem thermarum quas post multum temporis ad pristinam faciem suis sumptibus restauraverunt . . . o (sic) cuius dedicationim (sic) dedit decurionibus (denarios) V, sivr(is) (sic) (denarios) II, popul(o) (denarios) sing(ulos) et epulum sufficiens omnib(us)	<i>CIL</i> 10.5918
7.	Flavia Ammia	<i>collegium centonariorum</i> of Ameria	ob merita eius, quo honore contenta, sumptum omnem remisit, et ob dedic(ationem) ded(it) singulis (sestertios) XX n(ummos) et hoc amplius arcae eorum intul(it) (sestertium) V m(ilia) n(ummum) ut die natalis sui V i(dus) Mai(as) ex usuris eius summae epulantes dividerent	<i>CIL</i> 11.4391
8.	Iulia Pelagia, E	Aquinum	ob eius merita	<i>CIL</i> 10.5395
9.	Saenia Balbilla, P	Fabrateria	ob merita eius	<i>CIL</i> 10.5656
10.	Camurena Celerina, P	Tuficum	ob merita eius	<i>CIL</i> 11.5711

³⁸Marcia's inscription states that she is a *femina stolata*, a phrase which B. Holt-heide, "*Matrona Stolata—Femina Stolata*," *ZPE* 38 (1980) 127–31 interprets as a sign of a woman's equestrian rank.

Table I—*Continued*
Inscriptions Praising Benefactions of Women Only

No. Name and Rank	Dedicator and Date	Vocabulary of Praise	Citation
11. Avidia Tertullia, P	<i>Ordo Vivirales of Sentinum</i>	ob merita eius	<i>CIL</i> 11.5752
12. Claudia Hedones	<i>Cultores Herculis of Omero, c. 100</i>	ob merita	<i>Not. Sc.</i> 1885 p. 167
13. Laberia Hostilia Crispina, S	<i>Mulieres of Trebula Mutuesca, 139–180</i>	ob merita	<i>AE</i> 1964.106
14. Bruttia	<i>collegium cannophorum of Herdonia</i>	ob merita eius	<i>AE</i> 1967.94
15. Arrenia Felicissima	<i>collegium iuvenum of Herdonia</i>	ob merita eius	<i>AE</i> 1967.95
16. Bruttia [..] Iusta	<i>Seviri Augustales of Fanum Fortunae, 2nd c.</i>	ob mer(ita) C[. . .] Iustae m[atris] eius	<i>AE</i> 1983.373
17. Varia Italia, P	Capena c. 250	dignissimae, ob merita eius	<i>AE</i> 1954.166
18. Flavia Ammia, P	Capena	ob honorem caerimoniorum honestissime praebitorum	<i>CIL</i> 11.3933
19. Iulia Paulina, P	Capena 256	ob honorem sacerdo- talem honestissimis caerimoniis praebitum . . . et postea sacerdoti Veneris bis, epulum et sportulas decur(ionibus) et municipibus praebuit	<i>AE</i> 1954.165

Table II.
Inscriptions Honoring Women for the Generosity of Male Relatives
and/or for Traditional Female Qualities

No. Name and Rank	Dedicator and Date	Vocabulary of Praise	Citation
A. Without Recognition of Any Public Benefactions from the Honoree			
20. Magia Severina	Sipontum	ob merita . . . patris eius	<i>CIL</i> 9.698
21. Iulia Lucilia	Ocriculum	cuius pater thermas Ocricolanis a solo exstructas sua pecunia donavit	<i>CIL</i> 11.4090
22. Flavia Kara Gentia, P	Anagnia	in honorem . . . patris eius	<i>CIL</i> 10.5924
23. Mammia Aufidia Titecia Maria, E	Corfinium	honestae puellae . . . ob benignitatem patris	<i>CIL</i> 9.3180
24. Gavia Fabia Rufina, E	Puteoli	honestissim(ae) matron(ae) et rarissim(ae) femin(ae) . . . uxori . . . filiae . . . sorori . . .	<i>CIL</i> 10.1785
25. Iunia Gratilla	Atina	ob pudicitiam Iuniae Gratillae Atinates . . . scholam dederunt, quam Iunius Syriarches cum filis exornavit dedicavitque	<i>CIL</i> 10.5069
B. With Recognition of Generosity of Honoree or a Female Relative			
26. Annia Rufina	Canusium	ob merita avi . . . et . . . matris eius	<i>CIL</i> 9.330
27. Rutilia Paulina	<i>Seviri Augustales</i> of Corfinium	ob merita patris et ipsius	<i>CIL</i> 9.3182
28. Abeiena Balbina P	Pisaurum	ob merita eorum	<i>CIL</i> 11.6354

Table II—*Continued*
 Inscriptions Honoring Women for the Generosity of Male Relatives
 and/or for Traditional Female Qualities

No.	Name and Rank	Dedicator and Date	Vocabulary of Praise	Citation
29.	Severina Afra	Vicus Martis Tudertium	ob merita mariti eius . . . ob eximia beneficia eius erga se merenti	<i>CIL</i> 11.475
30.	Aurelia Calligenia, E	<i>collegium fabrum</i> of Ariminum 169	pudicissimae honorificentis- simaeq(ue) feminae . . . ob munificentiam in se [ab u]trisq(ue) conlatam . . . cuius dedicat(ione) sing(ulis) d(e)d(it?) (sestertios) n(ummos) III	<i>CIL</i> 11.405
31.	Aurelia Crescentia, E	Trebula Mutuesca	honestissim[e] et pudicissime femine . . . ob merita	<i>CIL</i> 9.4894
32.	Licina Victorina, S	Hispellum	ob singularem eius castitatem et erga se munificentiam	<i>CIL</i> 11.527

THE DEVELOPMENT OF *FORE/FUTURUM UT*
FROM OVID TO FESTUS:
A STUDY IN SEMANTIC CHANGE
AND ITS BASIS IN DISCOURSE SITUATION

1. Introduction. In two previous studies¹ I provided the first systematic treatment of the syntax, meaning, and discourse functions of the so-called periphrasis of the Latin future infinitive, *fore/futurum (esse) ut(i)*,² from its first attestations in Plautus and Terence through Livy. I showed that, contrary to prevalent opinion, the construction, at least in its free instances (i.e., with verbs which have FAP's and supines), is not merely a periphrasis for the FAI or FPI. In fact I established over a score of constraints which differentiate it from the FI. After Livy the construction undergoes substantial changes. Before the construction disappears, the constraints on *fore ut* are gradually eroded, and it begins to merge semantically and pragmatically with the FI. These changes have never before been documented. I will do so here and indicate, where recoverable, the sorts of textual or discourse situations which promote them. I will also show that, in terms of historical semantics, the construction follows a gradual but coherent path of evolution, which is even, to a certain extent, predictable from theoretical considerations.

I trace these developments through the second century B.C. The construction is attested in the following authors: Ovid, Vitruvius, Seneca the Elder, Valerius Maximus, Cornelius Celsus, Seneca the

¹L. D. Stephens, "The Latin Construction *fore/futurum (esse) ut(i)*: Syntactic, Semantic, Pragmatic, and Diachronic Considerations," *AJP* 110 (1989) 595–627 and "On the Model Semantics of the Latin Construction *fore/futurum (esse) ut(i)*," *Indogermanische Forschungen* 96 (1991).

²Henceforward, I use *fore ut* to indicate all of the possibilities of the formula in the text, unless it would be confusing to do so given the presence of *futurum* in an example under discussion. In fact the relative frequency of *futurum* increases considerably at the expense of *fore* after Livy. I will employ the following abbreviations: FAI = future active infinitive, FPI = future passive infinitive (supine + *iri*), FI = future infinitive, either active or passive, FAP = future active participle, GV = governing verb. It is sometimes necessary to distinguish the cases in which the use of *fore ut* is unavoidable, if futurity is to be marked, because the verb in question lacks a FAI or FPI, from cases in which one or the other FI was available. The former cases will be referred to as "necessary," the latter as "free."

Younger, Petronius, Columela, Pliny the Elder, the *Institutio* of Quintilian, the major and minor declamations attributed to Quintilian, Frontinus, Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, Suetonius, Florus, and Festus. I have relied primarily on the list prepared by Sjöstrand,³ but have checked and supplemented this material. Sjöstrand missed a few cases, for example Petronius 78.3, which contains no departure from earlier usage, and Celsus 5.28.1D, which does (see section 3.15). In this material there are some 93 instances of *fore ut* or its finite counterpart. A rather larger number of subjunctive verbs are embedded under the construction, whether as at Quint. *Inst.* 3.8.17, with triple, asyndetic repetition of *ut*, or, in 15 cases, with co-ordinated verb phrases. (Such co-ordination attains its highest relative frequency in Tacitus and Suetonius; on the semantics see section 3.3.) Thus the material provides quite a substantial data base in which to detect innovations, particularly as they may be tested against the extensive material available for the earlier period from Plautus to Livy (cf., e.g., section 3.18).

This study is concerned with later changes in the fundamental semantic values and discourse functions characteristic of *fore ut* in the period from Plautus to Livy, but, as a prefatory observation, it is worth noting that the construction is affected by other, independent changes in Latin syntax. One of these is its appearance after *non dubito*, where, according to classical usage, *quin* and not the accusative and infinitive is expected. The A. c. I. dependent on *non dubito* is first attested at Lucr. 5.249.⁴ Its usage with *non dubito* develops through a stage in which it is generally restricted to a word order preceding *non dubito*,⁵ a serialization effect paralleled by, *inter alia*, the sequence of tenses used with the historical present in certain authors. This word order restriction has ceased to operate by the time *fore/futurum ut* is first observed with *non dubito* at Plin., ep. 6.21.7

neque enim dubito futurum ut non deponas . . .

Another development that overtakes *fore ut* is the replacement of *ut* (. . .) *non* by *ne*, first attested at Val. Max. 1.1.8

³Nils Sjöstrand, *De futuri infinitivi usu latinorum quaestiones duae* (Lund 1892).

⁴See Cyril Bailey, *Titii Lucreti Cari De Rerum Natura Libri Sex* (Oxford 1947) vol. 3. 1358 *ad loc.*

⁵A. Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik* (Munich 1965) 357.

futurum enim, si quid prodigii in ea accidisset, ne dignosceretur, utri rem divinam fieri oporteret; . . .

and 6.4.3

continuo enim rex affirmavit fore ne amplius de se Ptolemaeus queretur.

It is well known that the ultimate source of *ne* for *ut* (. . .), *non* is provided by discourse situations in which jussive or optative force is salient even when a consecutive reading is not excluded, as in one of the earliest instances at Plaut., *Poen.* 1252

ne indigna indignis di darent, id ego evenisset vellem; . . .

where it is probably not chance that the *ne* clause precedes *evenisset* and is potentially analyzable as paratactic. The proximate source for *fore ne* is probably to be sought in the use of *ne* with other verbs that introduce happenings rather than doings in which the control of an agent is salient (see section 2 on these concepts). Examples would be *accidere*, e.g., ("in einem Sonderfall"⁶) at Cic., *div.* 2.21

potest . . . accidere ne fiat . . .

and *evenire*, e.g., Val. Max. 7.4.4

quo evenit ne . . . sciret . . .

As far as the decline of the construction after the middle of the second century A.D. is concerned, spot checks reveal that it certainly does not occur in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* (probably after 160 A.D.), nor *Historia Augusta* (*Probus* 24.2 is merely a consecutive clause dependent on *tantae . . . claritudinis* [interestingly, in the context of a false prophecy by *haruspices*: cf. section 3.11]), nor the *Vulgate* (although its finite counterpart *futurum est ut* does, e.g., I *Sam.* 2:36, *Matt.* 2:13, *Luke* 9:44). A search for the construction in inscriptions remains to be done. The changes affecting *fore ut* documented below are neither isolated nor peculiar to this construction. Rather, they are part of the larger pattern of evolution of the Latin future tense system in general and, in

⁶Szantyr (note 5 above) 642.

particular, are in some ways converse complements to changes in the future periphrastic (FAP + forms of *sum*). Limitations of space, however, require that I postpone treatment of this question to a future study.

2. The synchronic state of *fore ut* through Livy. I review here the more important constraints on *fore ut* established in my earlier studies. As there, the constraints are given here in topical order. Constraints 1–5 are primarily syntactic in their formulation, and 6–11 semantic and pragmatic,⁷ and relate to the semantic parameters of [control] and [intention]. A predication has the feature value [+control] if it expresses a situation in which “one of the entities involved has the power to determine whether or not that situation will obtain.”⁸ In particular [+control] predications have agents. The feature [intention] cross-classifies [+control] predications and refers to whether the situation is or is not intended by the agent. In particular [+intention] situations exclude such qualifiers as *invitus* (of the agent), *imprudenter*, *casu*, *fortuito*, etc. Documentation of these constraints will be found in my 1989 article. Constraints 12–20 concern epistemic and deontic modality. Epistemic modality concerns notions such as certainty, probability, possibility, etc., as opposed to factuality. Deontic modality covers notions such as behavioral (as opposed to logical) necessity, obligation, permission, etc. Documentation of constraints 12–20 will be found in my 1991 article. Of course, the syntactic constraints have semantic and pragmatic motivations.

All of the constraints derive from the basic value of the construction, which is to portray future situations as happenings rather than doings. When the construction is used with verbs which normally express actions, the agents’ control over and/or intention to perform the action is either obviated in the discourse context, de-emphasized, or otherwise not salient. This function, of course, is suggested by the construction’s literal translation, “that it will be (so) that.” The effect of this basic function can be seen most immediately in constraint 5 on prolepsis and constraint 9 on the expression of realization, below. Proleptic agents do not occur with *fore ut*, because prolepsis is a prominence device which would emphasize the prototypical characteristics

⁷“Pragmatics can be usefully defined as the study of how utterances have meanings in situations,” G. N. Leach (*Principles of Pragmatics* [London 1983] x).

⁸S. C. Dik, *Functional Grammar*³ (Dordrecht 1981) 32–33.

of an agent such as control and intention and would, therefore, be incompatible with a construction that indicates happenings rather than doings. Similarly, if the realization or non-realization of the predication embedded under *fore ut* is commented on, it is formulated in terms of an impersonal construction, e.g., *id quod evenit*, since use of a normally agentival construction would contradict the portrayal of the situation in question as a happening. Reference to the future quite generally involves modal notions such as possibility, probability, necessity, certainty, confidence, doubt, etc., rather than pure indication of a future temporal relation, so that it is not surprising that there should be a modal component to the meaning of *fore ut* as well. Since expressions of certainty, by their very nature, de-emphasize notions of control and intention and tend to portray agents of actions rather as participants in events, there is a clear affinity between *fore ut* and epistemic modal qualifications such as 'certainly' and 'surely,' as reflected in constraints 12–14. Similarly, the same de-emphasis of agentival control and intention creates an affinity between *fore ut* and the compulsive (as opposed to the morally obligative) type of deontic modality, as reflected in constraints 19 and 20. Furthermore, the simple presence of an element etymologically meaning "... it will be ..." could readily have been interpreted as an explicit expression of the "neustic"⁹ or "I-say-so"¹⁰ component of utterance meaning specifically indicating a positive qualification of the principal subject's commitment to the likelihood of the embedded predication. Such an interpretation leads not only to a modal value in general, but to the specifically subjective epistemic modality reflected in constraints 15 and 16.

1. Word order. The GV and *fore* always precede *ut*, which always precedes the verb embedded under it; the GV and *fore* may occur in either order relative to each other.
2. No constituent embedded under *fore ut* may be a relative pronoun, whether in prolepsis or not, whether *coniunctio relativa* or subordinating relative.
3. *fore ut* is not co-ordinated by simple conjunctions, such as *et*, *atque*, *-que*, *sed*, with the FI, unless the verb embedded under it lacks a FI or supine; i.e., only necessary instances of *fore ut* may be co-ordinated with the FI.

⁹R. M. Hare, "Meaning and Speech Acts," *Practical Inference* (London 1971) 74–93.

¹⁰John Lyons, *Semantics* (Cambridge 1977) vol. 2. 798–809.

4. Simple negation such that *non* or *neque* has scope directly over *fore* or *futurum (esse)* does not occur.
5. The agent of the predication embedded under *fore ut*, whether expressed as nominative subject or *ab* plus ablative, never occurs in prolepsis. Other constituents, however, particularly temporal adjuncts may be proleptic.
6. As compared to the FI, *verba dicendi*, in contrast to *verba sentiendi ac cogitandi*, are avoided as GV's of *fore ut*.
7. As compared to the FI, the subject of the main verb and the subject of the verb embedded under *fore ut* rarely refer to the same person or entity.
8. Adjuncts of psychological manner, such as *aequo animo*, *libenter*, *studiose*, *gravius* (with *ferre*) are not admitted in predications embedded under *fore ut*.
9. If the later realization or non-realization of the future situation expressed by *fore ut* is explicitly commented on, it is always so done by an impersonal construction lacking an overt agent. In other words, the realization of a predication embedded under *fore ut* is always presented as a happening rather than as a doing under the control of an agent.
10. *fore ut* is never used to express an action under the control of and intended by the subject of the GV, unless it is part of a request or other directive illocutionary act.
11. As compared to the FI, *fore ut* occurs far more frequently in three types of discourse situations: 1) polite expressions, including directive speech acts; 2) portrayal of past instances of foresight, prediction, or prophecy which have proved valid; 3) assertions of certainty or conviction and assurances given to an addressee to induce him to some course of action.

The following constraints relate to modal semantics (epistemic meanings such as 'surely,' 'certainly' and deontic meanings such as compulsion and obligation):

12. The free instances of *fore ut* are never combined with clauses which serve to weaken or make more cautious the epistemic commitment of the principal subject to the probability of the predication embedded under it. Letting WEC stand for a clause of weakened epistemic commitment, and ϕ for the predication embedded under *fore ut*, we may represent constraint 12 as

$$*[\text{WEC} + \text{GV fore ut } \phi],$$
 where * means 'does not occur/is not well formed.'

13. *fore ut* does not combine with non-harmonic, epistemic adverbs, such as *fortasse*, which suggest doubt about or improbability of the predication embedded under it.
14. *fore ut* does not combine with harmonic, epistemic verbs, such as *certe*, *profecto*, *nempe*, etc., expressing certainty or a high degree of commitment to the embedded predication. Letting E Adv stand for any epistemic modal adverb, constraints 13 and 14 may be represented as

*[E Adv + GV *fore ut* ϕ].

15. *fore ut* is never governed by a modal adjective such as *probabile*, *manifestum*, or *certum*. Letting E Adj G stand for any governing phrase consisting of such an adjective, constraint 15 may be represented as

*[E Adj G *fore ut* ϕ].

16. The (free) instances of *fore ut* are subjective rather than objective in their epistemic modal value; i.e., they express a (positive) qualification of the principal subject's commitment to the probability of the occurrence of the situation referred to by his utterance or thought, more like English adverbs such as *surely*, *certainly*, etc., than like phrases such as *it is certain*.¹¹
17. When forms of *posse* are embedded under *fore ut*, they never have epistemic meaning (e.g., 'it is possible/practicable') but always refer to dynamic modality (e.g., 'can/is able'). In other words they refer to the ability or capacity of agents to act in a certain way rather than to the possibility of certain situations occurring.
18. *fore ut* is not governed by any form of *scire*.
19. *fore ut* may independently express deontic modality, but its deontic meaning is restricted to the sense of compulsion arising from some outside force or lack of alternative; *fore ut* does not express such deontic notions as moral or legal obligation. Constraint 19 may be represented as

[+deontic]: (*fore ut* ϕ) \Rightarrow [+compulsive]: (*fore ut* ϕ).

¹¹ According to J. Lyons (note 10 above) 799, "it seems clear that the main difference between subjectively and objectively modalized utterances is that the latter, but not the former, contain an unqualified, or categorical, I-say-so component. The speaker is committed by the utterance of an objectively modalized utterance to the factuality of the information he is giving to the addressee: he is performing an act of telling . . . objective modalization differs from subjective modalization, the very essence of which is to express the speaker's reservations about giving or qualified, or categorical, "I-say-so" to the factuality of the proposition embedded in his utterance. Subjectively modalized statements . . . are statements of opinion, or hearsay, or tentative inference, rather than statements of fact; and they are reported as such." Cf. also E. C. Traugott, "On the Rise of Epistemic Meanings in English: An Example of Subjectification in Semantic Change," *Language* 65 (1989) 31-35.

20. Accordingly, the gerund/gerundive, *debere*, *necesse est*, *oportet*, and other verb phrases expressing deontic modality are not embedded under *fore ut*. Letting DVP stand for a deontically modalized verb phrase, constraint 20 may be represented as
- *[fore ut ϕ (DVP)].

3. Erosion of the constraints on *fore ut* after Livy. In this section I proceed *seriatim* through the violations of the constraints listed above as they begin to occur after Livy.

3.1. Word order. *fore* is never found following *ut*. The only violation of the constraint that the GV must precede *ut* and the embedded verb occurs at Ovid, *her.* 16.279–80:

1. hoc mihi—nam repeto—fore ut a caeleste sagitta
figar, erat verax vaticinata soror.

This violation is best regarded as arising from metrical requirements of the elegiac couplet, rather than as a change which has become acceptable in the literary register during the half-generation or so separating the births of Livy and Ovid: it is never found in prose.

It is interesting to note that the discourse situation of the violation in example 1 remains that of the characteristic type 2, prophecy proved valid; cf. the immediately preceding verses 277–78. In fact, aside from this violation, Ovid observes all the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic constraints on *fore ut* in force before Livy.

3.2. Relativization. This constraint is never violated. The preservation of this constraint is fairly readily explained. The relativization of any constituent of the predication embedded under *fore ut* would produce a species of *relative Verschränkung* as in

2. aberat omnis dolor, qui si adesset nec molliter ferret; . . .
(Cic., *fin.* 2.64)

Relative Verschränkung, however, like *coniunctio relativa*, declines in frequency in later Latin.

3.3. Non-harmonic co-ordination. This constraint is violated only at Suetonius 2.97:

3. sub idem tempus ictu fulminis ex inscriptione statuae eius prima nominis littera effluxit; responsum est, centum solos dies posthac victurum, quem numerum C littera notaret, futurumque ut inter deos referretur, . . .

The constraint against non-harmonic conjunction arises from the semantic and pragmatic differences between *fore ut* and the FI: simple co-ordination is, in general, used for the connection of semantically more similar and pragmatically more closely parallel items, so that simply co-ordinated predications are less likely to differ in those features that would motivate switching between *fore ut* and the FI. Accordingly, in 4 we can observe Livy changing from *fore ut* to the FI in predications linked by temporal *inde*, when the subject of the second becomes the same as that of the principal subject and the action referred to is under the control of and intended by the principal subject:

4. sperantes fore ut Romani equites abeuntium novissimum agmen aggrederentur; inde . . . se, qui equitatu et levi armatura plus possent, conversuros aciem. (Livy 42.57.11)

Thus, unnecessary non-harmonic co-ordination of *fore ut* with the FI is evidence for the effacement of the differences between *fore ut* and the FI. The violation in 3, however, is basically syntactic and does not involve the motivating differences in terms of the semantic parameters of [control] and [intention] of the principal subject. *victurum* is not under Augustus' control, and he is the patient of the passive verb *referretur*, not its controlling agent. Even so, it is probably not chance that *fore ut* is not found co-ordinated with the FI until after the appearance of considerable evidence for the semantic and pragmatic merger of *fore ut* with the FI, as represented by the effacements of constraints 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, and 18 (see the respective subsections).

3.4. Negation. This constraint is violated at Valerius Maximus 4.1.12:

5. idem filios suos monuit ut funebri eius lecto humeros subicerent, atque huic exequiarum illum honorem vocis adiecit, non fore ut postea id officium ab illis maiori viro praestari posset.

[Quint.] *decl. maior* 4.19:

6. mathematicus hoc non futurum dixit ut vellem, sed ut occiderem . . .

is not a violation, since the scope of *non* is over *dixit*, not *futurum*: "he did not say X, but Y."

The constraint against direct negation of *fore* is related to the difference between subjective and objective modality and is exactly parallel to the constraint against direct negation of the modal verbs *debere* and *oportet* in their epistemic meanings of 'surely, certainly' (but not in their deontic meanings of 'ought, should'). This more general constraint derives from the subjective nature of the epistemic modality expressed by these forms.¹² In contrast, the objective epistemic modal *necesse est* may be directly negated. Similar constraints on the negation of subjective epistemic modal expressions can be found in other languages. For example, in English, the modal adverbs *certainly*, *surely*, *probably*, *possibly*, etc., cannot be directly negated, whereas the objective modal phrases of the corresponding adjectives plus forms of *to be* may be so negated. Thus violation of constraint 4 indicates that *fore ut* is losing its primarily subjective character.

3.5. There is no violation of the constraint against prolepsis of the agent of the predication embedded under *fore ut*. The preservation of constraint 5 is not surprising, since prolepsis in general declines in the literary register, except for archaizing authors. (It remains frequent, of course, in registers closer to vulgar Latin, as in Chiron.) The general decline in prolepsis of all types of constituents of predications embedded under *fore ut* is striking. In the material from Plautus to Livy, obligatory constituents, such as the semantic patient of the embedded verb sometimes occur in prolepsis, e.g.,

7. ea comitia puto fore ut ducantur.

(Cic., *Att.* 90.7)

Prolepsis of obligatory constituents does not occur in the material from Ovid to Festus (but prolepsis of a patient constituent is found in the *Vulgate* at Luke 9:44). Whereas in the earlier period approximately half of optional adverbial, prepositional, and nominal constituents having the semantic functions of means, manner, cause, result, attendant circumstance, and the like occur in prolepsis, none are so found in the later material, except for *ita* (twice) and *sic* (once). (*certe* at Festus 464.1–32 will be discussed at 3.14 below.) Temporal adjuncts, such as

¹²Cf. A. M. Bolkestein, *Problems in the Description of Modal Verbs* (Assen 1980) 72–73, 100–101, 116, 130–31.

tarde, protinus, brevi, etc., are the only semantic type which remains more or less admissible in prolepsis, but the proportion of temporal adjuncts in prolepsis declines significantly to about 21% from 55% in the earlier material.

3.6. *verba dicendi* as GV's. Verb phrases of saying, writing, predicting (i.e., *verba dicendi* in the wide sense), as opposed to verb phrases of thinking, believing, knowing, certainty, hoping, etc., (i.e., *verba sentiendi ac cogitandi* in the wide sense) as phrases governing *fore ut* increase in frequency after Livy. In the later period the overall odds for *verba dicendi* (55% to 45%) increase two and a third times over the odds from Plautus to Livy (34% to 66%), a statistically significant difference. In the earlier period, *verba dicendi* are more frequent governing necessary or passive instances of *fore ut* than governing the free, active instances. Proportionally, the greatest increase in frequency in the later period occurs in just the class of free, active instances. The restricted occurrence of *verba dicendi*, particularly with the free, active instances of *fore ut*, in the earlier period is in part a consequence of constraint 10: if available, the FAI is used instead of *fore ut* when a person asserts that he will intentionally perform an action which is under his control. The increase in frequency of the use of *fore ut* after *verba dicendi* indicates its spread to contexts which are likely to undermine constraint 10.

3.7. Co-reference of principal and embedded subjects. Among the free active instances of *fore ut* dependent on GV's with personal subjects, the rate of coreferentiality between the principal and embedded subjects does not change significantly.

3.8. Adjuncts of psychological manner. Optional constituents of this semantic class continue to be excluded from predications embedded under *fore ut*. The relative proportions of the class of temporal adjuncts, on the one hand, and the more open class of manner adjuncts, means, cause, result, etc., on the other remain basically unchanged: respectively 54.55% and 45.45% from Ovid to Festus and 46.15% and 53.85% from Plautus to Livy. The one important development in regard to adjuncts is the appearance of the epistemic modal adverb *certe* at Festus 150.25L, which will be discussed at section 3.14.

3.9. Realization of the embedded predication. This constraint against the expression of the realization of a predication embedded under *fore*

ut as an action under the control of the agent of the embedded predication cannot be directly tested, since explicit authorial comments on the realization of the predications in question do not occur in the material from Ovid to Festus. It is, however, encroached upon in the reverse situation, in which a completed [+control] action is characterized as having been predicted. In the material from Plautus to Livy, this reverse situation always requires the FAI, not *fore ut*, e.g.,

8. cum illi ipsi venissent quos ego iam multis ac summis viris ad me id temporis venturos esse praedixeram. (Cic., *Catil.* 1.10.5)

Tacitus, however, uses *fore ut* to describe the prediction of the murder of Agrippina after the event.

9. hunc sui finem multos ante annos crediderat Agrippina contempseratque. nam consulenti super Nerone responderunt Chaldaei fore ut imperaret matremque occideret; . . . (Tac., *ann.* 14.9)

Example 9, nevertheless, is not a full violation, since, in its textual situation, the completed action is not described by a personal [+control] verb, but referred to by the noun phrase *hunc finem*.

3.10. Actions intended and controlled by the principal subject. Together with constraint 9, the constraint against using *fore ut* to express an action under the control of and intended by the subject of the GV is the semantically most revealing. It points to the general association of the construction with discourse/textual situations in which it is more appropriate to portray a situation as an event that will happen rather than an action that an agent will perform under his own control. Such an association is only to be expected from the etymological meaning of *fore/futurum ut* (in *oratio obliqua*) "that it will be (so) that. . . ." I have argued that the construction developed by gradual, analogical generalization from a prototypical use for only [–control] situations. By the time of Cicero, the free use of the construction had spread to verbs which in normal textual situations express [+control, +intention] actions, but only in the very restricted pragmatic context of polite requests. To understand the processes which led to this state of the construction and which set the stage for the erosion of constraint 10, it is necessary to examine the pragmatic and textual situations in more detail than provided by my 1989 article. The earliest attestation of *fore ut* occurs in a request; it is a necessary instance since the embedded verb

has no FI; and furthermore that verb is *fieri*, so that the situation is explicitly portrayed as a [– control], and therefore [– intention], event which, in the context, is obviously undesired:

10. (Simo) hoc ego numquam ratu' sum
fore me ut tibi fierem supplex . . .
nonne audes, quaesso, aliquam partem mihi gratiam facere hinc de
argento? (Plaut., *Pseud.* 1318–19, 1322)

In the same pragmatic situation, with the identical governing phrase, the construction was generalized to free instances of [– control] verbs as in

11. numquam ego ratus sum fore ut rex maximus in hac terra et omnium,
quos novi, privato homini gratiam deberem. (Sall., *Iug.* 110.1)

where the situation is also clearly not desired by the principal subject. Again, in the same pragmatic situation and with a nearly identical governing phrase, the construction spread to verbs which are normally [+ control, + intention], but in such a way as still to portray the action of the embedded predication as unintended, and in fact the result of circumstances beyond the agent's control (note *patior*), as in

12. numquam putavi fore ut supplex ad te venirem; sed hercule facile
patior datum tempus in quo amorem experirer tuum . . . amabo te,
da mihi et hoc . . . (Cic., *Att.* 407C.1)

The next stage is represented by the spread of the construction from the introduction to a request to its conclusion: thanks in advance, as it were, as in

13. etsi iam sperabam, cum has litteras acceperis, fore ut ea quae superioribus litteris a te petissemus impetrata essent, tamen non faciam finem rogandi quoad nobis nuntiatum erit te id fecisse quod magna cum spe expectamus. deinde enim confido fore ut alio genere litterarum utamur tibi pro tuo summo beneficio gratias agamus. (Cic., *Att.* 407E.2)

In 13 the predication embedded under the second occurrence of *fore ut* is no longer portrayed as undesirable or unintended. Yet, since compliance with a request (*impetrata*) is a felicity condition for the speech act of thanking (*gratias agamus*), the situation remains contingent, and not

actually under Cicero's control; pragmatically, it is a polite way for Cicero to express his confidence that Atticus will comply with his request.

It should also be noted that there is an additional constraint on the use of *fore ut* with normally [+control, +intention] verbs in request situations, which I did not note in my 1989 article. Those situations are always direct, first person requests, or imperatives, not reports or portrayals in the second or third person of such requests by someone other than the original speaker/writer.

The synchronic state of the construction attained in Cicero is obviously unstable, and one would expect further generalization of the range of usage. A spread to third person, reported situations, which, moreover, while still directive in illocutionary force, lack the element of politeness and de-emphasis on intention, is found in the minor declamations attributed to Quintilian.

14. maior frater minorem in adulterio deprehendit. pro (eo) rogante patre et abdicationem eius promittente, dimisit . . . quid enim mihi pollicitus est pater? si dimissem, futurum ut abdicaret fratrem meum.
 ([Quint.] *decl. minor* 275.0–3W)

This degree of violation of constraint 10 will be denoted by V(10.1). The next stage in the generalization of the construction that might be expected would be the effacement of the restriction to contexts of directive illocutionary force. Frontinus provides an instructive example of the processes by which this restriction was lost in the literary language. Consider

15. Ti. Gracchus, cum edixisset futurum ut ex volonum numero fortibus libertatem daret, ignavos crucibus adfigeret . . .
 (Frontinus, *strat.* 4.7.24)

Here *daret* and *adfigeret* are both [+control] and [+intention]. Moreover, there is no overt indication that the context involves directive illocutionary force. Exactly the same episode is treated by Livy in 16, and he uses the FI, not *fore* or *futurum ut*:

16. qui caput hostis rettulisset, eum se extemplo liberum iussurum esse; qui loco cessisset, in eum servili supplicio animadversurum; . . .
 (Livy 24.14.7)

From Livy's account, it is clear that Tiberius Gracchus' words are part of an exhortation before battle, and thus, in fact, situated in a context of directive illocutionary force. It is clear, therefore, that Livy had not generalized the use of *fore ut* to third person, reported directive contexts as observed in the minor declamations attributed to Quintilian (14 above). Furthermore, the narrative at Livy 24.14 is an unlikely textual situation for such a generalization, so long as *fore ut* maintained its association with de-emphasis on the control and intention of the agent, for Livy explicitly remarks on Tiberius Gracchus' desire to grant freedom to the *volones* (cf. 24.14.3–4). In contrast, Frontinus gives no indication that the context of *edixisset* is adhortatory. Nevertheless, the departure from constraint 10 is minimal, since Frontinus and his audience would either have known or could have conjectured the fuller context. Thus, in effect, we have the extension of a construction warranted in a specific type of pragmatic function, as in 14, to a textual situation in which that function is no longer salient, but at the same time, with which it is not incompatible. This degree of violation of constraint 10 will be denoted by V(10.2). It is well known that much semantic change takes place through gradual, contextually conditioned loss of salience of the distinctive values of semantic features, rather than by one step, categorical reversal of the values of those features: *lingua non facit saltus*. The complete loss of constraint 10 (denoted by V[10.3]) is also attested in Frontinus

17. Cyzicum cum oppugnaret Mithridates, captivos eius urbis produxit ostenditque obsessis, arbitratus futurum ut miseratione suorum compelleret ad deditionem oppidanos; . . . (Front., *strat.* 4.5.21)

In contrast to 16, 17 does not contain any performative speech act at all. It is clear from the context and from the ablative of means *miseratione* (since adjuncts in the semantic function of means may occur only in [+control] predications) that the embedded predication must be [+control, +intention]. At this stage, *fore/futurum ut* has merged with the FI in terms of pragmatic function and of the semantic parameters of agent coreferentiality, [control] and [intention].

Since it is the tendency to associate *fore ut* with the portrayal of situations as events not under the control of agents that motivates constraint 9, which requires the realization of predication embedded under *fore ut* to be stated via impersonal, [–control] constructions, that association would have to be weakened before constraint 9 was lost. Conse-

quently, while there is evidence for only a partial loss of constraint 9, it is only to be expected that violation of constraint 10, which is direct evidence for the disappearance of the association, should precede the partial violation of constraint 9. Furthermore, since constraint 3 against co-ordination of *fore ut* with the FI rests on the semantic and pragmatic differences between them, it is not surprising that both constraints 10 and 9 should appear at least partially violated before constraint 3. Moreover, since it has been possible to distinguish three degrees of violation of the semantic substance underlying constraint 10, the following order of violation of the constraints in question may be taken as well motivated:

$$V(10.1) > V(10.2) > V(10.3) > V(9) > V(3)$$

where the decimals refer to the degree of violation and $>$ means 'is a necessary stage in the development toward and does not chronologically follow.'

3.11. Discourse situations. In comparison to the material from Plautus to Livy, in the period from Ovid to Festus there is a decline, though small, in the proportion of instances of *fore ut* which occur in discourse situations of Type 1, polite expressions, especially requests; Type 2, portrayals of foresight, prediction, or prophecy which have proved valid; and Type 3, assertions of certainty or conviction and assurances given to an addressee to induce him to some course of action. More important is the change in the relative frequency of these three types. Type 1 decreases substantially, and Type 2 increases greatly, accounting for, respectively, 14% and 54% of these types. The increase in Type 2 is not surprising given the increased interest in omens and prophecy of the writers in the later period; in fact, two-thirds of the instances in Suetonius are of Type 2. Striking also is the emergence of two new, well-defined types of discourse situation. The first constitutes a generalization of Type 3 situations to threats. The use of *fore/futurum ut* to express the content of a threat is found first in Valerius Maximus

18. quo aperte denuntiabat futurum ut spiritum poenae inperderent,
quem pugnae dubitassent. (Val. Max. 2.7.ext.2)

Note also the very clear case

19. nec multo post in senatu Pompeio cuidam equiti Romano quiddam perneganti, dum vincula minatur, affirmavit fore ut ex Pompeio Pompeianus fieret, acerba cavillatione simul hominis nomen incessens veteremque partium fortunam. (Suet. 3.57)

The use of the construction in threats is a genuine innovation, since in the period from Plautus to Livy only the FI is used, and not *fore ut*, e.g.,

- 19.a. huc nisi venirem Kalendis Septembribus, etiam fabros se missurum et domum meam disturbaturum esse dixit. (Cic., *Phil.* 5.19)

Cf. Cic., *Phil.* 1.12.

- 19.b. ex qua se instructum et paratum ad urbem venturum esse minatur. (Cic., *Phil.* 3.1)

The second new situation is the presentation of the content of *rumor*. This usage occurs in the minor declamations attributed to Quintilian

- 20.a. rumor erat futurum ut pauperis filia sacerdos crearetur. (*decl. min.* 252.0W)

but is most widespread in Tacitus, e.g.,

- 20.b. ac tum rumor incesserat fore ut disiecti aliisque nationibus permixti diversas in terras traherentur. (Tac., *ann.* 4.46)
 20.c. mox, quia rumor incedebat fore ut nuru ac nepoti conciliaretur Caesar, saevitiam quam paenitentiam maluit. (Tac., *ann.* 6.23)

Cf. also *ann.* 1.5, *hist.* 1.54. When *rumor erat/incedebat/* etc., governs *fore ut*, the verb of the embedded predication is always passive. The use of *fore ut* after *rumor* is a genuine innovation, since the use of the supine + *iri* in this function had been established since Terence:

21. quom interea rumor venit
 datum iri gladiatores, populu' convolat, . . . (Ter., *Hec.* 40)

3.12. Combination with clauses indicating weakened epistemic commitment of the principal subject. Constraint 12 arises from the fact that

24. rem de qua deliberatur aut certum est posse fieri aut incertum. si incertum . . . cum autem de hoc quaeritur, coniectura est: an Isthmos intercidi, an siccari palus Pomptina, an portus fieri Ostiae possit, an Alexander terras ultra Oceanum sit inventurus.

(Quint., *inst.* 3.8.16)

It will be noticed that in these indirect questions, where it is possibility that is in question, Quintilian expresses the future temporal relation by the future periphrastic (*sit inventurus*), not by the subjunctive equivalent of our construction, *futurum sit ut* plus subjunctive verb. In clear contrast, in 23, where he treats situations, the possibility of which is certain (*constabit posse fieri*), he uses *futurum sit ut* for the corresponding indirect questions, not the future periphrastic. Thus, as the Loeb translation with *likely* makes clear, *futurum sit ut* is distinguished from the FAP plus *sit* as probability is distinguished from possibility. Nevertheless, the entire context is concerned with *coniectura* and thus encompasses a lower segment of the epistemic modal scale than that with which *fore/futurum ut* is associated in the period from Plautus to Livy (contrast, e.g., Cic., *fam.* 22.5.4 and *acad.* 2.100 with the FI).

It should be clearly understood, moreover, that the semantic change just documented is one of extension rather than replacement. At least in its corresponding finite form, the construction can still independently indicate the higher (or "certainty") end of the epistemic modal scale, as its use in parallel with epistemic *necesse est* in Cornelius Celsus shows:

25. quamvis autem non abscisus nervus est, tamen si circa tumor durus diu permanet, necesse est et diuturnum ulcus esse et sano quoque eo tumorem permanere; futurumque est ut tarde membrum id vel extendatur vel contrahatur.

(Celsus 5.26.28B)

3.13 Non-combination with non-harmonic modal adverbs is readily explained by the association of *fore ut* with the highest end of the epistemic modal scale and by the fact that modal adverbs and the construction both qualify the principal subject's epistemic commitment and thus, both, have co-extensive scopes. Consequently an occurrence with non-harmonic modal adverbs such as *fortasse* would produce an incompatibility similar to English *perhaps surely* or even *perhaps probably*. Even with the extension of *fore ut* to objective epistemic modal

uses (see section 3.14 below), the constraint against combination with non-harmonic modal adverbs would be expected to remain in force, since, in general, as Bolkestein¹⁴ remarks, "it is less acceptable to subjectively specify one's commitment to a probability (of some state of affairs being the case) as a weak one when the probability is 'objectively' stated to be a strong one . . . than it is the other way round: to subjectively specify one's strong commitment to a probability objectively stated to be weak. . . ." Accordingly, no violation of constraint 13 is found in the material from Ovid to Festus.

3.14. Combination with harmonic modal adverbs. The constraint against co-occurrence of *fore ut* with harmonic epistemic adverbs such as *certe* and *profecto*, unlike constraint 13, is not motivated by strong and outright semantic incompatibility between the high and low ends of the epistemic modal scale. Rather, it may be the result either of the redundancy of such combination or, perhaps, of the fact that *fore ut* occupies a narrower portion of the scale so that such apparently harmonic modal adverbs do not actually reinforce it. *fore ut* shares constraint 14 with *oportet*, in its epistemic meaning, but not with *debere*. Whatever form the ultimate, exact, explanation of constraint 14 may take, it does not seem to be related to the difference between objective and subjective modality. A difference in the scope of the modal elements is not necessary for semantic compatibility in the case of harmonic reinforcement, since there is a single modality running through the whole predication, although expressed in more than one place. Furthermore, there is no evidence that, in combination with harmonic modal adverbs, epistemic *debere* always requires an objective interpretation.

In section 3.12 we have seen evidence for the extension of *fore ut* to a lower portion of the epistemic modal scale. When this extension becomes established, it ceases to be redundant or uninformative to combine the construction with harmonic adverbs such as *certe*, since they can now reinforce its modality. Such combination is indeed found, but, in accordance with the evidence from Celsus for the persistence of the association of *fore ut* with the uppermost end of the scale, it does not occur until Festus:

¹⁴Bolkestein (note 12 above) 74.

26. rusum itaque consultus Apollo respondit, non esse persolutum ab his votum, quod homines immolati non essent: quos si expulissent, certe fore ut ea clade liberarentur. (Festus 150.23–26L)

3.15. Modal adjectives governing *fore ut*. Like English modal adjectives plus *that*-clauses (type *it is certain/probable that . . .*), Latin (neuter) modal adjectives plus *accusativus cum infinitivo* are objective modals; i.e., they are used for the unqualified assertions of some degree of probability of a situation rather than for the assertions of some situation, the speaker's commitment to which he qualifies to some degree. The fact that, from Plautus to Livy, they may not govern *fore ut* can be explained as a result of scope conflict. It is an apparently language universal rule that subjective epistemic modality must have wide scope, in particular scope over any objective modality. Structures such as *certum erat fore ut* would violate this rule by placing the subjective modal element within the syntactic scope of the objective element. Thus the occurrence of *fore ut* governed by a (neuter) modal adjective is evidence that the construction has acquired objective as well as subjective senses. Such a structure occurs first in Valerius Maximus

27. nam cum ad excidium eius summo studio Alexander ferretur progressumque extra moenia Anaximenen praeceptorem suum vidisset, quia manifestum erat futurum ut preces suas irae eius opponeret, non facturum se quod petisset iuravit. (Val. Max. 7.3.ext.4)

The next occurrence is in the minor declamations attributed to Quintilian.

- 28.a. cum interrogasses, certum erat fore ut protinus cupiditas aliqua in animum tuum descenderet; et, cum concupisses, ut raperes. (decl. min. 301.16W)

There is an important difference between the discourse situations in examples 27 and 28.a which suggests the way in which this change in usage developed. The textual situations such as that in 27 must have been an important factor promoting the generalization of *fore ut* to objective, epistemic modal uses. Grammatically impersonal expressions of evidentness or obviousness may be narratively salient because they implicate a subjective state of certain belief on the part of a partici-

pant in that narrative, and thus overlap in discourse function with an explicit portrayal of that state via typically subjective GV's. Consequently, the use of *fore/futurum ut* in such situations would not constitute a complete violation of the semantic and pragmatic substance of constraint 15. This contextually mitigated degree of violation of constraint 15 will be represented as V(15.1). The complete violation as seen in 28.a will be represented as V(15.2). Furthermore, a stage intermediate between 27 and 28.a can be observed in Celsus:

28.b. certaue esse fiducia potest fore ut undique vitiosa caro exci-
dat . . . (Celsus 5.28.1D)

where there is no narrative participant involved and the modal adjective is predicative on *fiducia*. It is surely not accidental that the first occurrence of *fore/futurum ut* embedded under a neuter adjective of epistemic character occurs in just such a situation of overlap as in 27, well before such embedding in a fully objective discourse situation as in 28.a.

3.16. Restriction to subjective epistemic modality. We have seen already in the preceding section the first stage in the extension of *fore ut* to objective modal sense, namely its use after neuter modal adjectives which in their textual situations implicate the subjective commitment of a narrative participant to the embedded predication (V[15.1]). Fully objective usage was facilitated by the development of the finite counterpart of infinitival *fore/futurum ut*.¹⁵ Examples have already been give at 23 and 25 (V[16]). As has also been noted above, constraint 4 against direct negation of *fore ut* is connected with its subjective character. Just as V(15.1) is evidence for a growing affinity for objective uses, so is V(4). While there is no reason to expect V(4) either to precede or follow V(15.1), both may be expected to precede V(16). Furthermore, since the development of an objective epistemic value of *fore ut* is necessary if it is to be governed without scope conflict by a neuter epistemic adjective in textual situations which do not implicate the subjectivity of a narrative participant (V[15.2]), we may take the following partial ordering of the appearance of the violations to be well motivated:

¹⁵The first occurrence appears to be Cic., *Flacc.* 2: quod si esset aliquando futurum ut aliquis de L. Flacci pernicie cogitaret.

V(4), V(15.1) > V(16) > V(15.2)

3.17. Dynamic *posse*.

29. = 5.

It is obvious that by *posset* in this passage, Metellus is not referring to the ability or capacity of his sons to carry a funeral bier or perform funeral rites in the future. Rather, he is asserting that it is not possible for a situation to come about in which they will do so for a greater man. Consequently, the force of *posset* here is epistemic rather than dynamic. Violation of constraint 17 constitutes a generalization of the epistemic modal uses of *fore ut*, since with it the construction can appear in utterances containing two modalities, an objective one expressed by *posse* and a subjective one potentially expressed by *fore ut*.

3.18. *scire* governing *fore ut*. In its basic uses *scire* is a factive verb,¹⁶ in that by using it in normal contexts a speaker/writer commits himself to the truth of the *accusativus cum infinitivo* predication embedded under it. Whether or not justifiable in epistemology, the future can be treated as known in Latin as well as English, so that the FI is perfectly acceptable after *scire*. Lyons¹⁷ characterizes 'know' as follows: "if [a speaker] employs 'know' rather than 'believe,' he is making a stronger commitment: by employing 'know' he is claiming that his belief in the truth of *p* is well grounded and in his judgement at least unassailable, and by virtue of this fact, which he should be able to substantiate, if called upon to do so, by providing the evidence, he has the right to assert *p* and to authorize others to subscribe to its truth." Nevertheless, *know* or *scire* epistemically modalizes an utterance, since each introduces an explicit epistemic qualification. The fact that *fore ut*, in the period from Plautus to Livy, is never governed by *scire*, but is governed by *verba sentiendi ac cogitandi* in the "belief" range, such as *confidere*, *putare*, *rerī*, etc., provides an upper bound to that part of the epistemic modal scale to which the construction is applicable. It is associated with certainty and high degrees of commitment, but not with factivity.

¹⁶On factivity see P. and C. Kiparsky, "Fact," *Progress in Linguistics*, ed. M. Bierwisch and K. Heidolph (The Hague 1970) 143–73, and reprinted in *Semantics*, ed. D. Steinberg and L. Jakobovits (Cambridge 1971) 345–69.

¹⁷J. Lyons (note 10 above) 794.

scire, like English *know*, however, is not factive (i.e., does not commit the speaker/writer to belief in the truth of its complement) in all discourse or textual situations. It may be used ironically or in hyperbole (as commonly with English *just know*). Such pragmatically non-factive usages could provide the entry point for embedding *fore/futurum ut* under *scire*. Just such a usage is found in Seneca the Younger's anecdote about a Pythagorean:

30. sutor ille, quem quaeris, elatus, combustus est; quod nobis fortasse molestum est, qui in aeternum nostros amittimus tibi minime, qui scis futurum ut renascatur. iocatus in Pythagoricum. (Sen., *de ben.* 7.21.1)

Embedding under *scire*, however, was already well established in his father's time, e.g.,

31. si hic desiero, scio futurum ut vos illo loco desinatis legere quo ego a scholasticis recessi; . . . (Sen., *suas.* 6.27)

It is important to realize just how significant an innovation Seneca the Elder's is in comparison to earlier usage. Taking into consideration all types of the construction, necessary, free, with active, and with passivized verbs, I find no case of *fore ut* embedded under *scire* in 123 instances from Plautus to Livy. By contrast three of the nine cases in Seneca the Elder are embedded under *scire*. If in fact there had been no change, and *scire* plus *fore ut* were uniformly acceptable in the earlier period and in Seneca the Elder, there would be a chance of only one in five thousand ($p = 129! 9!/132! 6!$) that all three instances should at random be restricted to Seneca the Elder.

Violation of constraint 18 is evidence for the generalization of *fore ut* up the epistemic modal scale. Moreover, from theoretical considerations, the loss of constraint 18 likely established the conditions which led to the generalization of *fore ut* down to a lower portion of the epistemic scale, as seen in section 3.12. So long as *fore ut* was restricted to governing *verba sentiendi* in the "belief" range of the epistemic scale, it contrasted with the FI more or less as certainty versus probability (and lower points), but did not itself occur in saliently different epistemic ranges. When, however, it became established as a complement to *scire*, there arose a contrast between utterances of the types *scio fore ut* and *puto fore ut*, which did contrast in terms of a salient difference in epistemic range. Furthermore, the new contrast *scio fore ut* : *puto fore*

ut stood in a proportional semantic analogy with *scio* FI : *puto* FI. At this stage, it was but a small step to extend the analogy to a further term involving contexts of weakened epistemic commitment (WEC). As noted in section 3.17, from occurrences in the context of overt WEC, the construction was further extended to independent use in the lower, 'likely' range of the scale. After that usage was established, it could then be informatively reinforced by epistemic modal adverbs in the 'surely' range of the scale. Thus the effacement of constraint 18 could have been the starting point for a whole series of modal semantic changes as evidenced by the violation of the following constraints, the degree of violation being indicated by the decimal:

$$V(18) > V(12.1) > V(12.2) > V(14)$$

I believe that it is quite likely that this was in fact the actual causal sequence of events. The data are certainly in accord with the hypothesis. The embedding of *fore ut* under *scire* is well established before the first evidence of the combination of *fore ut* with clauses of weakened epistemic commitment. *fore ut* continues to be associated with the higher end of the epistemic modal for some time. Finally, modal reinforcement of *fore ut* does not occur until the end of the later period. Furthermore, it is *a priori* likely that the loss of constraint 18 was a smaller and easier transition than the loss of constraint 12, for, as has been observed above, there are fully warranted discourse situations in which embedding *fore ut* under *scio* would not have been an outright violation of constraint 18, whereas situations promoting loss of constraint 12 seem less readily available.

3.19–20. Deontic modality. For a long time into the period after Livy, *fore ut* continues to be able to signal independently of any other overt element the compulsive sense of deontic modality, as in

32. *cumque vulgo fore praedicarent ut si privatus redisset, Milonis exemplo circumpositis armatis causam apud iudices diceret.* (Suet. 1.30)

Nevertheless, just as its original range along the epistemic modal scale is gradually widened, so too is its range along the deontic. Evidence for its deontic generalization, however, is not forthcoming until Festus:

33. sacrificium fit cap(ite aperto) . . . Metellus pontifex (maximus Claudium augurem iussis)set adesse[t], ut eum . . . (Sul)pici Ser. f. inaug(uratio) . . . ret se sacra sibi fam(iliaria . . . sup)plicandum esset capite . . . esset, futurum ut cum ap(erto capite) . . . facienda esset, pontif(ex) . . . Claudius provocavit. (Festus, 462.28–36/464.12)

Although the passage is badly mutilated, its content can be reconstructed,¹⁸ and it is absolutely certain that the gerundive *facienda esset* is embedded under *futurum ut*. Thus passage 33 constitutes a violation of constraint 20. Moreover, and more importantly for the semantics, the sense of the gerundive in 33 is not that of compulsion arising from some outside force, but rather of a religious obligation. Consequently 33 is also evidence of the erosion of constraint 19.

The violations of constraints 19 and 20 are unlikely to have been abrupt innovations by Festus. In the case of his violation of constraint 14, concerning epistemic modality, it was possible to document the intervening stages in the evolution of *fore ut* which led up to that point. We may suppose that there was a parallel, gradual evolution of the deontic modality of *fore ut* leading up to 33.

The restriction of *fore ut* to the compulsive sense of deontic modality arises from the association of the construction with situations neither controlled nor intended by an agent. Certainly a special case of such situations are those in which an agent acts under outside compulsion. Furthermore, it would be impossible for an agent to assert (or be portrayed as asserting) a moral obligation which he fully accepts and intends to fulfill, as Claudius does in 33, without seriously encroaching on the semantic basis of constraint 10. Therefore, violation of constraint 19 or 20 would not be expected to occur until after the complete loss of 10. Since three degrees of violation of 10 have been differentiated, we may take the ordering:

$$V(10.1) > V(10.2) > V(10.3) > V(19), V(20)$$

to be motivated.

¹⁸Cf. the supplements of Theodor Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*³ 2.Bd.1.Abt. (Leipzig 1887) 35, n. 1. See also F. Bona, "Aeterio Capitone et Fest. 462.28L, (Saturno) sacrificium fit cap(ite aperto)," *SDHI* 29 (1963) 316–25; B. Gledigow, "Condictio und inauguratio. Ein Beitrag zur römischen Sakralverfassung," *Hermes* 98 (1970) 369–79; and J. Linderski, *The Augural Law* (ANRW II, 16.3 [1986] 2146–2312) 2219, n. 275.

4. Distribution of violations. In the 93 instances of *fore ut* or its finite counterpart, 14 of the 18 categorical constraints discussed above are found to be violated at least to some degree. Clear cases of these violations total 33, or about 10 violations of some kind for every 28 occurrences of the construction (rate = .355). That none of these 33 instances of violation occur in the even more extensive data-set from Plautus to Livy is obviously statistically significant. These violations, moreover, are not randomly distributed over the authors and works considered or in relation to each other. Their distribution may be portrayed by matrix in which each row corresponds to a degree of violation of a constraint and each column to an author or work with the number of violations of each type in each author or work given in the cell at the intersection of the corresponding row and column.

It is, unfortunately, not possible to arrange the authors and works according to a completely well-ordered, rigid chronology. The major uncertainty concerns the minor declamations attributed to Quintilian. Winterbottom¹⁹ believes that "in all probability they will postdate the *Institutio* (c. 90 A.D.)" and considers the lexical and syntactic evidence to be consistent with a dating to the second or even first century. The problem is exacerbated by the possibility that the *Declamationes minores* may contain considerably later material. Consequently, if a violation is first attested in them, it may be concluded only that it does not occur until after Quintilian but not that it occurs before another author. To emphasize this limitation, a vertical line has been inserted down the right hand side of the column corresponding to the *Declamationes minores*. The ordering of the remaining authors in whom violations are attested is on the whole unproblematic except in the case of two pairs. The relative chronological positions of Valerius Maximus and Cornelius Celsus and of Quintilian and Frontinus (both born ca. 35 A.D.) are quite close respectively. In each of the two pairs, the author writing in the relatively more technical genre has been placed after the author writing in the relatively more literary one on the grounds that there is ample evidence from the historical study of other syntactic and semantic phenomena in Latin that the more technical genres admit innovations earlier and more readily than the more literary, and, thus, that given one of the former and one of the latter, both of approximately the same date, if an innovation has penetrated into the former, but not the latter, it has

¹⁹M. W. Winterbottom, *The Minor Declamations Ascribed to Quintilian* (Berlin 1984) xv.

presumably had less time in which to do so. I, of course, do not wish to suggest that synchronic generic or register differences invariably imply diachronic differences. The constraints violated are ranged down the vertical axis of the table according to the position of their first occurrence in the chronological/generic partial ordering described above. As an aid to reading, an asterisk (*) is used to mark first attestations. In certain cases it has been possible in the foregoing discussion to distinguish between degrees of violation of the semantic substance underlying a given constraint. These degrees of violation are represented by a decimal following the constraint number. In particular, 10.1 refers to the use of *fore ut* for [+control, +intention] predication in contexts of reported, rather than direct first person, directive illocutionary force and 10.2 and 10.3 to the extension to contexts not involving directive illocutionary force. 11.1 refers to the use of *fore ut* in threats and 11.2 to give the content of rumors (11.1 and 11.2 do not necessarily correspond to a gradable difference in degree of innovation). 12.1 refers to the co-occurrence of *fore ut* with clauses of weakened epistemic commitment.

[illegible]

12.2 to independent use to indicate a lower range of the epistemic modal scale. 15.1 refers to the embedding of *fore ut* under neuter adjectives of epistemic character in textual situations where they implicate epistemic subjectivity and 15.2 to such embeddings where they are fully objective. The matrix summarizing the distribution of the violations of the classical constraints on *fore ut* in the material studied is given in the table on page 543.

In the table there are three noticeable concentrations of innovations: the first in Valerius Maximus, the second in the minor declamations attributed to Quintilian, and the third in Festus. More importantly, the order in which the innovations appear is surely not random. In section 3, it has been possible to motivate the chronological ordering or partial ordering of subsets of the entire set of violations according to degree, namely

- 34.a. Relating to the semantic features of [control] and [intention]:
V(10.1) > V(10.2) > V(10.3) > V(9) > V(3)
- 34.b. Relating to position on the epistemic modal scale:
V(18) > V(12.1) > V(12.2) > V(14)
- 34.c. Relating to objective modality:
V(4), V(15.1) > V(16) > V(15.2)
- 34.d. Relating to deontic modality:
V(10.1) > V(10.2) > V(10.3) > V(19), V(20)

The orderings in 34 are strongly confirmed by the high level of correlation with the chronological/generic partial ordering of the horizontal axis of the table; in fact there is no outright contradiction of any of them. A number of reservations, however, need to be taken into consideration. In regard to 34.a, V(10.1) is attested only in the *Declamationes minores*, so it is possible that its occurrence may postdate the attestations of V(10.2), V(10.3), V(9), and V(3). It should be noted, however, that the distinction in degree of violation between V(10.1), the use of *fore ut* with [+control, +intention] predications in the third person, reported situations of overt directive illocutionary force, and V(10.2), the same except the context is not overtly but only inferentially directive, is the finest one drawn, and, perhaps, should not be expected to be reflected chronologically. In regard to 34.c, given the contemporaneity of Valerius Maximus and Celsus, V(16) is not chronologically separated from V(4) or V(15.1), but it is separated from them by a genre/register–

type of difference, since Celsus is obviously the more technical writer. In regard to 34.a and 34.d, $V(10.2)$ does not appear before $V(10.3)$; since, however, it does not appear after $V(10.3)$, but at the same time there is no outright contradiction with the prediction. Of course the comparison of the orderings in 34 with the data in the table does not constitute scientific hypothesis testing in its strong sense. Obviously it is not possible to search continuously in time through all registers and varieties of Latin. Rather, only the cross-sectional, synchronic implications of the orderings in 34 are in practice testable, such that for any violations of constraints x and y , if $V(x) > V(y)$, then in any temporal cross-section at time t_i after $V(y)$, the occurrence of $V(y)$ implies the occurrence of $V(x)$: $V(x) > V(y) \Rightarrow [V(y) \Rightarrow V(x)]_{t_i}$. Even so, the data cannot falsify such implicational predictions in any individual case, since there is always the possibility of chance non-attestation in any text or set of texts, and, furthermore, differences in subject matter and style cannot be controlled for as they might affect the probability of the occurrence of the various utterance types in which violations of the various constraints can be detected. Moreover, it is obvious that the very distinctions drawn between the degrees of violation of individual constraints could not have been made without prior examination of the data. Nevertheless, and granting these reservations, I believe that the pattern displayed in the table is a coherent one typical of gradual linguistic change developing over time.

LAURENCE D. STEPHENS

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL

ROMANS AND BLACKS: A REVIEW ESSAY

In *Romans and Blacks* (London and Oklahoma 1989, pp. xii & 265. Cloth, \$32.50) Lloyd A. Thompson states that his purpose is to reexamine evidence relating to blacks from the first century B.C. to the third century A.D. in a manner appropriate to the Roman ideological system and thereby to avoid the errors of earlier treatments of Roman attitudes toward blacks. In Thompson's opinion, previous investigations are defective because they have used undefined "nebulous" concepts (e.g., race, racism, color, and race prejudice); they have ignored sociological theory; and they have attempted to analyze "the sociological and psychological impact of perceived somatic difference (in popular parlance, physical 'race' differences) without first giving serious consideration to the *Roman* concept 'black person' (*Aethiops*) and to *Roman* perceptions of somatic difference" (p. 3). Thompson describes his first chapter as an examination of modern treatments of the subject in the light of ancient evidence and modern sociological theory; his second, as a discussion of the perception of somatic difference in Roman society with respect to the ideology underlying the representation of blacks in art and literature; and a third chapter as focusing on "values and cognitive structures that shaped attitudes of appreciation or disparagement of somatic and cultural traits as well as conceptions of deference-worthiness and inferiority in the Roman socio-cultural system" (p. 12).

As for "nebulous" concepts, a term, for example, frequently used by other scholars to which Thompson objects is "color prejudice." The basis of his objection is difficult to comprehend. Used in the usual sense of pejorative attitudes based solely on skin color, the term is unambiguous and requires no technical or terminological gloss.

With respect to neglect of relevant research in the social sciences, the findings of social scientists (many the same scholars cited by Thompson) have been incorporated in several previous studies, usually without Thompson's technical jargon. The author also argues that inadequate attention has been given to the term *Aethiops*, which he defines as an anthropological type "marked by a combination of black skin, crinkly hair, thick lips, and broad or flat nose" (p. 58). These very same traits, however, have been clearly identified as those most commonly associated with the Aethiopian type and have been copiously illustrated in earlier studies which have also emphasized that classical

antiquity was well acquainted with a wide range of Negroid and mixed black–white types. Scholars who describe the mixed black–white types of classical texts and art as mulattoes, according to Thompson, project into Roman society a racist concept motivated by an “ideological urge to recognize some social–role significance” in somatic appearance (p. 82), and implicitly attribute racism to Roman society (p. 84). Although the Romans did not use terms such as mulatto, it is neither racist nor inappropriate to employ these terms commonly used to describe persons of black–white ancestry. Thompson himself refers to the “constant process of biological amalgamation into the mainstream of the white population” (p. 84). Realistic portrayals of obviously mixed black–white types, who would today be described as mulattoes, are important evidence of physical assimilation because they vividly illustrate various steps in the disappearance of Negroid physical traits, provide dramatic confirmation of the racial mixture noted in ancient texts, and provide relevant information about the lives of descendants of blacks.

Thompson also objects to the practice of describing depictions of individuals as racially mixed or as mulattoes because he regards such classifications as based on subjective assessments. In spite of the difficulties involved in identifying racially mixed types, scholars with a wide knowledge of classical art and a “sense” of non–Greek or non–Roman features, and aware of the literary and anthropological evidence for black–white racial mixture in the ancient world, have often agreed, on the basis of obvious combinations of hair, lips, and nose, in identifying some classical portraits as mulatto, mixed, or Negroid. One cannot, of course, be scientifically precise in such identifications. However, only the anthropologically naive or those unacquainted with descendants of black–white racial mixture in the modern world would deny the obvious Negroid admixture in many of the portraits of persons who lived in Egypt, north Africa, Rome, or in other areas with Aethiopians in the population.

A major shortcoming of *Romans and Blacks* is the author’s tendency to read unwarranted negative attitudes into certain Roman references to blacks, often because of his failure to consider specific texts in the light of the total evidence. This shortcoming, together with Thompson’s penchant for overlooking important aspects of the Roman attitude toward blacks, distorts the Roman view. He gives, for example, undue emphasis to what he regards as the negative impact of black–white symbolism and of Roman “sensory aversion” to Aethiopian somatic characteristics. One of Thompson’s favorite illustrations of this “aversion” to *Aethiopes* is the description of Scybale, the black slave woman

in *Moretum* (31–35): “African in race, her whole figure proof of her country—her hair tightly curled, thick lips, color dark, chest broad, breasts pendulous, belly somewhat pinched, legs thin, and feet broad and ample.” Although Thompson considers the depiction of the white peasant slave-owner in *Moretum* as a “man fully comfortable in, and satisfied with, the familiar company of a black slave woman as his sole-house companion” (p. 136), he regards the anonymous author’s description of the woman as an example of mockery and “open distaste . . . for . . . the somatic appearance of the ‘typical’ *Aethiops*” (pp. 30–31)—one of several instances in which Thompson sees an unprovable color prejudice. The description, however, is merely a detailed description of a Negro woman, markedly similar to that of modern anthropologists. She appears as the sole companion of a humble farmer whose life is realistically and sympathetically described. Furthermore, Thompson suggests that the slave’s name Scybale is derived from σκύβαλον, which he translates several times as “shit.” A simple and more plausible explanation, however, in the context of a poem highlighting salad is the herb σκύβα—σκοῦβα. Similarly, Thompson’s excremental suggestion that the lines “corvus carbo cinis concordant cuncta colori / quod legeris nomen, convenit Aethiops” (*Anth. Lat.* no. 182) may be intended to evoke an imagery of *caca*—(excrement) is more than just dubious. Equally questionable also is his rendering of *faex Garamantarum* as “shit” in an inscription from Hadrumetum (*Anth. Lat.* no. 183 cited below, cf. *faecis Achaei*, Juvenal 3.61—“dregs,” though also pejorative, may have been the intention of both poets).

Further, Thompson strangely reads into simple realistic portrayals of blacks a “degree of antipathy . . . [and] a sensory aversion to the physiognomy of blacks” (p. 160). E. Mveng of the Federal University of the Cameroon, however, and others acquainted with present-day Africa have seen in the vast tableau of Graeco-Roman art many authentic portrayals of African Negroes, and a profusion of exact physical detail.¹ Some depictions of blacks (especially pygmies) are caricatures, as

¹ E. Mveng, *Les Sources grecques de l’histoire négro-africaine depuis Homère jusqu’à Strabon* (Paris 1972) 67–68. As early as 1879 E. de Chanot, “Bronzes antiques,” *Gazette Archéologique* V (1879) 209–10 foresaw the anthropological importance of classical representations of Negroes in his comment on the anthropological accuracy of south Italian lamps depicting Negroes and their value for the history of Graeco-Roman relations with black Africans. J. Russell, review of *The Image of the Black in Western Art*, vols. 1 and 2 in *New York Times Book Review* (June 29, 1980) 24 comments on the “profusion of exact physical detail” in the portrayal of blacks by Greek and Roman artists.

Thompson rightly points out, but to see caricature and mockery in artists' use of thick lips, flat nose, and exaggerated prognathism (p. 25) misrepresents the vivid and accurate portrayals of Negroes in the extensive gallery of ancient art. Caricature, as Thompson himself recognizes (p. 137), was not limited to the somatic traits of Aethiopians. Whites of many races, as well as gods and mythical heroes, appeared in comic and satirical scenes. If Negroes had been depicted only as caricatures, or if satirical scenes were the rule and not the exception, there might be some justification for a pejorative interpretation. Further, Thompson has overlooked the views of scholars who have commented on the individualized representations of blacks, the obvious aesthetic attractiveness of Negro models to many artists, and the high quality of many pieces—some of the finest from ancient workshops. For many artists the inclusion of blacks was one means of emphasizing the diversity of mankind.

Another example of a text (*Anth. Lat.* no. 183) which, according to Thompson, disparages the physiognomy of blacks and conveys an attitude of distaste for their somatic appearance is an inscription from Hadrumentum (pp. 36–37). The verses, however, though probably motivated by Roman troublesome encounters with the Garamantes, are to a large extent a *jeu d'esprit* on the theme of death and the Underworld, with echoes from earlier Roman poetry. Vergil's Underworld was dark and murky; the god of the nether regions himself was often black (*niger Jupiter* and *niger Dis*). The pitch-black (*piceo . . . corpore . . . niger*) Garamantian of the Hadrumentum piece is reminiscent of Vergil's grim warden Charon (*portitor . . . horrendus*, guardian of black Tartarus, *nigra Tartara*); and the door of black Dis (*atri ianua Ditis*) in Vergil's Underworld is echoed in the Hadrumentum grim ghost (*horrida larva*), a fit guardian of Dis.

Like other peoples, before and after them, blacks included, the Romans had narcissistic canons of physical beauty—what H. Hoetink has called a "somatic norm image."² Greek and Roman authors, while recognizing the subjectivity of their ethnocentric criteria, frequently stated a preference for their own "Mediterranean" complexion and features—a middle point between the extremes of blond, blue-eyed northerners, and black, woolly-haired southerners. There is nothing strange about preferences for a Mediterranean "white" type of beauty in

²*The Two Variants in Caribbean Race Relations: A Contribution to the Sociology of Segmented Societies*, trans. E. M. Hookykaas (New York 1967) 120.

a predominantly white society. What was unusual, however, in the Graeco-Roman world was the spirit of those who, rejecting the Mediterranean norm described the beauty of blackness and at times openly expressed their preference for dark-skinned women. Mixed black-white types of classical art also point to a rejection of the "Mediterranean" norm image. All of this Thompson overlooks, however, in his statement that men who found dark-skinned women beautiful were apologetic in their descriptions of them as "black *but* beautiful" and in likening them to burning coals shining like rose-buds, or dark violets or hyacinths (p. 133).

Further, the tribute of the sixth-century poet Luxorius (*Anth. Lat.* no. 354) to the *venator* Olympius, an idol of contemporary Carthaginian fans, was not, as Thompson argues, an exaltation of the white man's whiteness illustrating Roman worship of the somatic norm image (p. 31), but was in the tradition of many before him (Asclepiades, Agatharchides, Vergil, Martial, Sextus Empiricus, Dio Chrysostom) who either emphasized the inconsequence of color in judging individual worth, rejected the traditional somatic norm image, or commented on the relativity of classical standards of beauty. Luxorius was not only describing black physical beauty but was expressing another important idea: excellence is found among all men, whatever their race. Menander (Frag. 533 Kock) had said that natural bent, not whether one is Aethiopian or Scythian, determines nobility; Agatharchides (*De Mari Erythraeo* 16), that success in battle depends not upon color but upon courage and knowledge of warfare. Similarly, for Luxorius, it was Olympius' strength and skill in the arena that mattered. In the sixth century Luxorius, in the spirit of earlier Greeks and Romans, was adapting an ancient symbolism—black in a society with a somatic norm image of white—to emphasize the inconsequence of color in evaluating men. Olympius' glory, wrote Luxorius, would live ever after him, and Carthage would always remember him—his color was of no importance. A tribute by Luxorius to another black athlete also refers indirectly to his color, but only to praise him. Associating a famed black charioteer with mythological greats, Luxorius writes that he has the swiftness of Aeolus and Zephyrus; the color of Night, his mother, and of Memnon, but that unlike the great ally of the Trojans he will not meet death at the hands of Achilles (*Anth. Lat.* no. 293).

In his interpretation (pp. 33–35) of Juvenal's *derideat Aethiopem albus* (2.23), Thompson has not given proper consideration to the context in which these three words appear in a satire of one hundred and

seventy lines. Juvenal is not writing about blacks, much less a diatribe against blacks. In a passage concerning the practice of criticizing flaws in others resembling one's own, the satirist writes "a straight-legged man may laugh at a crooked-legged man, a white man at a black man," but, he continues, by asking who will not confound heaven with earth and sky with sea if Verres denounces a thief, Milo, a cut-throat; if Clodius condemns adulterers; if Catiline upbraids Cethegus. In other words, straight and crooked, black and white are opposites, but the other combinations are not. But much more important, the *Aethiopem albus* is largely a reflection of the familiar Roman ethnocentric criteria, and has no broader significance. Juvenal himself has the somatic norm image in mind when he writes (13.163-73) that women in Meroe with large breasts (bigger than their babes) and Germans with blue eyes and yellow hair (greasy curls twisted into a horn) evoke no astonishment in their own countries because their physical traits are common, and that no one laughs at African pygmies because the whole population is no taller than one foot.

Seneca also selected Aethiopians and Germans to illustrate his observations on the somatic norm image. Unlike Juvenal, however, Seneca found no reason for astonishment or laughter in somatic differences, for like Diodorus (3.34.8), who saw nothing surprising in such obvious differences, he observed that neither the color of Aethiopians nor the red hair of Germans is notable among their own people, and nothing in a man is to be considered odd that is characteristic of a nation (*De ira* 3.26.3). In short, the total evidence relating to Roman ethnocentric standards of physical beauty does not warrant Thompson's conclusions that among the educated classes there was an "unashamed and open 'worship of the somatic norm image'" (p. 48) or that "crinkly *Aethiops* hair, blond and greased German locks . . ." particularly aroused sensory aversion and offended the aesthetic sensibilities of Romans of the upper classes (p. 135).

Classical anthropology, in many statements of the environment theory which attributed ethnic diversity to the effect of diverse environments upon a common human nature, explained the physical characteristics and mores of all mankind, regardless of color, in the same manner. According to Pliny, for example, heat is responsible for the scorched complexion, curly beards and hair, and tall stature of Aethiopians, and the mobility of the climate explains their wisdom (*Nat. hist.* 2.80.189). Moisture of the climate, on the other hand, accounts for the white, frosty skin and yellow hair of northerners, and the rigidity of the

climate accounts for their fierceness. Some Aethiopians, according to Diodorus (3.2.1–4, 3.8.3, 3.9.2) were considered the first of men, the first to honor the gods, and originators of many Egyptian customs, while others cultivated none of the practices of civilized life, and a few believed in no gods at all. Ptolemy (*Tetrabiblos* 2.2.56) attributes the savage habits of white Scythians to the extreme cold of the far north and those of black Aethiopians to the oppressive heat of the deep south. In other words, whites as well as blacks in certain environments were portrayed as savage. Strabo (4.5.4) describes the inhabitants of Ireland as the most savage people in the entire world, more savage than the Britons. Aethiopians and Scythians were selected as favorite illustrations of the environment theory because as physical and geographical extremes they provided dramatic examples of ethnic diversity. And, significantly, Scythian–Aethiopian contrasts were later used in important statements of conviction that race is of no consequence in evaluating men, and that all whom God created He created equal and alike. In short, classical anthropology evolved from ethnic differences no special theory as to the inferiority of blacks *qua* blacks and no stereotype of blacks as uncivilized. Thompson's comment on the environment theory, however, is another illustration of his penchant for overlooking the positive in Roman attitudes toward blacks and for focusing on what he considers the Roman obsession with their whiteness: the environment theory "neither precluded nor discouraged sensory aversions to blackness" (p. 101).

Thompson also argues that early Christian writers, like their pagan predecessors, offered apologies for Aethiopian blackness and cites as a particularly instructive example Origen's exegesis of "black and beautiful" in the Song of Songs (p. 134). Origen, however, like other early Christian writers whom he influenced, realized that adaptations of the familiar classical symbolism enabled him to interpret scriptural references to Aethiopians more meaningfully and to explicate Christianity's mission more convincingly. Thompson's discussion of Christianity's black–white symbolism presents a distorted picture because he does not take into consideration the Christian black–white imagery in its entirety. Christian authors referred to Aethiopians and blackness in demonological and especially exegetical contexts, neither of which included apologies for Aethiopian blackness. The demonological emphasis in references to devils or demons in the shape of Aethiopians, Egyptians, or crows, or simply described as black, was on the color black and not on any other racial characteristic. Also perhaps related to

the emphasis on color and the absence of any other similarity to real Aethiopians is the fact that later medieval iconography, in spite of the black and Aethiopian apparitions of apocryphal and patristic literature, portrayed so few demons with Negroid features. The demonological use of black was obviously related to the earlier classical association of the color black with evil. A similar origin perhaps also explains the contrast of the blackness of evil with the light of God. The devil is black, according to Didymus the Blind, because he fell from the splendor and virtue of spiritual whiteness that only those who have been "whitened" by God can possess (*In Zachariam* 4.312). And, above all, there was no stereotyped image of Aethiopians as personifications or demons or the devil.

In spite of the demonological "Aethiopians," the much more important exegetical texts left no doubt as to the fundamental Christian attitude toward blacks: All whom God created He created equal and alike, Origen wrote—it made no difference whether one was Hebrew, Greek, Aethiopian, Scythian, or Taurian (*De principiis* 2.9.5–6). In his "black and beautiful," Origen was not apologizing, as Thompson stated, "in deference to the dictates of the traditional and dominant values" (p. 134) which considered whiteness as an essential element of beauty, but he was purposely adapting for his exegesis the language of those Greeks and Romans who had rejected the ethnocentric yardstick of the majority and considered black naturally beautiful. In Origen and others, Aethiopian blackness gave rise to a deeply spiritual imagery of black and white in which Aethiopians came to occupy a privileged position. In his commentary on the "black and beautiful" maiden, Origen illustrates the applicability of black–white symbolism to all men. "We ask in what way is she black and in what way fair without whiteness. She has repented of her sins; conversion has bestowed beauty upon her and she is sung as 'beautiful'. . . . If you repent, your soul will be 'black' because of your former sins, but because of your penitence your soul will have something of what I may call an Aethiopian beauty" (*Homilia in Canticum Canticorum* 1.6). The mystery of the church arising from the Gentiles and calling itself black and beautiful, Origen points out, is adumbrated in the marriage of Moses to a black Aethiopian woman which he interprets as a symbolic union of the spiritual law (Moses) and the church (the Aethiopian woman)—a foreshadowing of the universal church (*Commentarius in Canticum Canticorum* 2.362–78).

In a coherent body of exegesis during the first six centuries of

Christianity blacks were summoned to salvation and welcomed in the Christian brotherhood on the same terms as others. All men were regarded as black who had not been illumined by God's light and all men, regardless of the color of the skin, were considered potentially Christians. The baptism of the minister of the Aethiopian queen by Philip the Evangelist (Acts 8:26–39) was a landmark in proclaiming that considerations of race were to be of no significance in determining membership in the Christian church. All believers in Christ were eligible. Blacks were not only humble converts like the young Aethiopian slave, "not yet whitened by the shining grace of Christ," the object of concern in a correspondence between Fulgentius, Bishop of Ruspe, and a deacon Ferrandus (*PL* 65.378–92). St. Menas, sometimes portrayed as a Negro, was a national saint of Egypt, and pilgrims from Asia and Europe as well as from Africa came to his shrine west of Alexandria.³ One of the most outstanding Fathers of the Desert of Scete was a tall black Aethiopian, Moses, of a widespread fame, who, once a brigand, reached the height of perfection, left seventy disciples at his death, and was a model of humility and the monastic life, an excellent teacher and a Father's Father.⁴ Thompson in his emphasis on certain references to the color of Abba Moses fails to comprehend the reasons for the application of the black–white symbolism to the monk (p. 41–42), which are clearly stated by Jean Devisse: ". . . the person of Abba Moses seems to epitomize

³For a detailed discussion of *ampullae* depicting Menas as unquestionably a Negroid type with thick lips and tightly curled hair (e.g., Oxford, Ashmolean Museum, 1933–717; Paris, Musée du Louvre, MNC 140) see J. Devisse, *The Image of the Black in Western Art II: From the Early Christian Era to the "Age of Discovery" Part I* (New York 1979) 38–43 and the literature there cited. The appearance of a Negro Menas as a variant of the more usual non–Negroid type on some *ampullae* has "puzzled" some scholars. A number of unconvincing suggestions have been made, including that of Devisse (p. 43) that "the canny monks 'met the need' manifested by their black clientele by giving their saint, as occasion demanded, a black face exportable all through the Nile Valley to the south." A simple and more plausible suggestion, however, is that the appearance of a black Menas points to one tradition that the saint was of Aethiopian (Nubian) ancestry since blacks and whites had lived side by side for centuries and had worshipped Isis at the same temples in Egypt, which provided an environment compatible with a tradition of a black Menas.

⁴For sources on the life of Abba Moses, see Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* 22 (*PG* 34.1065–68); Sozomen, *Historia ecclesiastica* 6.29 (*PG* 67.1376–81); *Acta Sanctorum*, August, VI 199–212; *Apophthegmata Patrum* (*PG* 65.281–90); *Vita S. Moysis Aethiopsis* in V. Latyshev, *Menologii anonymi Byzantini saeculi X quae supersunt* (St. Petersburg 1912) fasc. 2, 330–36; J. Devisse (note 3 above) 25, 62, 113, 225, notes 256–57.



the *Aethiops*-sinner's symbolic road from the darkness of sin to the light of grace as the Greek, and especially the Western European Christian, would have thought of it."⁵ In short, the Aethiopian imagery dramatically emphasized the ecumenical character of Christianity, and adumbrated the symbolism of the black wise man in the Adoration of the Magi. There is no evidence that Aethiopians of the first centuries after Christ suffered in their day-to-day contacts with whites as a result of metaphorical associations of this symbolism. Nor did the early Christians alter the classical symbolism or the teachings of the church to fit a preconceived notion of blacks as inferior, to rationalize the enslavement of blacks, or to sanction segregated worship. In the early church blacks found equality in both theory and practice.

Another illustration of Thompson's failure to consider the total evidence is his statement that from the late first century B.C. to the third century A.D. accounts of Aethiopian military power related only to a glorious Napatan-Meroitic past, and not to contemporary Aethiopia (p. 93). Thompson, however, overlooks Strabo's account (17.1.53-54) of Aethiopian activity in Egypt which required the intervention of C. Petronius after Aethiopians had crossed the Roman frontier in Egypt, captured several towns, including Elephantine and Philae, defeated three Roman cohorts, enslaved the inhabitants, and seized the statue of Augustus. The extremely favorable terms of Augustus' settlement suggest that Strabo was exaggerating the Roman victory: Augustus granted the envoys of the Aethiopian queen everything they pleaded for, including the remission of the tribute he had imposed. Further, the importance, if only propagandistic, that Augustus attached to Petronius' Aethiopian activity is perhaps suggested by the inclusion of his Aethiopian campaigns in the official record of his administration and achievements. Copies of the *Res Gestae*, originally engraved on bronze tablets outside the Emperor's mausoleum in Rome and set up in some provinces, were constant reminders to the Roman world of the Aethiopian threat to Roman Egypt's southern boundary. The many terracotta figurines of Negro warriors from this period provide vivid illustrations of Rome's Aethiopian adversaries mentioned by authors of the early Roman Empire. Nor should it be overlooked that Josephus' references to Aethiopians in *Jewish Antiquities* (10.15-17; 8.165) reinforced the recurrent image of black warriors and their widely respected kingdom and may

⁵Devise (note 3 above) 62.

have reminded the historian's contemporaries of events closer to their own era: the Aethiopian attack on the Romans in Egypt at the time of Augustus had been foreshadowed by the ancient Aethiopian invasion of Egypt; and the wise Queen of Sheba had a later counterpart in the Aethiopian Candace, whose ambassadors were diplomatically so skillful as to gain from Augustus all their requests.

Roman military encounters with blacks in northwest Africa in the late first century B.C. and early Empire have also escaped Thompson's attention. The Garamantes, classified by some ancient authors as Aethiopian and as mixed black-white peoples by some scholars, were described by Tacitus (*Hist.* 4.50) as "an indomitable tribe and one always engaged in brigandage on their neighbors." Their anti-Roman activity, for example, required L. Cornelius Balbus, proconsul of Africa (21–20 B.C.), to launch a punitive and deterrent campaign in which Garama, their capital, was captured. The Garamantes gave their support to Tacfarinas, a Numidian, who stirred up a serious insurrection in 17 A.D. In spite of a plea to the Romans that their offenses be pardoned, the Garamantes later gave assistance to the Oeans during a civil war between Lepcis and Oea. Blacks participated in revolts that broke out sporadically during the Roman occupation of northwest Africa. Numerous Aethiopian auxiliaries, according to Ammianus Marcellinus (29.5.37), were recruited by Firmus, the Moorish chieftain who raised a revolt in 372 A.D. In short, in light of the above-cited military activity of blacks, Thompson's statement about the Roman image of blacks as warriors of only a distant past is inaccurate.

The evidence as a whole does not support major points emphasized in Thompson's study. Thompson argues that the homage of the Romans, especially the educated and upper classes, to the somatic norm image was a kind of overriding obsession. And further, this pride in their Mediterranean whiteness, according to Thompson, resulted in hurtful psychological consequences which must have driven some blacks "to develop ego defences of various kinds. . ." and to seek "revenge on mockery and potential mockers where possible. . ." (p. 138). In view of the lack of relevant ancient evidence, this suggestion is mere speculation. On this point also, in addition to what has already been said, it remains only to emphasize that Romans should not be indicted for color prejudice because, like other peoples, they had ethnocentric aesthetic criteria. Also questionable is the author's assumption that the Roman association of the color black with death, evil, and sin triggered negative and hostile attitudes toward blacks. With respect to both of

these points it should be noted that of all the many references to Aethiopians in the entire corpus of classical literature those few that can definitely be classified as negative are far outnumbered by positive examples and by an overall favorable image of blacks.

Thompson mentions that blacks were liable to "mockery and to other unwelcome behaviour prompted by the negative symbolism of blackness" (p. 152). Research in the social sciences, however, has questioned whether individuals who react negatively to the color black also develop an antipathy to dark-skinned peoples, and suggests that though such a reaction is theoretically plausible, the evidence is far from conclusive. Further, it is unlikely that the association of dark-skinned people with omens of evil had in the Roman Empire an adverse impact on day-to-day reactions to blacks. The overall favorable image of Aethiopians had long been firmly established, and the unbiased environmental explanation of racial differences had been deeply rooted since the fifth century B.C., and was clearly restated in literature of the Empire. At the same time that the notion linking dark-skinned peoples and omens of disaster was being circulated in the Roman period, unprejudiced explanations of physical differences and the ancient image of just Aethiopians and of the glorious Napatan-Meroitic Kingdom of Kush were being reinforced. And not without a positive influence on attitudes toward blacks was the black-white imagery of Christian authors, used also no doubt in sermons, which emphasized the black man's membership in the Christian brotherhood and other ecumenical "lessons" on the meaning of Aethiopians in exegetical texts.

Views such as Thompson's are largely speculative and have perhaps been influenced by a consideration of the experience of blacks in societies in which great importance has been attached to the color of the skin and in which blacks have suffered from virulent color prejudice. The pattern of black-white relations in the Roman period, however, differed from that in the modern world, and these differences are important for the proper assessment of Roman attitudes toward blacks. In the first place Roman slavery was color-blind and the majority of slaves was white, not black; hence, the anti-black sentiment which developed after slave and black became synonymous was absent. Nor were there theories that blacks were especially or more suited to slavery than whites. The black slave or freedman, therefore, was in a no more disadvantageous position than anyone else unfortunate enough to be captured as a prisoner of war or to be enslaved for any other reason. In science, philosophy, and religion color was not the basis of a theory

concerning the innate inferiority of blacks. There were no hierarchical notions of human races, with whites occupying the highest and blacks the lowest positions. On the contrary, ethnic differences were explained in the same way for all peoples. Blacks were not stereotyped as "savages," but blacks and whites alike living at the outer extremities of the world were described as following a primitive way of life, and the savage mode of life of some Greeks—the Cynaetheans—was also attributed to the rugged, inclement atmosphere of Arcadia (Polybius 4.20–21; Diodorus 3.34.7–8).

Black–white racial mixture *per se* was not considered strange or a menace to "white racial purity." Writers who referred to black–white racial unions, either as illustrations of the transmission of inherited physical characteristics or as evidence of adultery, included no strictures on black–white racial mixture, though some condemned adultery. Black gods or heroes and their interracial amours presented no embarrassment and evoked no apologies from poets. Ovid suggests that a black lover of Aurora was the father of Memnon (*Amores* 1.13.33–34). Perseus married the dark-skinned Andromeda, whose father, king of the Aethiopians, had been depicted as a mulatto in a mid-fifth century B.C. vase painting (*Ovid, Heroides* 15.35–36; *Ars Amatoria* 1.53; 3.191). Juba II, King of Mauretania, whose features in some likenesses suggest Negroid admixture, was married first to Cleopatra Selene, daughter of Antony and Cleopatra, and later to the daughter of a king of Capadocia. Blacks were physically assimilated into the predominantly white population of the Roman world as attested by the portrayal of mixed black–white types in Roman art and by textual references to black–white racial mixture.

There is no evidence that blacks were excluded because of their color from avenues—occupational, economic, cultural, social, or religious—open to others. Like many other newcomers from alien lands, most black slaves and freedmen found employment in occupations at the lower end of the economic scale. But blacks with special qualifications found a place for their talent. Blacks, like those who served in the army of Septimius Severus in Britain, had the same advantages upon discharge as other auxiliary soldiers in the *numeri*, and at least one black was apparently a member of Septimius Severus' elite corps.⁶

⁶For an Ethiopian reported among the auxiliaries of Septimius Severus in Britain, perhaps part of a *numerus Maurorum* billeted at one of the forts astride Hadrian's wall,

Evidence from northwest Africa illustrates the great popularity and fame of black athletes, and the financial success of a black landowner like C. Julius Serenus in Thaeanae.⁷ There were blacks who were at home in the culture of the Mediterranean world. The dark- or black-skinned Terence, who might have been of Negroid extraction, arrived in Rome as a slave from Carthage. He received a liberal education and his freedom from his owner, a Roman senator. Achieving fame as a playwright, Terence became a member of the learned Scipionic circle, and his daughter is said to have married a Roman knight. As mentioned earlier, it was an Aethiopian, mentioned in the New Testament, who figured prominently in Christian exegetical texts as the first Gentile to be baptised by Philip. This official of the Aethiopian queen who was reading a roll of Isaiah when he met Philip apparently read Greek, and perhaps, Hebrew. Juba II was a man of great learning who strove to introduce Greek and Roman culture into his African kingdom. Among Juba's many works (now lost) were a history of Rome, books on Libya and Assyria, and treatises on drama, painting, and plants. Memnon, the black protégé of Herodes Atticus, was one of the celebrated sophist's most talented disciples. Blacks were welcomed on the same terms as whites in both Isiac worship and Christianity as converts and as priests or monks.

The Romans, in spite of the attitudes toward blacks which Thompson has described as negative and detrimental to blacks, had the ability to see and to comment on the obviously different physical characteristics of blacks without developing an elaborate and rigid system of discrimination against blacks based only on the color of the skin. Color,

see *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, *Septimius Severus* 22.4–5 and R. G. Collingwood and R. P. Wright, *The Roman Inscriptions of Britain* (Oxford 1965) I, 626, no. 2042 (cf. A. Birley, *Septimius Severus: The African Emperor* (London 1971) 265–66; and for a scene on an early third-century marble sarcophagus showing, to the right of a general whose features resemble those of Septimius Severus, three soldiers—one a Negro—receiving suppliant captives, see L. Salerno, *Palazzo Rondinini* (Rome 1965) 259, no. 85 and fig. 139.

⁷The financial success of C. Julius Serenus, of unmistakable black-white extraction, is suggested by the scenes depicted on a third- or fourth-century funerary mosaic showing in separate panels Serenus and Numitoria Saturnina, apparently his white spouse, each in semi-reclining positions, holding a golden goblet in the right hand, with three Cupids in each panel—one filling a basket with flowers, a second carrying flowers to the reclining spouse, and the third playing a cithara. See R. Massigli, *Musée de Sfax*, *Musées de l'Algérie et de la Tunisie*, no. 17 (Paris 1912) 9, no. 24 and plate V, no. 3; M. Yacoub, *Guide du Musée de Sfax* (Tunis 1966) 44 and plate XIV, figs. 2–3.

in spite of the existence of black-white symbolism, somatic norm image, and the like, did not acquire in the Roman world the great importance which it has assumed in some post-classical societies either in the self-image of many peoples, or in the denial of equality to blacks in theory and practice.

In short, Thompson has presented little new evidence on Roman attitudes toward blacks but most aspects of his inquiry have been treated in earlier investigations. His conclusions, which not only read unwarranted negative attitudes into certain texts but also fail to give proper consideration to the total evidence relating to blacks in the Roman world, present a distorted view of the Roman attitude toward blacks.

FRANK M. SNOWDEN, JR.

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

BOOK REVIEWS

A. B. BOSWORTH. *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988. Pp. xiii + 330. Cloth, \$44.50; paper, \$14.95.

The title of A. B. Bosworth's most recent work provides a clear indication of its contents and emphasis; its subtitle, however, tends to deceive: rather than a general study of Alexander's reign, Bosworth here presents us with a largely military and administrative history of the reign. Originally conceived as a contribution to volume VI of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, *Conquest and Empire* is now intended by its author to form part of a tetralogy including his two-volume *Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* (the second volume of which is as yet unpublished) and his recent historiographical work, *From Arrian to Alexander: Studies in Historical Interpretation*. *Conquest and Empire*, although neither quite the comprehensive survey the author wished it to be nor the Alexander biography he abhorred, is nonetheless an interesting, penetrating and useful work, so long as its limitations are recognized.

The book is divided into two sections, one labeled "General Narrative," and another called "Thematic Studies." This division, somewhat reminiscent of W. W. Tarn's famous or infamous work, has both advantages and disadvantages. The initial section offers a lucid, surprisingly detailed, and sophisticated account of Alexander's campaign: as such, it should be extremely useful in advanced courses in military history, but only if readers are warned that terms unfamiliar to the general reader like *agēma*, *ilē* and the mysterious *asthetairoi* are defined and discussed in the thematic section labeled "Alexander and the army." Unfortunately, no note warns the inexperienced to refer to the other section. Similarly, Bosworth's admirable description of the nature of Alexander's army at the beginning of the campaign, despite its brevity, is relegated to the same thematic section, but would be more helpful if included in the general narrative. The remaining material included in the thematic sections appears much better suited to this organizational approach, both because its length would impede the flow of the general narrative and because its nature benefits from separate treatment. The section on mainland Greece in Alexander's reign is especially well-done and should be useful both to the scholarly reader and to the student approaching the period for the first time. Equally excellent is the fascinating section on the evolution and reorganization of the army, in which Bosworth offers a convincing explanation for the military and political decline of the phalanx. But the short and intelligent survey of the ancient sources, both lost and extant, is unfortunately hidden in the bibliography section and would

be of much more use to the inexperienced reader if placed at the beginning of the work.

Aside from these comparatively superficial difficulties created by its organizational strategy, *Conquest and Empire* suffers from a kind of identity crisis: its focus and intended audience, particularly in an American context, remain unclear. Despite Bosworth's stated desire to make accessible to a general audience recent research on Alexander, his bibliography thins out after the early 1980's (his discussion of the royal tombs at Vergina [p. 27, n. 9], for instance, fails to refer to anything later than 1982 and thus omits reference to Andronikos' 1984 monograph, *Vergina, inter alia*), and is especially sparse on American scholarship. Thus, one cannot count on *Conquest and Empire* as a consistent reference to the most recent scholarly discussion of problems in Alexander history.

Bosworth asserts that he is quite consciously not writing a biography about Alexander and certainly does resist indulging himself in speculations about Alexander's personality and motivation, but this laudable intention is seriously undercut by the heavily military nature of his narrative, both because such a narrative inevitably focuses attention on the commander and command decisions (uniquely concentrated in one person in Alexander's reign) and because Bosworth so clearly and consistently scants analysis of Macedonian politics and institutions in his narrative.

The result of this focus, clearly an unintentional one, is to give the uninitiated reader the impression of an invincible if not infallible conqueror and administrator who acts nearly alone, and is not significantly limited by Macedonian problems and institutions. While there is a section on Philip's reign, there is none on Macedonia in general, and that absence is made more notable by Bosworth's tendency to underemphasize political events which occurred in the course of the campaign. The events on the Hyphasis, call them mutiny or not, are so briefly narrated (pp. 133–34) that though Bosworth himself attaches considerable significance to them in his later narrative, the reader is surprised that he does so because the initial account so underplays them. Thus, although Bosworth argues, rightly I believe, that the reasons for many of Alexander's changes in the structure of his army were primarily political, he limits the force of this argument by giving his readers so little sense of the degree of political pressure Alexander experienced.

It is a curiosity that a writer so capable of adept commentary on Macedonian institutions and the king's dealings with them (one thinks, for instance, of his acute analysis of Alexander's unpopularity in Macedonia and the long-term damage his reign did his homeland in "Alexander the Great and the decline of Macedonia," *JHS* 106 (1986) 1–12) offers so little of it here. The weakness of political analysis is perhaps best exemplified by Bosworth's treatment of the death of Cleitus (pp. 114–16).

Bosworth argues that not only was Cleitus himself unimportant ("... there is no evidence that he was ... a personage important enough in his

own right to be undermined and eliminated" p. 114), but also that the murder had virtually no long-term repercussions ("Cleitus may have had his followers and sympathizers, but they were a small minority and unable or unwilling to make capital out of his death" p. 115). Cleitus' role as co-commander of the Companion cavalry with Hephaestion hardly made him obscure; the fact that he had saved Alexander's life and that his sister and other members of his family were intimate associates of the king also speak to Cleitus' standing (see H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich II* [Munich 1926] 206–9). In the end, the murder itself suggests that Alexander considered Cleitus and his arguments very important; had it been otherwise, had not Alexander been used to dealing with the man as a near equal, he would have left his silencing to his underlings or servants. Bosworth's remarks about the repercussions of Cleitus' death seem equally unconvincing: not only did the problems with Callisthenes and the Hermolaus conspiracy follow fairly close upon the murder, but its obvious terrorizing nature tended to silence opposition short of conspiracy. Oddest of all is Bosworth's transition back to campaign narrative after his account of the murder: "The serious business of campaigning remained" (p. 116). The implication seems to be that the murder was a kind of light relief and that political events were somehow less serious than military ones.

There are several other examples of this cursory and sometimes illogical treatment of political events. Bosworth asserts (p. 26) that the execution of the sons of Aeropus clears Alexander of involvement in the murder of Philip, because he believes that Alexander would not have dared to execute accomplices in public where they might implicate him. He fails to consider the possibility that the sons of Aeropus were mere scapegoats and not genuine conspirators, despite Badian's well-known arguments (*Phoenix* 17 [1963] 248). Similarly, Bosworth claims (p. 21) that Attalus' famous insult to Alexander at the wedding feast (Athen. 557d; Plut. *Alex.* 9.7) was aimed at Olympias' marital fidelity and also her non-Macedonian origins, thus mentioning the superficial causes and failing to observe that Attalus' primary purpose was, of course, to champion his own family's tie to the throne and to jeopardize that of Olympias and Alexander. None of these difficulties signify much for those already knowledgeable about Alexander scholarship, but they could prove dangerously deceptive to students new to the field. *Conquest and Empire* should certainly not, therefore, be used as the sole modern text in any course.

Despite these not inconsiderable weaknesses, there are a number of strengths, other than those already noted. Bosworth does much more than simply flesh out the bones of information about the role of Greece in Alexander's reign and about the administration of the empire. He consistently reminds the reader of the viewpoint of the conquered. Bosworth stresses the number of massacres and the cost in human life of Alexander's victories and he carefully notes the parasitic nature of Alexander's city-founding. This emphasis is particularly significant in a work so heavily military in nature and stands as a useful corrective to the much less critical viewpoint of that found in the only

other easily accessible and heavily military narrative, N.G.L. Hammond's *Alexander the Great, King, Commander and Statesman*.

Although Bosworth's primary intent is certainly not to break new ground, he scatters a number of intriguing and penetrating observations throughout the narrative. The author, for instance, suggests that the numerous risks Alexander took (and the wounds these risks so often precipitated) must have created widespread expectation of his imminent death and must therefore have fueled resistance to his reign (p. 43). Bosworth's discussion (p. 57) of the causation of Harpalus' first departure is original and should be read by anyone interested in that particular puzzle. His 'take' on the consequences of the destruction of Persepolis is equally unconventional: he argues that the burning of Persepolis did not alienate the Persian populace, which he believes continued to be accepting of Alexander (pp. 93–94). Towards the end of a long footnote on the royal tombs at Vergina (p. 27, n. 9), Bosworth tosses off the remark that Alexander had no reason to be in a rush about the burial of his father—as far as I know, he is the only scholar in the field who makes such a claim, yet his argument is a good one. And, of course, throughout the narrative the reader benefits from the judgments of a brilliant source critic.

Conquest and Empire is neither a major new scholarly study of the reign of Alexander (somehow we continue to expect such a book when we should, perhaps, recognize its arrival is as likely as that of the Great American Novel) nor the perfect solution to the problems of those who teach courses on the history of Macedonia and the reign of Alexander. The author intended it to be neither of these. *Conquest and Empire* makes available to a general audience many of the ideas and techniques of perhaps the most gifted scholar currently at work on the reign of Alexander the Great.

ELIZABETH D. CARNEY

CLEMSON UNIVERSITY

PHILLIP MITSIS. *Epicurus' Ethical Theory: The Pleasures of Invulnerability*. Cornell University Press, 1988. Pp. ix & 184. Cloth, \$24.95. (Cornell Studies in Classical Philology, 48)

The upsurge of a general interest in the philosophers of the Hellenistic age in recent years makes a comprehensive study of Epicurus' ethical theory highly desirable. For although the old clichés about the primitiveness of Epicurean philosophy have long been on the wane among the specialists, there has been as yet no reassessment of the complexity and sophistication of the Epicurean doctrine that would attract a wider public and satisfy the specialist at the same time. Mitsis takes up a considerable challenge: he attempts not only to liberate Epicureanism from the odium of being merely "an archaic self-help manual" that gives "simple moral recipes for those uninitiated in philosophical theo-

ricing" (4/5), but also to provide a serious philosophical appreciation such as Stoicism has already received in recent years. His whole investigation is tailored towards a reevaluation of the aim of invulnerability and moral autonomy (cf. the subtitle of the book) as the focus of Epicurean ethics; it serves as the basis for a more informed appreciation of the strengths and limitations of an ethical system with such a commitment. In chapter 1 ("Pleasure, Happiness, and Desire") the author gives his reasons for the reappraisal of the concept of "pleasure" itself: it is not a subjective state, a feeling, to be weighed and measured in a hedonistic calculus, but rather the overall healthy condition or function of the natural organism. In chapters 2 ("Justice and the Virtues") and 3 ("Friendship and Altruism") Mitsis pursues the problems which such a self-centered concern for invulnerability and self-sufficiency necessarily imports for other-directed values such as justice and friendship. The fourth chapter ("Reason, Responsibility, and the Mechanisms of Freedom") discusses the moral psychology and theory of voluntary action underlying this conception of invulnerability and shows that it not only is quite compatible, but indeed requires Epicurean physics.

The dialectic procedure adopted by Mitsis, depicting Epicurean ethics in the larger context of both ancient and modern ethical debates, makes for challenging reading. It allows Mitsis to draw in a large (for a monograph of such moderate size astonishingly large) amount of relevant material, both ancient and modern, that should be of equal interest to the historically orientated as well as the philosophically minded specialist. Mitsis realizes that he thereby incurs the risk of being charged with multiple historical confusion by confronting Epicurus with earlier thinkers' doctrines to point out agreement or disagreement, or by introducing contemporary ethical concerns, such as altruism, moral obligation, or materialistic reduction. He hopes to open, not close, the discussion of these problems and that his attempt at such cross-fertilization will "tempt more high-flying philosophers or more careful and informed historians . . ." (7).

Chapter 1: If the notion of invulnerability is treated as the key-concept that is capable of philosophical justification, then Epicurean "hedonism" can be discussed and evaluated squarely within the context of the Greek tradition of Platonist or Aristotelian eudaimonist ethics. For if "pleasure" is to be interpreted as overall *satisfaction*, it can then serve as the supreme goal in human life, providing a proper perspective for the structuring of our actions and the organization of our life. Epicurean ethics is then much more akin to the Aristotelian conception of *eudaimonia* as a flourishing life than to the British empiricist's hedonistic ideal of maximization of a supposedly uniform feeling of pleasure, as widely assumed (cf. Gosling and Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure*, chs. 18–20).

His dialectic method allows the author to collect the evidence for both a "dispositional" and a hedonistic ("private feeling") account of pleasure and to point out that in the overall balance of arguments the scales come down heavily

on the side of the dispositional account. Only some of the main points favoring Mitsis' interpretation can be mentioned here: (1) The identification of happiness with peace of mind (*ataraxia*) and health of the body (*aponia*) is not a simple confusion or fraud, but legitimized by the formal conditions of his theory of happiness: invulnerability to chance and self-sufficiency. (2) In contrast with individual pleasant sensations that resist normative prescriptions, the notion of "satisfaction" permits an objective standard of evaluation, a structuring, ranking, and ordering of desires by looking at the activities that provide such satisfaction. (3) The conception of satisfaction explains why there is no neutral state in Epicurus and no mixture of pleasure and pain: it is a matter of pass/fail; satisfaction is either achieved or it is not. (4) The dispositional account allows for a dependence of pleasure on rational belief, which would well explain Epicurus' insistence on the sage's rationality, while it is difficult to maintain any such position for a sensualist account. (5) Finally and most importantly, the distinction between *kinetic* and *katastematic* pleasures (satisfying vs. satisfied), and Epicurus' insistence that only the latter are good, make very good sense on the basis of a dispositional account, but are difficult to justify for a "sensualist" Epicurean. The kinetic pleasures, as the means whereby satisfaction is achieved, are "mere variants" to which Epicurus assigns no value: any means to still our hunger is equally useful, frugality is recommended so that we do not get falsely obsessed with the means rather than the end, satisfaction, itself.

Whether the proponents of the traditional interpretation of Epicureanism will be convinced by all of Mitsis' arguments remains to be seen. That the signs for the existence of a hedonic calculus are slim does not mean that they don't exist; in fact Mitsis has to do some explaining away as far as quantitative evaluations are concerned (23ff.). That there are other considerations for the sensualist in the evaluation of pleasures is to be expected: all hedonists must have learned the Calliclean lesson that not all pleasures are equally good, and that prudence has its function in a hedonist's life. Emphasis on structure and rational order are not *eo ipso* incompatible with a hedonist point of view, as has been emphasized by some British empiricists. Nor will the defense of hedonism so easily give in to Mitsis' reinterpretation of the "argument from the cradle" (cf. "Pleasure and Belief," esp. 40), i.e., that observation of newborns is not proof of an affinity to a sensual conception of pleasure. These points will no doubt be taken up by the scholars who are less in sympathy than this reviewer with a "dispositional" account of pleasure.

A more serious impediment to a full-hearted agreement with Mitsis lies in the fact that his interpretation contains a significant hole, a hole that lies, unfortunately, right in the center of his reconstruction of the Epicurean theory. Probably mainly because of his dialectic procedure of comparing and contrasting, he has omitted any kind of explanation of what satisfaction really means, a kind of phenomenological description of "being satisfied," as far as the content goes. This omission is unproblematic in the case of undisturbedness of the body,

aponia; there is no need for further comment here, but not so in the case of *ataraxia*. If satisfaction is an intentional intellectual state such a description ought to be possible, at least in general terms (even if the flexibility in the kinds of satisfactions sought by the Epicurean wise man forbid too detailed a description). What does satisfaction mean? Is its content determined by the particular satisfaction of the moment, i.e., the satisfied thought that I have now eaten, or talked about Epicureanism, augmented by the happy thought of similar future satisfactions?

Unfortunately the few remarks we find in Mitsis that indicate what "having one's needs satisfied" means are spread out far and wide over the whole book and sometimes hidden in footnotes. And nowhere are there any specific comments. If satisfaction does not have any content beyond the constation of satisfaction itself (an "all quiet"), it must be either an indistinct feeling or no psychic state at all, but the objective fact that desires are satisfied; but why, then, call it pleasure and not rather, with Democritus, *eustatheia* or *autarkeia*?

Chapters 2/3: The importance of the question of an intentional content for Epicurean pleasures goes beyond the existential feasibility of the life of an Epicurean. It affects more central philosophical issues, relevant for the solution of the problems that Mitsis raises himself, of the justification of other-related values such as justice, and friendship. As Mitsis points out very aptly, the value ascribed to justice and friendship presupposes a more expansive conception of happiness than the "egocentric" conception of the good as the enlightened self-interest of the self-sufficient sage would allow for.

As I want to suggest, a clearer notion of the "intentional content" of the Epicurean pleasures of satisfaction might present such an expansive view as a less uneasy compromise than Mitsis allows. For if our satisfactions can have a complex content, then they may very well be other-related, albeit self-centered, fulfillments. Since Mitsis does not go into any such considerations he has a tendency to regard all factors involved in activities that are not strictly identical with (the feeling of?) satisfaction as external goods that are at best the means to achieve happiness but cannot be part of the happiness itself. But if the virtues do not only *produce* the inner state but *are* the satisfactory inner state (as Mitsis sometimes seems to grant, 60), then *ataraxia* must consist in being virtuous, and the virtues are not just a means of rationally calculating our advantage, an "infallible craft of securing happiness" (78). It may, then, not be necessary to accuse Epicurus of succumbing to Mill's temptation to confuse "the pleasure with the pursuits that give rise to it" (114). Justice may not only be the "productive means to *ataraxia*" but can also have intrinsic value. This is not to dispute the validity of the defense Mitsis gives for the prudence that motivates the Epicurean to respect contracts, or the *instrumental* value of social peace; it is to suggest that the possession of a non-pleonectic soul may provide me not only with the *means* to satisfaction but with its *content* as well. It is difficult to conceive that Epicurus regarded peace of mind as restful empty-headedness (cf. esp. Mitsis 93, n. 81).

A stronger case than for justice can be made for the intrinsic value of friendship and altruism; for Epicurus did stress the concern for friends as important, and not only in an instrumental sense. Mitsis gives good reasons why associanist (from habit) and contractual accounts of friendship do not fill Epicurus' bill, but regards the intrinsic value ascribed to friendship as an uneasy compromise, a point left unclear by the master and thus confusing to the disciples (112). But some indications support the view that a more extensive conception of what "contentment" contains might clear Epicurus from the reproach of inconsistency. Contentment might, for example consist *in* conversation with friends and mutual contemplation rather than being *derived from* it (cf. 123, n. 49). For this reason even the Epicurean gods value friendships. The arguments against such an inclusive conception of "pleasurable states" that Mitsis refers to do not seem to settle this question (116, n. 33, Sidgwick's objections to Mill clearly do not treat pleasure as an intentional state).

Chapter 4: The last issue is the question of how Epicurus manages to combine his atomism with the notion of human rationality and responsibility. Mitsis rightly separates the question of psychological determinism ("Rationality and Responsibility") from that of materialist reductionism ("Indeterminism and the Swerve"); the question of a psychological determinism is not decided by the question of whether there is a mutual dependence between the macroscopic and the microscopic level, the phenomenal and the atomic level (whether the influence is taken to work "top-down" or "bottom-up"). Mitsis shows why Epicurean hedonism is not particularly vulnerable to determination by a "stimulus-response" mechanism: Flexibility in our desires and responsiveness to rational control enable us to cope with "fatal attractions."

The final question of the connection between the atomic swerve and human autonomy does not allow for an easy solution, as Mitsis realizes. If micro-events control macro-events the swerve would guarantee capriciousness and erraticity, but not rational spontaneity. It seems that no exact account of how the swerve(s) interrupt the causal chains can be given. The most plausible reconstruction ascribes a kind of emergentism to Epicurus which preserves a causal coherence between macro- and micro-levels, while the emerging higher-order properties are not directly subject to either random or non-random motions of atoms. Even so, Mitsis concedes, emergentism must assume a kind of "conjunction" between the two levels that "itself remains essentially mysterious."

Whether from the conviction that it might be too early to pass final verdicts over the different aspects of this tangled subject, or perhaps also from the desire to be done with it for the time being, Mitsis is less explicit and decisive in the discussion of the issues in the last chapter. He seems ready to grant the justifiability of Epicurus' assumptions rather than to argue for it (cf. 144ff.), as he does, for example, in his contention that in spite of causal continuity there must be an Archimedean point in our rational deliberations that puts us in control (149).

Such cautionary and tentative treatment of these issues is, however, quite

in keeping with his initial modest self-assessment of providing for the opening rather than the closing of the difficult questions dealt with in his book. A wider recognition of the book should indeed lead to a very lively and fruitful discussion.

DORETHEA FREDÉ

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

THEODORA HANTOS. *Res publica constituta*. Die Verfassung des Dictators Sulla. Stuttgart, F. Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, 1988. Pp. 176. Paper, DM 48.

The title implies a clear and promising statement: Sulla the dictator constituted the *res publica* (cf. App. *B.C.* 1.99.462); he did not only rebuild or reconstitute it (cf. Cic. *Rosc.* 48.139; *Brut.* 90.311). While reading the introduction (pp. 13–18), we may expect a new picture of the Sullan constitution neither influenced positively or negatively by the overwhelming authority of Mommsen's analysis, nor dealing only with single aspects, questions of Sulla's personality or preconceived ideas, nor ending up at a loss ("Ratlosigkeit," p. 17).

This likeable, fresh approach—quite optimistic as it seems regarding the lamentable state of evidence—will succeed according to H. if based both on recent research on state and constitution (especially by A. Heuss and J. Bleicken, p. 17) and on an appropriate method: namely the principle of the autonomy of the object and the use of hermeneutical criteria immanent and adequate to the topic dealt with ("Prinzip der Autonomie des Objekts und der Immanenz und Adäquanz des hermeneutischen Maßstabs," pp. 17/18. That means, I guess, that a constitution is a constitution, and therefore it should be treated as a constitution designed in a specific situation). To come closer to the basic idea ("Grundgedanke") as well as to the sense and coherence ("sinnhafter Gesamtzusammenhang") inherent in Sulla's plans, H. intends to put together particular elements of the *res publica constituta* under headings different from Mommsen's formal corner-stones, Magistracy–Senate–People's Assemblies. We may suppose that the headings preferred correspond with the titles given to the two big chapters analysing "Aristokratie und Ritterstand" (chap. I, pp. 19–68) and "Aristokratie und Exekutive" (chap. II, pp. 69–161). Following, however, a didactic concept which starts looking at the elements singled out, and anxious about being blamed for hasty conclusions, H. does not give reasons for that choice nor does she reveal the concept attributed to Sulla until she comes to the conclusion ("Schlusswort," pp. 162–67). Then we learn that the modernized but aristocratic-minded concept shows two constitutive levels ("Ebenen der Gestaltung," p. 162): The first deals with the formation of political will and decision-making (chap. I), the second aims at a more efficient transfer of decisions to daily politics (chap. II). In addition, strong control was an important factor to

keep the Sullan system up in working order on both levels. In case of doubt, control should gain priority over efficiency (p. 166).

It seems as if Sulla did not feel very confident of his fellow-aristocrats and the persuasive power of his basic idea. Shall we trust in the persuasive analysis of the Sullan state produced by H.? There are some inconsistencies visible in that concluding summary: To separate the making of decisions strictly from executing them hardly hits the point if the executing magistracies can be looked at as highly involved in the process of decision-making. It is also hard to understand how the Sullan principle of political integration of the upper class ("Oberschicht") composed of senators and equites could have worked if it had been paralleled to an enforced political domination granted to a small élitist "inner circle" of consuls and *consulares* ("Vermassung der Führungsschicht unter verschärfter Elitebildung," p. 163; see pp. 57 and 60). Finally, emphasizing the Sullan intention to raise the efficiency of executive power by increasing the numbers of magistrates, specialising their duties and unifying the conditions of office-holding, does not fit in very well with the principle of control stressed so intensely by H.

The opening section of the first chapter deals with the admission of quaestors and tribunes of the plebs to the senate and with the way the list of senators had to be drafted after the omission of censorship ("Die Rekrutierung des politischen Nachwuchses . . .," pp. 19–33). According to H., Sulla was first to grant the tribunes the title to membership in the senate by law ("Rechtsanspruch," p. 20, whatever that might mean in Roman society). Consequently, H. has to date the Atinian plebiscite treating the same subject before the *lex Hortensia* 287 B.C., because plebiscites did not have the effect of laws until then. Unfortunately, H. leaves out the convincing remarks of Develin, who dated that plebiscite in 216 B.C. (*CQ* 28 [1978] 141–44). Discussing the membership in the senate, H. connects the *lex Cornelia iudiciaria* with the senators' list: Publishing the names of the jurors in the rearranged *quaestiones perpetuae*, the *praetor urbanus* simultaneously made known the names of the senators (p. 27). Should Roman senators be defined primarily by being jurors? Moreover, it seems questionable to shift the censorial *potestas* partially to the praetor, thus granting him a political standing higher than that of the consuls, otherwise presented correctly as the leading politicians by H. (pp. 60, 88). Doubling the number of quaestors from 10 to 20 surely has to be seen as an effort to further integration and toward coherence of the leading class ("Führungsschicht," p. 31), but doubts may be raised about the intention of furthering also the efficiency of the political system. For the exclusion of the 10 tribunes from the *cursus honorum* must have simply caused the need of adding 10 political beginners, if competitive spirit as well as constraint of conformity should not be weakened at that level. With regard to all this, it is not surprising that the *cursus honorum* analysed in the next section ("Das interne Avancement," pp. 33–45) does not show essential changes, except perhaps for the fixing of a ten-year-interval between the tenure of two consulates and (highly hypothetical) of two

tribuneships, too. The third section ("Der Senat und seine Neubildung," pp. 45–61) discusses the most important topic of the role of the senate, of which the number of members was increased by Sulla from 300 to 600. H. tries to explain why that role has been seen so differently by modern scholarship. H. reduces the problem, which is (allegedly) caused by paying too much attention to the senate as an institution, to a problem of definition, and she solves it by means of dividing the senatorial stratum of society into parts, i.e., aristocracy, particular segments of aristocrats and, finally, the senate as a mere institution. It is acceptable to split up the senate in a way like this (and it has been in use for some time), but to suppose that the primary goal aimed at by doubling the senators was to fill the *quaestiones perpetuae* (p. 53) is misleading because the aspect of integration is minimized. The result would have been more balanced if H. had attended seriously to both the comparable efforts of Livius Drusus before and the new situation after the Social War (cf. p. 50). Expanding citizenship all over the peninsula made integration a pressing political task. The following section ("Die Kontrolle der Führungsschicht," pp. 61–68) deals primarily with the permanent courts reorganized by Sulla.

The second chapter, dealing with aristocracy and executive power (69–161), begins with a paragraph about lawgiving (69–89), an arrangement which may be disturbing to readers used to seeing lawgiving as part of decision-making rather than of executive power. It becomes understandable when we look at H.'s emphasis on magisterial *rogatores*, whereas she almost completely leaves out *comitia* and *concilia*. Following the formal ductus of reasoning, H. sketches two functional unities ("Funktionseinheiten," p. 70) engaged in lawgiving, namely consuls/praetors/*comitia* and tribunes of the *plebs/concilia plebis*. So far, so formally good. But it becomes an idle play with numbers when the political role of these unities is connected with the number of the potential *rogatores*, with the conclusion that the first unity should be strengthened by increasing the number of praetors to have at hand 10 consuls and praetors against 10 tribunes (pp. 73f.). Even if the competence of lawgiving was left to the tribunes, as H. argues with good reasons, the decisive fact is that any tribunician proposal had to be approved by the senate in advance. Turning to the provinces ("Die Verwaltung der Provinzen," 89–120), H. seems most interested in the governors, ignoring the government and the governed. Accepting Mommsen's concept of a systematical succession of *imperium domi* and *militiae*, H. brushes aside Giovannini's considerations (*Consulare imperium*, 1983) rather bluntly (pp. 98ff.). To her the automatic change from magistracy to promagistracy means a real doubling of regular offices ("reguläre Ämter," p. 111), and she therefore neglects the question why then the term pro-magistrate has been kept on. Consequently, H. states that the position of magistrates was enforced against the senate, and the periodical change of holding power was guaranteed by creating "Biennität," that is by regular two-year-terms in office (a short glance at Broughton's *MRR* makes nonsense of that assumption). It seems also questionable to trace back the numerical expansion of the priesthoods to the

growing exigencies of ruling an empire (cf. "Die Verwaltung der sacra," pp. 120–30, esp. 126f.). Furthering of integration by conceding prestige but keeping up the aristocratic principle of minimizing political offices may come nearer to the intended effect.

Control as the most stabilizing factor in the Sullan concept is analysed in the last section ("Die Kontrolle der Exekutive," pp. 130–61; see also pp. 61–68). H. presents as instruments of control the *ius intercedendi* of the *tribuni plebis* and their right to veto, the disciplinary effects of one-year-terms of office ("Annuität"), collegiality and the *quaestiones perpetuae*. These *quaestiones* surely should help to control the politicians, too. The inclusion of standing courts into a constitutional system, however, should have led to a glance at the other side of the coin, i.e., the weakening of the respective competence of the *comitia* and the tribunes. Some points do not become fully clear, e.g., how "Biennität" may have stabilized the principle of "Annuität" (p. 148, cf. p. 111) and why *intercessio* by colleagues was enforced by adding ten new quaestors (always dependent on hints from above) and two praetors (engaged in different courts!). But H.'s reasoning about the effects of the July-term for elections causing "latente Kollegialität" makes good sense. When dealing with the tribunes' intercession, which Sulla did not touch on as H. argues cautiously and rightly (p. 135ff.), H. makes no point of the surprising fact that her chief witness, Q. Opimius, was not convicted by the *quaestio maiestatis*—as anybody would expect following H.'s arguments (p. 143)—but was fined a ruinous sum by the urban praetor Verres in 74 B.C.

H. made the right choice when accepting J. Bleicken's authority by pointing out both the growing tendency to transform *mores* into *leges* and the efforts in ancient evidence to identify the state with its laws in the late Republic (pp. 69ff., 159). It was wrong, however, to conclude that the power of the *lex publica* was growing through history, making the Romans in Sulla's time a law-abiding nation, because the development of nobility since the fourth century was paralleled to forms of social order and control which turned legal control into a secondary matter. Sulla surely was well aware of the fact that *leges* cannot substitute *mores*. Moreover, by linking together state and law in the Sullan constitution, H. misunderstood the argument of Bleicken, who says with desirable clarity: "Eine Integration des Rechts in die Staatsidee erfolgte jedenfalls nicht . . ." (*Staat und Recht in der römischen Republik* [Wiesbaden 1978] 24).

H. was right again to give up Mommsen's view directed primarily to institutions, but it was less wise to stick to his idea of a Sullan plan to correlate numerically *quaestiones*, praetors and provinces and to organize the regular succession of *imperium domi* and *militiae* for magistrates and promagistrates. For none of these "basics" is well-founded, neither the number of *quaestiones* nor that of praetors or provinces nor the regular change of magistrates (see now the masterly unorthodox remarks of J. D. Cloud, "Sulla and the praetorship," *LCM* 13.5 [1988] 69–72).

Finally, daring a fresh methodological approach does not free one from

looking anew at the sources. H. may be right by stating that Cicero has nothing to say about Sulla's intentions (31). Then, however, it becomes even more urgent to follow the way chosen, for example, by Badian (*JRS* 52 [1962] 47–61) and to look further for other evidence, even if it comes out with some names of authors whose writings are lost and some evidence of which the producers are unknown.

Criticism like that will not impress H., I am afraid, because her methodological approach allows her to ignore almost completely the historical development and the consequences within the analysis of a special event in its setting, as well as to brush aside any argument not fitting into the narrow legal concept of constitution. Theories, methods and models, welcome as they are to stimulate new questions and new answers, should be handled with care. Otherwise, history may be defeated by methodology. For the time being, alas, we are still "waiting for Sulla"—and his concept.

WALTER EDER

FREIE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN

SUSAN FORD WILTSHIRE. *Public and Private in Vergil's Aeneid*. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1989. Pp. xiii & 170.

This is a readable little book, short, well-written, and carefully constructed, its seven chapters (plus introduction and conclusion) organized into an elegant structure. The first chapter, "Public and Private and the Problem of Time" argues that Vergil, in contrast to other ancient authors, "learned to manage the problem of time in such a way that the present could bear the weight of the political struggle while the past and the future together contained the hope and the positive vision that the costly present always assails" (20). The remaining six chapters alternate in emphasis: first a concern that is essentially private, next a related aspect of public life.

Chapter 2, "Grieving Mothers and the Costs of Attachment," sets out Vergil's concern for the private sphere and the cost, especially to women, of the enterprise of founding Rome. Chapter 3, "Self-distancing and the Capacity for Action," attempts to answer Chapter 2 by showing that people can achieve successes in the public sphere despite the cost if they can distance themselves from their private concerns; only Aeneas and Ascanius, however, manage to do so.

Chapter 4, "Where is Home?," links the conflict between public and private with the idea of home and with time. "To create a home in the present for the sake of the future is the work of the public realm, the home we remember from the past, however, is private" (66). Thus Aeneas progresses from private to public as he stops looking for a home in the known past and commits himself to the unknown future. Chapter 5, "Hospitality and the Transformation of

Realms," treats home as a place where public and private meet. Here Wiltshire treats the function of hospitality in five episodes in the poem: its disastrous effects on Dido, its function as a haven (Acestes), its collapse in the events of Book 7, its capacity for creating political alliances (Evander and Aeneas), and for initiating changes in public behavior (Diomedes' reception of the Latin envoys).

Chapter 6, "*Amor*," examines various types of love in the *Aeneid*, including love of land, love between people (familial and passionate love), and history and the love of praise; it concludes that there is no satisfactory integration of public and private through love in the *Aeneid*. Chapter 7, "Bridging Public and Private: *Labor* and *Pietas*," argues that *labor* and *pietas* play the role that love might have played in integrating public and private: "The strain between public and private is softened by the strategy of self-distancing, and eased by the practice of hospitality, but for Vergil the primary means by which an individual bridges the gap between private and political life is *labor* or work. The social motive that sustains such *labor* is *pietas*" (122).

Scattered through the book are many good observations. The mothers who burn the ships in *Aeneid* 5 are not torn between the desire to stay and to go, but between desire (to stay where they are) and the fated realm (*miserum inter amorem / praesentis terrae fatisque vocantia regna* (5.655–56); in other words, theirs is a "dilemma between private love and public destiny" (107). The change from *sociis natoque penatibus et magnis dis* (3.12) to *patribus populoque* . . . (8.679) implies a transfer of *pietas* from the private to the public sphere (136). Provocative, although I am not sure I am convinced, is Wiltshire's argument for interpreting Creusa's words, *serva nati communis amorem* (2.789) as Ascanius' love for his parents rather than Aeneas' love for their son. Certainly Servius Danielis' remark, *quasi mater sollicita, quod dixerat, eum aliam habiturum uxorem*, which she quotes on page 111, fits the conventional reading of the phrase just as well. However that may be, Creusa's last words are, as Wiltshire observes, rooted firmly in the private realm where the love of a child resides.

Certain sections of the book are impressive. I like Wiltshire's discussion of the "possible present" (36–37), her treatment of the relationship between Dido and Ascanius (46–47), and her assessment of the importance of Diomedes for the poem. Her handling of the way Andromache, whose concerns are mostly private, frames Helenus' "public" speech (111–12) is illuminating. I especially like her treatment of the way Vergil incorporates the "casualties" of the private realm into his story (120–21).

Despite its virtues, however, I have problems with the book. For my taste much too much space is devoted to the views of other scholars, whether or not their work is especially relevant to Wiltshire's own. Pages 17–20, for example, are little more than a catalogue of recent work on the *Aeneid* and could well have been cut out or relegated to footnotes. A more serious problem, related to the first, I think, is Wiltshire's tendency to quote a scholar rather than to argue a point herself. Only a footnote to *Patterns of Time in Vergil* backs up the assertion, "Vergil achieved this reconciliation (of problematic present and positive

future) by writing a poem in which the present is fully embraced but at the same time the past is remembered as good and the future is anticipated with hope" (22–23). I would like to see the point argued on the basis of evidence from the text. When none is adduced, I am sceptical. Some assertions are not supported at all. A basic premise of the book, one I find unconvincing, is that the *Aeneid* is a "true celebration of the achievements of Augustus" (22). It is an important assumption; it seems, in fact, to underlie the assumption that the future the poem envisions is good, but the evidence for the claim is not mustered and examined.

The other problem I have with the book is that I do not always understand exactly how the discussion of the *Aeneid* fits into the terms of the public/private dilemma. For example, the originality of "Where is Home?" must lie in the new light shed on Aeneas' gradual realization that his mission is not to found a new Troy by its incorporation into the framework of the public/private dilemma. The first paragraph of the chapter, partially quoted in the survey of chapters, is intended to provide the link, but I do not understand it. Why is the home we remember from the past exclusively private (66)? And if it is, is it only the memory of the past or the past itself that is private? In chapter 6 Aeneas' private Trojan past is opposed to his public Roman future: "Upon leaving Troy he will never again be able to function simply in the sphere of family without regard to history" (111). Did he ever function simply in the sphere of family? (Book 2 seems to me to tell a very different story.)

I had a similar problem with the five functions of hospitality in the next chapter. As examples of hospitality they did not seem to add up to much, while the discussion of Diomedes' role in the poem, which was good, seemed to have only a tenuous link with hospitality. And what of the various forms of hospitality in Book 3? Surely they must be included in a thorough assessment of the topic. More careful argumentation might well have clarified these and other issues.

I think chapter 2 is the most interesting and, taken as a whole, probably the best in the book. The issues are central to the poem, the argument is effective, and the focus on public and private really works, even though there seems to me to be some slight distortion in the comparison of Dido and Andromache. Surely "Andromache lives in a past that is no longer," but does Dido really live "in a future that will not be" (47), or is she rather living all too much in the present? The discussion of women's gifts is fascinating, and could be taken further if men's gifts were more closely examined. I would be very interested in Wiltshire's views about the gifts Aeneas gives Dido and also about the cloak that Aeneas does not use to cover Pallas' corpse. Aeneas does not use both of them, as Wiltshire claims on page 54 (one of the very few factual errors I spotted in the book): *tum geminas vestis . . . extulit Aeneas . . . harum unam iuveni . . . induit* (*Aen.* 11.72–76). The man who gave Helen's and Ilione's ill-omened regalia to Dido has one more tragedy-laden cloak in his possession as he moves on toward his Roman future.

Despite these criticisms there is much to praise in this book. One of the

things it does best, in my view, is to relate Vergil's concerns with our own compromises between public and private every day, and—most importantly—with those of a number of other writers whom we may not have thought of as sharing Vergil's interests, among them Shakespeare (64–65), Hardy (65), Edith Wharton (93), Radcliffe Squires (34–36), and Wendell Barry (33–34, 122). Vergil would be pleased to find himself in such good company.

SARA MACK

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL

ANNA ANGELI, Editor. *Filodemo, Agli Amici di Scuola* (PHerc. 1005). Naples, Bibliopolis, 1988. Pp. 353. Cloth, L. 70,000. (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, La Scuola di Epicuro, 7)

ENZO PUGLIA, Editor. *Demetrio Lacone, Aporie Testuali ed Esegetiche in Epicuro* (PHerc. 1012). *Precedono testimonianze su Demetrio Lacone ordinate da Marcello Gigante*. Naples, Bibliopolis, 1988. Pp. 328. Cloth, L. 70,000. (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, La Scuola di Epicuro, 8)

COSTANTINA ROMEO, Editor. *Demetrio Lacone, La Poesia* (PHerc. 188 e 1014). Naples, Bibliopolis, 1988. Pp. 329. Cloth, L. 70,000. (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, La Scuola di Epicuro, 9)

MARIO CAPASSO, Editor. *Carneisco, Il Secondo Libro del Filista* (PHerc. 1027). Naples, Bibliopolis, 1988. Pp. 301. Cloth, L. 70,000. (Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, La Scuola di Epicuro, 10)

These four volumes contain new editions of five Herculanean papyri, the two papyri in vol. 9 being from the same work. The total amount of Greek text is about 150 printed pages, more than half of which contain little or no intelligible text. But what is intelligible is of considerable interest. The editors have meticulously examined the papyri; they have consulted the Oxford and Naples copies; they have corrected errors of earlier editors and recovered many additional letters. The texts that they offer provide the best available basis for future work on these Epicurean writings.

In two of the volumes the Greek text is divided between fragments and columns. PHerc. 1005 (vol. 7) has 117 fragments and 20 columns. PHerc. 1027 (vol. 10) has 110 fragments and 21 columns. The columns are in each case from the inner end of the roll, containing the last part of the treatise. Only the upper portion of each column, that above the tie that encircled the roll, has been preserved. The columns are arranged in a likely sequence, but the fragments are disconnected bits whose place in the work can only be surmised from what little information they provide.

The other two volumes have a different arrangement. Since even the

smallest fragments were parts of columns, and even the best of the columns is fragmentary, the editors of these volumes reject the distinction. They arrange the parts of their papyri in what they consider a probable order, number them consecutively, and call them all columns. Puglia identifies 74 partial columns in PHerc. 1012 (vol. 8); Romeo (vol. 9) recovers nineteen from PHerc. 188, sixty-six from 1014.

The editors divide their Greek texts into chapters and provide translations into Italian of as much as is translatable. Introductory and explanatory material occupies more than five times as many pages as text and translation. Preceding the text in each volume are an *Introduzione* that discusses author and subject-matter, and a *Premessa all'Edizione* in which the editor describes the papyrus and gives an account of the copies and earlier editions. Following the text and translation is the commentary, which takes up specific textual problems and larger problems of interpretation. Each volume has a generous bibliography, concordances, and indexes of names and words. Volumes 8 and 9 have an additional index of passages quoted in the text, and vol. 7 has an index of passages from Greek and Latin authors cited in the introduction and commentary. Volume 10 departs from the general pattern by placing the 110 fragments after the commentary, and vol. 8 has as a special feature nine passages, assembled by M. Gigante, that provide information about Demetrius Lacon.

The papyri edited in these volumes expand considerably the range of interests and activities that we associate with Epicureanism. The earliest is 1027 (vol. 10). The subscription has survived. It identifies the author as Carneiscus and the work as *Philistas*, Book II. Carneiscus was a first-generation Epicurean. His name appears in a letter written almost certainly by Epicurus and quoted in Philodemus' *Pragmateiai* (Epicurus, frag. 120 Arrighetti). His *Philistas* is addressed to a certain Zopyrus, otherwise unknown. Philistas is also unknown except for a possible reference to him in another Herculanean papyrus.

Capasso finds in the extant portion of the work a combination of praise and polemic. Carneiscus praises his dead friend and at the same time accuses the Peripatetic Praxiphanes of having mistaken notions about friendship and about the proper attitude toward the death of a friend. Two of the major themes in Capasso's introduction and commentary are the Peripatetic and Epicurean views on friendship and death, and the wide variety of literary styles found in the writings of Epicurus and other early members of the school.

The latest of these texts is 1005 (vol. 7), a work of Philodemus. By the time of Philodemus, early first century B.C., the Epicureans were adapting their teachings to changing times and circumstances. Questions of orthodoxy arose, and Philodemus participated in the resultant controversies. In 1005 he accuses certain unnamed Epicureans of failing to follow the teaching of Epicurus, and in support of his position he quotes and explicates passages from Epicurus' writings. Angeli, who gives in her introduction a good account of the history of controversy within the school, presents a text that differs at many points from

that of F. Sbordone (Naples, 1947). She rejects outright some of Sbordone's restorations, including those that appear as fragments 262 and 263 in the second edition of Arrighetti's *Epicuro*. Others are greatly altered. An important passage in 1005 is Philodemus' quotation from a letter almost certainly by Epicurus that mentions Aristotle's *Analytics* and *Physics*, frag. 1³ Sbordone, frag. 127 Arrighetti, and now frag. 111 Angeli. Aristotle is still there, but Crates has disappeared, Aristippus is now author of a work *Su Socrate*, and there is a new entry, Speusippus' *Encomium of Plato*. Angeli's comment on this passage is seven pages long, and indeed her restoration is attractive, except that one might question whether Aristippus' work had the title *Περὶ Σωκράτους*; see the lists of Aristippus' writings in Diog. Laer. ii. 84–85.

The title that Angeli gives to the papyrus is also questionable. All that remains of the subscription is Φιλοδήμου Πρὸς τοὺς. Taking πρὸς as expressing opposition, Sbordone, and Vogliano before him, supplied σοφιστάς. Angeli, however, believing that Philodemus is addressing his associates, supplies ἑταίρους. But the Epicureans, so far as I can discover, did not address each other as *hetairoi*. In Epicurus, frag. 119 Arrighetti, *hetairos* does not refer to a member of the school, and the *hetairos* of Diogenes of Oenoanda (frag. 16 I 11 Chilton) is beginning the study of philosophy and is not committed to Epicureanism. The feminine *hetaira*, courtesan, was used in attacks on the school (see Plut. *Mor.* 1129B, Diog. Laer. x.6), and Angeli introduces ἑταῖρα as a conjecture in 1005. The similar entry in Usener's *Glossarium Epicureum* is also a conjecture. But even if these conjectures should be correct, they give no support to the view that the Epicureans addressed each other as *hetairoi*. When Epicurus wrote to his followers he called them *philo*.

Another uncertainty bearing on Angeli's title is the question whether in this papyrus Philodemus is addressing one person or a group. Some of the second-person forms are singular, some plural. Angeli's solution is that he is addressing a group but sometimes limits his address to one member of the group. Possibly, but since πρὸς is ambiguous, it is better to leave the question of the title unanswered.

The papyri in vols. 8 and 9 are better known for their literary quotations than for their Epicurean doctrine. PHerc. 1012 (vol. 8) lacks author and title, but content, style, and peculiarities of orthography identify it as the work of Demetrius Lacon, an Epicurean of the late second century B.C. In it Demetrius clarifies passages in Epicurean texts that suffer from ambiguities, variant readings, unfamiliar words, and seeming contradictions. As a means of clarification he quotes passages from Homer, Empedocles, the three tragedians, and Callimachus. There are quotations also from two Hippocratic works and from Apollonius Empiricus. These quotations are not newly discovered, but Puglia offers new readings and new identifications. One of the latter was first made by A. Roselli in *Cron. Erc.* 18 (1988) 53. The words Μυκτῆρ ἐν τούτοις ἀπ[ο]στάζων ἀλέθειον (col. XVIII.12–13) are not from a lost tragedy, as Crönert had supposed, but from Hippocrates, *Prorrhet.* i.1. Demetrius' use of the technical

language of rhetoricians and grammarians in his discussion of quoted passages reveals a critical activity that must have been influenced by Alexandrian scholarship; and indeed in col. XXII he mentions by name Ἀριστοφ[άνης ὁ γ]ραμματικός.

PHerc. 1014 (vol. 9) has a subscription that identifies the author and title as Demetrius, *On Poems*, Book II. It was thought by some to be the work of the Peripatetic Demetrius of Byzantium, but Romeo, following Crönert, has made a convincing case, on the basis of internal evidence, that the author is Demetrius Lacon. PHerc. 188, the other papyrus in this volume, lacks a subscription, but it also is assigned to Demetrius Lacon on the basis of internal evidence; and since it is on poems, the assumption, first made by Crönert, is that it is from the first book of Demetrius' *On Poems*. PHerc. 188 is in poor condition. Seven of its 19 fragmentary columns are now published for the first time. It contains a criticism of the views of Andromenides, of uncertain date, who is mentioned also in other Herculanean papyri.

It is 1014 that contains quotations from poets and prose writers. Most were already known, but there are some major changes. The verses in col. LXIII, with a few new readings, are still assigned to Alcaeus (frag. 358 Voigt), but Aeschylus, Archilochus, and Democritus are replaced by an *incertus auctor*. Two other citations, of uncertain authorship, are identified for the first time, and a third is tentatively assigned to Sophron.

Demetrius refers to his critical activity as ζήτησις πραγματική. Puglia and Romeo see in this phrase an instance of Epicurean empiricism. If an empirical inquiry into texts is one that solves textual problems by collecting similar texts from which to draw inferences, then indeed Demetrius is using an empirical method, for this is precisely the way he proceeds in 1012 and 1014.

These four volumes may be read on two levels. We must accept the editors' reports of the letters they have seen on the papyri and thank them for performing a difficult task. They deserve our thanks also for restorations and interpretations that make significant advances in the understanding of these papyri. But this part of the task, as they themselves recognize, is not yet finished. The reader still encounters clusters of letters that have not yet been molded into words, and some of the restorations and interpretations are not wholly convincing. An example is the meaning of ὑπηναντίωται in 1012, col. LVII. It occurs in a discussion of the question whether sense-perceptions are true or false and is followed by the clause "for he says that some sense-perceptions are true and some are false." Puglia takes the verb as passive and translates "sono . . . contrapposte." But might not the verb be middle, with a reference to the logicians' ὑπεναντία? "He has made them subcontraries; for he says that. . ."

In 1014, col. XXXIII, Demetrius quotes a passage in which, he tells us, a person is compared to the rising of a star. Romeo's text is ἀστ[ρου] . . . ἐπιτολήν. Her commentary mentions several similar metaphors, but in each case the word is ἀστήρ, not ἀστρον. Why not ἀστ[έρος] here?

In 1014, col. LII is the phrase τὸ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶ[σ]ιν [ὅ]πουσιν[ε]γγμόν, ἔχον. . . . Romeo concludes from this that the *hapax* ὑποσυριγγμόν is a neuter noun. *LSJ* erred in making it masculine. But is it necessarily neuter? Demetrius is here listing the last three parts of the Pythian nome. After the σπονδῆον the composer composed, ἐπόησεν, the part, μέρος, called καταχόρηον (the spellings are characteristic of the writings of Demetrius). Then comes the phrase quoted above. The syntax calls for the accusative governed by the preceding ἐπόησεν, and τὸ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν is the final μέρος. ὑποσυριγγμόν is then in apposition to the implied μέρος, and ἔχον modifies μέρος. "The last (part) of all, (called) sibilant, that has (the dragon's last hisses)." It is therefore possible, even probable, that the accusative ὑποσυριγγμόν is masculine, consistent with the gender of συριγγμός.

Col. XV in 1027, part of the attack on Praxiphanes, contains a sentence with the structure νομίζω φανερόν γεγόνέναι διότι . . . καὶ ὥς. . . . Capasso translates διότι *per quale motivo*. But may not διότι be in place of ὅτι? Capasso notes in his introduction that Carneiscus was careful to avoid hiatus. In that case we cannot infer that Carneiscus had made it clear why Praxiphanes erred so badly, but only that he did.

These are some of the kinds of questions raised by these texts. Truly, in working with the Herculanean papyri one must sometimes, in Romeo's words, *concludere aporeticamente*.

PHILLIP DE LACY

BARNEGAT LIGHT, NEW JERSEY

LEOFRANC HOLFORD-STREVENS. Aulus Gellius. Chapel Hill, NC, University of North Carolina Press, 1989. Pp. xvii & 284. Cloth, \$49.95.

Aulus Gellius charmed this reviewer in her student days because he was both learned and humane: in Leofranc Holford-Strevens (henceforward H-S) Gellius has found a scholar-critic whose humanity matches his own and whose learning undoubtedly exceeds it. From the affectionate elegiac dedication through the many wise *obiter dicta* to his appendix on editions and translations into eight languages, H-S involves his heart and his considerable wit in every aspect of Gellius and his Nach- (or Nacht-?) Leben. Like his subject H-S has a generous concept of relevance, but even when his learning races ahead out of sight his interest communicates itself and spurs the reader on.

Despite Marshall's useful Oxford Text (1968) Gellius has been neglected in this generation; omitted from Scribner's *Ancient Writers* (New York 1982), receiving only two pages in the *Cambridge History of Classical Literature* (also 1982), Gellius is the subject of only one brief English monograph—Barry Baldwin's modest *Studies in Aulus Gellius* (Coronado 1975).

Now we have the definitive study, articulated in three parts: sixty pages on

Gellius' life and the form and purpose of his book: more than fifty on his teachers, models and other contemporaries, and the bulk of the work (115–236) on Gellius' material, its origin, nature and significance. This helpful division enables H–S to illuminate the *Noctes Atticae*, through his study of ancient miscellanies and by comparison between the texts and testimonia of Gellius' contemporaries and their representation in the *NA*.

H–S restores the belief in Gellius' African origin, dates his birth between 125 and 128, and sets the final reworking of *NA* after 177. His views are now endorsed by Richard Goulet (*Dictionnaire des Philosophes Antiques* I [CNRS Paris 1989] 680) who differs from H–S only in arguing for a parallel rather than dependent relationship between Apuleius and Gellius, whereas H–S (identifying Apuleius with the "highly cultured youth" of *NA* 19.11.3) makes a case for early acquaintance and possibly continued mutual influence through correspondence.

The "more than thirty years" (15) of composition may help to explain the transformation of what began as an artistic Miscellany into something more like Memoirs: certainly the autobiographical elements in the twenty books begin sparsely (from book 1, we learn only of Gellius' time as a house-guest of Herodes at Cephisia, and of indefinite scenes he witnessed as a pupil, or at the praetor's tribunal), becoming more frequent in the last few books. Even so, much of it is fictitious autobiography. As H–S comments, "what Gellius says is no guide to what he does," and his dramatized dialogues aim at "verisimilitude rather than historicity."

In part II the texts of surviving authors such as Favorinus (72–92, surely a definitive appraisal) and Fronto are adduced to show how their style, behavior and opinions in *NA* differed from those reflected in their own writings. Gellius is detected attributing his own views and values to his role models, putting expertise in Roman institutions and Latin linguistic history into the mouths of Greeks to whom they would be of marginal interest. Thus Fronto's first appearance in 2.26, where he out-argues Favorinus in a dispute over Latin color terms, is revealed as a Gellian fiction, the vehicle for his own learning and his admiration for Virgil (47, 97, cf. H–S's "Fact and Fiction in Aulus Gellius," *LCM* 7 [1982] 65). H–S is equally skeptical of the fictional *alazones*—grammarians or philosophers (cf. Goulet 685–86) who provide Gellius' heroes with their easy victories. In particular, he suggests, the *librum . . . doctrinae omnigenus ut ipse dicebat praescatentem* (*NA* 14.6) is certainly not the *Pantodapê historia* of Favorinus, but probably (82–83) invented by Gellius to distinguish what he perceived as useless pedantry from the (not very different) material that he transmitted *quasi libamenta ingenuarum artium* (*Praef.* 13).

The ancient Miscellany was to some extent a literary equivalent of the cultural "show and tell" of the symposium, as H–S illustrates from Gellius' account of his student celebration of the Saturnalia in *NA* 18.2. But miscellany fed on miscellany: considering, for instance, that the *Hypomnemata* written by the Alexandrian lady Pamphile (on whom see Regenbogen, *RE* 18.3 [1949] 321–

23) in the reign of Nero had already been excerpted by Favorinus before Gellius (who cites her at 15.17 and 23) and would be excerpted again by Sopater, it is clear that we can hardly distinguish between second-hand and third-hand information in *NA*, though we may put more faith in Gellius' exact verbal references.

Rejecting Gellius' claim to *ordine rerum fortuito*, H-S illustrates his practice of "deliberate disruption" by separating out material extracted from a single source, and his careful choice of significant opening chapters for each book. Thus *NA* 4.1, Favorinus' triumph over an illiterate grammarian in *Socraticum modum*, serves to vindicate for the study of *grammar* the philosophical standards that Cicero in his day vindicated for rhetoric.

Within each book arrangement resembles a patch-work quilt, and a survey of *variatio* in book I confirms the studied nature of Gellius' disarray. A first "parade" series of ten chapters is framed by the sequence of Pythagorean material followed by a scene of rebuke to a foolish student that recurs from 1.1 and 2 (Herodes and the young Stoic) to 1.9 and 10 (Favorinus and the archaizer). Gellius uses 1.2 to define himself socially and intellectually (as traveller to Greece *ob capiendum ingenii cultum*). He introduces Herodes, Favorinus, Julianus, Castricius and Taurus, offers material on ethics (1.2, 3 and 9), Cicero and his language (1.3, 4 and 7), *mos maiorum*, (the censor "Numidicus" on marriage), and Greek biographical anecdotes (1.5 and 8, the latter from Sotion's miscellany). The same artful disorder recurs in the second sequence (from 1.11–26) so that the complete book combines real-life dialogue (1.2, 4, 6, 9, 10, 22, 26), acknowledged paraphrase and quotations from recent and current writers (Plutarch, 1.1, 3 and 26; Sotion 1.8; Favorinus 1.3, 10, 15, 21, Arrian 1.10), discussions of classical texts (Cicero, 1.3, 4, 7; Virgil, 1.21), and a run of scholarly information drawn from Varro (1.16, 17, 18, 20, 24, 25), Hyginus (1.14 and 21), and Opilius (1.25). In subject categories ethics (1.2, 3, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 26) and grammar (etymology, semantics, syntax, 1.4, 7, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 25) predominate over Roman antiquity (1.6, 12, 14, 19, 23), and Greek cultural biography (1.5, 8, 11 and 17), while the last two chapters of the book affirm Gellius' standards as anthologist (citing Opilius' *Musae* in full to show he can be as fastidiously complete) and as student.

Gellius' concept of encyclopaedic learning differs, as H-S makes clear, from the nine Muses of Varro's *Disciplinae: grammatike* (both the study of language and *enarratio* of literary texts), Rhetoric and Dialectic, Geometry, Arithmetic, Astronomy and Music, with Medicine and Architecture. Thus the scale of H-S's chapters in part III, which follows the helpful organization of Elizabeth Rawson's *Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic* demonstrates the cultural bias of second-century Rome. Gellius' predominantly grammatical and rhetorical education makes room for history and law, as recommended by Cicero (*Orator* 120) and Quintilian (12.3 and 4) but stints the sciences: hence there are substantial chapters (9–12) on his linguistic and literary criticism (with a postscript on rhetorical theory at 215–18). Philosophy, virtually confined to ethics, earns a solid chapter, but as H-S notes, what passes in Gellius for

history is anecdotal and unsystematic. Gellius' interest in Law (well treated in 218–23) is shown to be more critical than his rather naïve approach to medicine, but his indifference to music, the visual arts and science deserves its relegation to “Weak spots and blindspots.” A shrewd excursus (212–14) balances Gellius' creditable indifference to magic and superstitious practices against his unthinking religious traditionalism: “the world and his life made sense enough: he is immune to *Angst*.”

Most of us first consult *NA* for testimonia to lost republican authors—Caecilius, Cato, Lucilius, Quadrigarius, Nigidius and the lost Varro—and on this material H–S offers detailed discussion with new evidence or arguments: he has more faith in Gellius as transmitter of learning than Jocelyn (see *Vir Bonus Discendi Peritus: BICS Suppl.* 51 [1988] 57–72) but singles out for praise (135) Gellius' independent judgment on etymology and—for a Roman—pioneering interest in syntax. On the scholarly prejudices of Gellius H–S notes his hostility to Verrius, Hyginus and Cornutus (119) and disagreement with negative criticism of Virgil, even from Probus (120, cf. 153–56). Certainly his literary criticism deserves H–S's gentle strictures “lacking comprehension of a poem as a whole . . . Gellius is the son of an age that judged the author by his words” (156). But these limitations are not peculiar to Gellius or his age: they persist in our own classical philology.

This book will challenge even the scholarly reader. Wasting no time on elementary or undisputed information, H–S delights in the problematic and ambiguous: indeed his erudition might dismay if it were not always enlivened by broad interpretive comment. Thus the minor complaints that follow can be blamed on my own deficiencies of learning. Precisely because H–S's discussions of specific passages are so valuable it is a great pity that there is no *Index Locorum*, forcing readers to make their own *Annotationes*: indeed the general index gives up “Varro” after two passages. Again it can be difficult to distinguish H–S's own judgment from reports of Gellius' views, and the allusive argumentation is sometimes compressed to the point of obscurity. At times, too, H–S explains *ignota per ignotiora*, or refers to material inaccessible outside Duke Humphrey or the Widener collections.

But given the complexity of reference and cross-reference it is an achievement of both author and editor that the sentences flow and the pages are clean and handsome; indeed I found only one confusing typographical error—the substitution of a semi-colon for an opening bracket (225 line 12). To me this book is a joy, as much for the mind of the modern writer as of his beloved ancient subject. I hope others will share my pleasure.

ELAINE FANTHAM

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

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ISSN 0002-9475

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Published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall, and Winter. The *American Journal of Philology* is indexed and abstracted in *International Bibliography of Periodical Literature*, *International Bibliography of Book Reviews*, *Arts and Humanities Citation Index*, *Book Review Index*, *Current Contents*, *Humanities Index*, *Philosopher's Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, *Linguistics and Language Behavior Abstracts*, *l'Année Philologique* and *Current Philosophy*.

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Subscriptions: \$59.00, institutions; \$22.00, individuals. Subscribers in Canada and Mexico add \$3.60 postage, outside North America, add \$8.00. Single issue \$7.50 each.

Subscriptions, address changes, advertising, and other business correspondence should be sent to The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 701 W. 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, Maryland 21211, U.S.A. Claims for replacements of missing issues must be received within three months (six months for foreign subscribers) following publication of the issue.

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Composition by Village Typographers, Inc.; printed by The Sheridan Press.

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984. TM

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
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
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


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